BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE SKEPTICAL OF U.S. POSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000465 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS NSC FOR RICHELSOPH E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV NP SUBJECT: BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE SKEPTICAL OF U.S. POSITION ON MAOISTS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, reasons 1.4 (b/d) BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE FOR THREE-WAY TALKS -------------- ¶1. (C) In a February 15 conversation, Anthony Stokes, head of the South Asia Group of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, questioned the Ambassador's urging reconciliation between the Parties and Palace before engaging the Maoists. Stokes pushed instead to start a three-way negotiation process among the Parties, King, and Maoists. Stokes believed that three-way talks were the quickest way to resolve the political impasse and to address the Maoist insurgency. He suggested that the Ambassador's position amounted to requiring the Royal Nepalese Army to take back all Maoist-controlled territory before the Maoists could be engaged in talks. In contrast, a negotiating process itself might be able to force the Maoists toward moderation. AMBASSADOR REAFFIRMS U.S. POLICY ON RECONCILIATION -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) While agreeing that contact with the Maoists and exploring their positions was acceptable, the Ambassador explained that three-way talks now would only benefit the Maoists. The Ambassador explained that the Maoists had given no indication that they were willing to lay down their arms; insurgent groups that believed they were winning their struggle seldom agreed to abandon their ultimate goal. He commented that the Maoist's were now clearly indicating an intent to pursue a strategy similar to Lenin's model of revolution. The Lenin model called for the Maoists to retain a monopoly of violence within the revolutionary forces as they worked together to topple the government, following which the Maoists would topple their revolutionary partners - the Parties. The Ambassador opined that, if the Maoists did not succeed in fomenting a violent revolution in the next few months, they might change tactics. He cautioned that, even if the Maoists agreed to constituent assembly elections, they had made it clear they ultimately intended to keep their arms. The Ambassador stated that the international community needed to urge reconciliation of the legitimate political forces so that a stable government could form and start providing security and services to all Nepali people. This would erode people's support for the Maoists and Maoist ability to control territory in Nepal. COMMENT -------------- ¶3. (C) Stokes' comments serve as a reminder of the need for the USG to continue to work with British officials in Kathmandu, London, and Washington to maintain a unified policy on Nepal. Her Majesty's Government continues to believe that beginning a process of negotiations with the Maoists would resolve Nepal's constitutional and security issues. We are not so sanguine and to date have seen nothing to indicate that the Maoists are ready to abandon their quest for absolute power. MORIARTY