Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU600
2006-03-02 13:49:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

ALTERING THE DISCUSSION: EMBASSY PUBLIC

Tags:  OEXC SCUL PREL KMDR OPRC KPAO NP 
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VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKT #0600/01 0611349
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021349Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0552
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9287
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 9327
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 4251
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2237
UNCLAS KATHMANDU 000600 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA (CAMP, DONALD)
DEPT FOR SCA/PPD (SCHWARTZ, LARRY)
DEPT FOR SCA/INS (GOWER, MOLLY)
DEPT FOR PA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OEXC SCUL PREL KMDR OPRC KPAO NP
SUBJECT: ALTERING THE DISCUSSION: EMBASSY PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY SPURS MEDIA INTROSPECTION ABOUT MAOIST
INTENTIONS

REFS: A) KATHMANDU 000552

B) KATHMANDU 000107
C) KATHMANDU 000244
D) KATHMANDU 000379
E) KATHMANDU 000450
F) KATHMANDU 000390

SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS KATHMANDU 000600 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA (CAMP, DONALD) DEPT FOR SCA/PPD (SCHWARTZ, LARRY) DEPT FOR SCA/INS (GOWER, MOLLY) DEPT FOR PA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OEXC SCUL PREL KMDR OPRC KPAO NP SUBJECT: ALTERING THE DISCUSSION: EMBASSY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SPURS MEDIA INTROSPECTION ABOUT MAOIST INTENTIONS REFS: A) KATHMANDU 000552 B) KATHMANDU 000107 C) KATHMANDU 000244 D) KATHMANDU 000379 E) KATHMANDU 000450 F) KATHMANDU 000390 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. In a case study of the value of public diplomacy, the Embassy has recently waged a broad and largely effective public discussion about the goals and intentions of the country's Maoist insurgents. Our centerpiece was a February 15 speech by Ambassador Moriarty that raised concrete questions about Maoist intentions and warned that the Parties' partnership with the insurgents was "wrongheaded" and even dangerous for the major political parties. The address ignited a wave of media coverage, commentary, and news articles in Nepal that has yet to abate. To keep the argument going, the Embassy sent letters under the Ambassador's name to editors of major newspapers critical of the speech, and the Ambassador conducted lengthy interviews with two major broadcast media outlets. Our efforts followed several weeks of media statements and interviews of top Maoist leaders, (Refs B, C, D, E) who touted their desire for peace and democracy (but also made some chilling statements that Nepal media commentators often overlooked). ¶2. The Ambassador's speech caused media and public attention to refocus on Maoist intentions, reviving "a sort of introspection everywhere," as one commentator put it. The address also spurred the Maoist second-in- command to publish two lengthy op-eds in response. While much media commentary attacked the Ambassador and U.S. policy for allegedly hindering the parties' attempt to bring the insurgents into the political mainstream and ending Nepal's 10-year insurgency, the speech and ensuing media interventions clearly have caused media opinion makers to re-examine and question the sincerity and goals of the Maoist insurgents. This soul-searching has intensified as Maoist violence in the countryside has mounted. END SUMMARY. A Speech that Questions Maoist Intentions. -------------- ¶3. Ambassador Moriarty's speech on February 15, "Nepal's Political Crisis: A Look Back, A Look Forward," ignited
;a continuing chain of news articles, editorials, letters to editors, and commentaries - including at least two by a senior Maoist leader - in Nepal's media. The Ambassador's speech, coming one week after Nepal's failed nationwide municipal elections (Ref F) and two weeks after the first anniversary of King Gyanendra's seizure of power, was much anticipated by Nepal media. This was the Ambassador's first policy address in six months, and coming as it did so soon after the February 8 municipal elections, the media no doubt expected strong criticism of the King, his failed rule, and his failure to reconcile with the political parties. The speech included all of that, but the news for reporters and editors was the strong questioning of Maoist intentions and the warning to the parties that, instead of leading the insurgents back to the political mainstream, the parties themselves were in danger of being co-opted by partners committed to using violence to topple Nepal's government. The speech urged the King to reach out to the parties to find a way to return to democracy and also effectively address the Maoist insurgency. . And Conventional Wisdom -------------- ¶4. The questioning of Maoist intentions and the cautionary note about the insurgents-parties understanding went against conventional editorial wisdom of most independent media. Editors had embraced the 12- point understanding signed between the seven major political parties and the Maoists in November, which promised to establish "absolute democracy by ending autocratic monarchy." Editors, exhausted by the bloody 10-year Maoist insurgency and incensed at the King's authoritarian rule (and harassment and pressure on independent media),had touted the understanding as Nepal's best chance for peace and democracy. They harshly criticized the Ambassador for warning against Maoist intentions and for arguing that the insurgents seek to bring the parties closer to their violent orbit. To keep the debate going in days after the speech, PAS sent letters under the Ambassador's signature to three leading newspapers - Kantipur (Nepali language, circulation 150,000); The Kathmandu Post (English language, circ. 30,000); and The Himalayan Times, (English language, circulation 40,000). All were published. In still wider interventions, the Ambassador gave an interview to BBC's popular Nepali Service, which aired across the county on the February 18-19 weekend. And, on February 26 in prime time, popular Kantipur TV's "Frontline" political talk show aired a 40-minute interview with the Ambassador, focusing largely on points raised in the speech. In short, in the 10-day period after the speech, the Embassy mounted a public diplomacy full court press, responding to critics and repeating points of concern about Maoist intentions. The Maoist Response -------------- ¶5. Media reaction to the speech has continued daily, with editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editors taking issue with or mentioning points from the Ambassador's speech, his letters, his BBC interview, or his TV appearance. In an unusual response, Maoist second-in- command Baburam Bhattarai published two lengthy responses to the Ambassador's speech. The first, "On Moriarty's Pontification," appeared in the February 23 Kathmandu Post (Ref A). The second, "Why So Excited, Mr. Ambassador?," appeared in the March 1 editions of Jana Aashta weekly newspaper (Nepali language, circ.: 10,000). The Maoist leader called the speech "vitriolic" and the BBC interview "provocative" and took issue with various parts of the address. In publishing these rejoinders, though, the Maoist leader unintentionally appears to have confirmed the effectiveness of our efforts to effectively raise questions about the Maoists and their goal to secure power. The Message Getting Heard. -------------- ¶6. To be fair, independent media, particularly the large Kantipur Group (including Kantipur TV, Kantipur FM, The Kathmandu Post, and Kantipur newspaper -- the nation's largest) have provided their audiences ample opportunity to access the Ambassador's thoughts. On February 16, Nepali-language Kantipur published the entire text of the speech, translated by PAS. On February 27, it published a transcript of the Ambassador's interview on Kantipur TV. And while The Kathmandu Post and many of its op-eds have strongly criticized the Ambassador's remarks, the paper has continued to report Maoist attacks and atrocities since the insurgents broke their self-imposed four-month ceasefire on January 2. . And Understood -------------- ¶7. Encouragingly, the Post also heard the Ambassador's message. In a lead editorial on March 1, the newspaper took note of recent Maoist violence and commented: "When the international community has been claiming that the [Maoist] party is more a terrorist outfit than a political organization, it (the recent Maoist violence) has only provided credibility to that voice.. When the Maoists were required to show their humane face, and to show intention to join the mainstream, they have taken just the opposite route." It urged the insurgents to renounce violence "and show their commitment to join the political mainstream." ¶8. In a March 2 op-ed in the same newspaper, lawyer- commentator Bipin Adhikari wrote approvingly of the Ambassador's speech, noting: "Moriarty's remarks have revived a sort of introspection everywhere, and many politicians are already trying to respond [to] him with a sort of vague denial. He has at once reminded many in the diplomatic community circle in Kathmandu, and the international donors, that the United States stands for a democratic future of this country and does not accept their vacillating stance vis-...-vis the Maoists and the political parties." Winning the Battle of the Polls -------------- ¶9. One interesting (if unscientific) sign of the impact of the Embassy's public diplomacy effort has been an online poll by The Nepali Times, a 15,000 circulation, English-language, generally respected weekly journal of news and opinion. The poll has appeared for almost a week on nepalnews.com, the leading news portal in Nepal. The poll asks if visitors agree with recent statements by Ambassador Moriarty on the Maoists. As of late March 1, the response from 5,880 respondents was: Yes, 50.9 percent; No, 45.6 percent; and Don't Know, 3.5. Similarly, a Himalayan Times article on February 28 quoted a political party official cautioning against Maoist figure Bhattarai's comments on "bourgeois democracy." The Ambassador had raised exactly that issue in his interview on Kantipur TV on February 26. And a western wire service reporter based in Kathmandu told the PAO he had never seen such intense media reaction to an ambaQadorial speech, and added: "It does really seem to have hit home." COMMENT -------------- ¶10. Our two-week public diplomacy offensive did generate commentary that initially seemed to focus more on U.S. intentions in Nepal, and these were frequently dubbed nefarious. But our efforts clearly pushed the media to begin to question more seriously the goals and violent actions of the Maoists. Even as they have blasted U.S. policy, commentators repeated our questions about the insurgents or asked new ones. This is positive, as independent media opinion makers had greeted the parties- Maoists partnership almost with euphoria and had willingly overlooked uncomfortable statements and actions by the Maoists that undercut the insurgents' purported peace-and-democracy credentials. The mission's public diplomacy campaign challenged this attitude, forcing opinion makers to respond to the assertions made in the Ambassador's speech, letters, and broadcast interviews. Moreover, our efforts countered a media blitz by the Maoists, who -- in granting interviews with their leaders and publishing op-eds by one of them -- had shown dexterity in the war of ideas. We believe the questions the Embassy raised publicly about the Maoists and their intentions will continue to resonate, helping pressure the parties and their media supporters to question seriously the intentions of the Maoists. MORIARTY

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