BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE SKEPTICAL OF U.S. POSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000465

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NP
SUBJECT: BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE SKEPTICAL OF U.S. POSITION
ON MAOISTS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, reasons 1.4 (b/d)

BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE FOR THREE-WAY TALKS
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1. (C) In a February 15 conversation, Anthony Stokes, head of
the South Asia Group of the British Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, questioned the Ambassador's urging reconciliation
between the Parties and Palace before engaging the Maoists.
Stokes pushed instead to start a three-way negotiation
process among the Parties, King, and Maoists. Stokes
believed that three-way talks were the quickest way to
resolve the political impasse and to address the Maoist
insurgency. He suggested that the Ambassador's position
amounted to requiring the Royal Nepalese Army to take back
all Maoist-controlled territory before the Maoists could be
engaged in talks. In contrast, a negotiating process itself
might be able to force the Maoists toward moderation.

AMBASSADOR REAFFIRMS U.S. POLICY ON RECONCILIATION
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2. (C) While agreeing that contact with the Maoists and
exploring their positions was acceptable, the Ambassador
explained that three-way talks now would only benefit the
Maoists. The Ambassador explained that the Maoists had given
no indication that they were willing to lay down their arms;
insurgent groups that believed they were winning their
struggle seldom agreed to abandon their ultimate goal. He
commented that the Maoist's were now clearly indicating an
intent to pursue a strategy similar to Lenin's model of
revolution. The Lenin model called for the Maoists to retain
a monopoly of violence within the revolutionary forces as
they worked together to topple the government, following
which the Maoists would topple their revolutionary partners -
the Parties. The Ambassador opined that, if the Maoists did
not succeed in fomenting a violent revolution in the next few
months, they might change tactics. He cautioned that, even
if the Maoists agreed to constituent assembly elections, they
had made it clear they ultimately intended to keep their
arms. The Ambassador stated that the international community
needed to urge reconciliation of the legitimate political
forces so that a stable government could form and start
providing security and services to all Nepali people. This
would erode people's support for the Maoists and Maoist
ability to control territory in Nepal.

COMMENT
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3. (C) Stokes' comments serve as a reminder of the need for
the USG to continue to work with British officials in
Kathmandu, London, and Washington to maintain a unified
policy on Nepal. Her Majesty's Government continues to
believe that beginning a process of negotiations with the
Maoists would resolve Nepal's constitutional and security
issues. We are not so sanguine and to date have seen nothing
to indicate that the Maoists are ready to abandon their quest
for absolute power.
MORIARTY