INDIAN AMBASSADOR: SUMMIT AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY TO

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 000566 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR MILLARD/RICHELSOPH DEPT FOR SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PINS IN NP SUBJECT: INDIAN AMBASSADOR: SUMMIT AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESSURE KING REF: KATHMANDU 473 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee believes it important that we show the King and the people of Nepal that we remain closely lashed up with respect to handling the situation here. In a February 27 conversation, Mukherjee suggested that it would be particularly useful if the President and Prime Minister Singh discussed Nepal during their upcoming conversations and pointed out that fact publicly. Mukherjee agreed that pressure was building on King Gyanendra and hoped that staying the course and encouraging peaceful activities by the parties would lead to positive change; he shied away from my suggestions that the GOI might consider options to significantly up the ante on the King. Mukherjee noted that he had been pushing Nepal's political parties to push the Maoists in a peaceful direction and would urge India's intelligence agencies to begin giving a similarly tough message to the Maoists. Doing Good Work with the Political Parties -------------- ¶2. (C) I met with Indian Ambassador Mukherjee at his request on February 27. He began by pointing out that he had followed up on his commitment to encourage the political parties to press the Maoists to live up to their commitments regarding non-violence (ref.). He had told the parties that my public comments on the subject had merely reinforced the long-standing principle of the parties themselves that the Maoists would have to prove their sincerity not just through lip service, but also through actions on the ground. Some of the parties had pushed back at first, but all had eventually acknowledged the need to verify the sincerity of the Maoists. I replied that I had seen articles in the press that had made it clear that Mukherjee had been urging the parties to use their contacts with the Maoists to urge moderation, and I thanked him for his efforts in this regard. Keeping Pressure on the King -------------- ¶3. (C) Mukherjee readily agreed with my statement that the King appeared to be under increasing pressure both domestically and internationally. He noted that both China and Japan were increasingly pressing Gyanendra to compromise and that the King's domestic support continued to decline. The military was increasingly worried about the security situation and the lack of progress on the political front: the miserable showing by the RNA during the mid-February ambush in Nawalparasi District suggested that morale was alarming and could have a negative impact on morale. Meanwhile, the parties hoped to mobilize increasing numbers of people for their peaceful demonstrations in the coming weeks. ¶4. (C) I told Ambassador Mukherjee that there was considerable concern in Washington that, if the King did not begin to reconcile with the parties soon, the situation here might spin out of control. Mukherjee replied that many in New Delhi shared such concerns: he personally had told the Prime Minister during an early-February visit home that India needed to keep the pressure on the King, while not doing anything that could lead to serious advances by the Maoists. Mukherjee had insisted to the Prime Minister that, for now, the GOI had to wait and watch the situation in Nepal closely. By the end of April, Mukherjee speculated, it would be clearer whether the mounting pressure would convince the King to compromise, or whether the Maoists were able to convert their current momentum into serious gains. (Note: March and April are, with respect to the weather, the best months for demonstrations in the Kathmandu Valley. The parties have put in place stepped-up plans for peaceful protests during those E months, while the Maoists have announced a general strike for mid-March and a nationwide strike for early April. The Maoists will presumably enforce their strikes with violence.) Less Desirable Options -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Mukherejee agreed that both our governments would likely have to provide emergency assistance to the Nepali government if the security situation deteriorated dramatically in the coming weeks; we also agreed, however, that throwing the King a lifeline to save him from his own obstinacy would be a difficult policy prescription to follow in both Washington and New Delhi and would be accepted only in the face of a huge and immediate threat from the Maoists. In that context, I asked Mukherjee again whether he thought there would be any support in New Delhi for having Washington and New Delhi (and presumably London) issue an ultimatum to the King: either begin meaningful reconciliation with the parties immediately, or the international community would commence severe sanctions against his regime. I acknowledged that India would have to bear the brunt of implementing the most effective possible sanctions: seizing royal family assets, banning royal family travel, closing the border to trade. Mukherjee immediately replied that New Delhi would be very unlikely to agree to such a proposal: Prime Minister Singh had made it clear that the GOI should do nothing that would hurt the people of Nepal. Keeping the Intelligence Agencies in Line -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) I reminded Ambassador Mukherjee that Washington was becoming discomforted by all-too-credible rumors that Indian intelligence agencies were squiring the top leaders of the Maoists around New Delhi and arranging interviews for them. Mukherjee replied that he had neither the ability nor the desire to know exactly what the Indian intelligence agencies were up to. He added, however, that he would be communicating to those agencies that, in whatever contacts they had with the Maoists, they needed to stress: that the GOI would do everything necessary to prevent them from establishing a one-party dictatorship in Nepal; that they would be judged not by their statements, but by their actions; and that the only way they could return to the political mainstream in Nepal would be by foreswearing violence and abandoning their weapons. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) This was an encouraging meeting. Mukherjee clearly wanted to ensure that, on the eve of the President's visit to New Delhi, GOI and USG policy on Nepal were as much as possible in synch. I agree with him completely that the best means to keep productive pressure on the King is to make it clear that the leaders of our two countries are working together, and see eye-to-eye, on Nepal. MORIARTY