C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000047

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL NP
SUBJECT: UML WORRIED ABOUT KING MORE THAN MAOISTS

REF: A. 05 KATHMANDU 2956


B. 05 KATHMANDU 2969

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Arguing that the King forced the Maoists to end their
cease-fire, UML leader MK Nepal suggested to the Ambassador
on January 4 three scenarios in which the Parties would
chastise the Maoists for violence. The Ambassador countered
that there was no excuse for the resumption of violence. MK
Nepal agreed, and noted that the Parties "could not support
the path of violence." He argued, however, that the Maoists
would lose all support if they had no weapons, and therefore
concluded that the autocratic monarchy was a greater threat
than the Maoists. The Ambassador cautioned it was
short-sighted to say it was impossible for the Maoists to
take over. Saying it would be "suicidal" for Maoists to
attack American interests, MK Nepal dismissed any fear that
the Maoists had changed their policy of not targeting
Americans. End Summary.

Maoist Tripwires
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2. (C) MK Nepal, UML leader, told the Ambassador on January 4
that the Parties still supported the 12-point understanding
despite the end of the cease-fire, but were concerned about
the Maoist's return to violence. In response to the
Ambassador's question, he outlined three cases in which the
Parties would chastise the Maoists for violence: 1) if the
Maoists disrupted the political parties and restricted their
activities in the countryside; 2) if the Maoists "went mad"
and killed indiscriminately; and 3) if the Maoists targeted
for assassination non-combatant civilians, including
government officials. The Ambassador said he hoped to see a
clear statement from the Parties if the Maoists violated
these principles.

There Can Be No Excuse for Violence
--------------


3. (C) MK Nepal said the Parties had encouraged the Maoists
to extend the cease-fire, but the government was attacking
the Maoist cadre and the Parties could not protect them.

Thus the King's lack of reciprocation had forced the Maoists
to act. The Ambassador countered by quoting the USG January
3 statement, saying "there can be no excuse for the
resumption of violence." MK Nepal agreed, saying the Parties
"could not support the path of violence." He noted that the
Parties had "tried our best to solve the problem through a
political solution."

UML Worried about King More Than Maoists
--------------


4. (C) MK Nepal admitted that the Maoists "might betray" the
Parties. But, he said that the Maoists could not capture
Kathmandu to establish a regime, as neither the international
community (India, China, EU and US) nor the people in Nepal
would accept a Maoist government. He added that even if
Maoists captured the capital, "they certainly could not keep
it." He said that the Parties did not fear Maoist ideology
but they feared the autocratic rule of the King. He said
people were no longer wondering when the King would reach out
to the Parties, and instead doubted he would do so at all.
According to MK Nepal, the King was on his own path. In
contrast, he said that without modern weapons the Maoists
would loose all support. Arguing that "the enemy of my enemy
is my friend," he noted that the Maoists also wanted an end
to the autocratic monarchy. In response, the Ambassador
cautioned that it was short-sighted to say there was no way
for the Maoists to take over. He noted that the Maoists
seemed to care little about the international community and
he reminded MK Nepal that Maoists had taken up arms in 1996
against a ruling multi-party Parliamentary democracy, not
against a royal autocracy. He suggested it was unlikely the
Maoists would surrender their guns voluntarily. MK Nepal
countered that the Maoists were "gradually changing their
thinking" and now the Parties were watching to see a "change
in behavior." The Ambassador cautioned that Maoist rhetoric
of change might only be tactical.

Maoists Won't Target Americans
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5. (C) Referring to the UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights' (OHCHR) December 28 statement that the
Maoist leadership had given assurances that they had not
instructed cadre to abduct or kill as part of their
anti-election plan (ref A), MK Nepal said that the Maoists
"lied to the UN." He also worried that the Maoist leadership
could not control "irresponsible behavior at the grassroots
level." However, taking up a point raised by the CDA on
December 30 (ref B), MK Nepal dismissed the notion that the
Maoists might target Americans. He said he had repeatedly
warned the Maoists "not to make too many enemies" and that it
would be "suicidal" for Maoists to attack American interests.
Referring to the September 2004 bombing of the American
Center, MK Nepal said "the Maoists learned what not to do
from past mistakes." He said the Maoists had assured him
that attacking Americans was not their policy then or now.

Comment
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6. (C) Because he wants to believe, MK Nepal sees a change in
Maoist thinking and action. However, Post finds little
evidence to support this. Post is not sure whether he made
up on the spot the three scenarios under which he would
criticize the Maoists, but we are glad to see that he
acknowledges that there must be some limit to Maoist violence
and that he understands that the international community
cannot tolerate Maoist atrocities.
MORIARTY