Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU3324
2006-12-29 10:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
NEPAL: PEACE PROCESS MOVES FORWARD IN FITS AND
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003324
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PEACE PROCESS MOVES FORWARD IN FITS AND
STARTS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003324
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PEACE PROCESS MOVES FORWARD IN FITS AND
STARTS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) PM Koirala's foreign policy advisor told Charge
December 28 that the Government of Nepal would not promulgate
the interim constitution until UN arms management had begun
in earnest. Chalise noted that Koirala had charged Maoist
Supremo Prachanda with undermining the planned June 2007
Constituent Assembly elections by continuing Maoist
extortion. The Prime Minister had ordered Nepali Congress
cadre to the countryside and was pushing for the
reestablishment of Village Development Committees and police
posts to fill the security vacuum. He admitted that the PM
was beginning to realize the elections might have to be
postponed. Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D) President Deuba
expressed frustration December 27 to Charge that the PM's ill
health seemed to be prompting the PM to give the Maoists too
much in spite of their continuing abuses. He said he would
speak out, but could not afford to become isolated. On
December 28, senior NC, NC-D and Communist Party of Nepal -
United Marxist Leninist (UML) leaders voiced concern to
Charge about the GON's failure to establish law and order and
seemed resigned that the Maoists would retain the political
initiative. Meanwhile, the first UN arms monitors began
arriving in Kathmandu.
No New Constitution Until Arms Management In Earnest
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Dr. Suresh Chalise, PM Koirala's foreign policy
advisor, told Charge December 28 that the GON would not
promulgate the interim constitution until UN arms management
had begun in earnest, at the earliest after the arrival of
the first, full complement of UN arms monitors, expected
January 9. Chalise said that the GON would adhere strictly
to this timetable and insist that UN monitors and monitoring
equipment be up and running before pronouncing that arms
management had commenced and promulgating the interim
constitution as agreed with the Maoists on December 16. He
insisted that the GON would not permit Maoist entry into the
government until UN arms management (separation of the
People's Liberation Army combatants from their weapons and
registration of combatants) had concluded, which could be as
late as March 2007.
PM Koirala Talks Tough With Prachanda
--------------
3. (C) Chalise said that PM Koirala had stood up to Maoist
Supremo Prachanda in a recent meeting, insisting that
Prachanda order Maoist extortion and mayhem to stop, or risk
slippage of Constituent Assembly elections beyond the planned
June 2007 timeframe. The PM's advisor said that Prachanda's
response had been demure, including the Maoist leader
insinuating that he did not have complete control over Maoist
cadre, and that the December 19 nationwide strike had erupted
out of cadre enthusiasm. Chalise noted that the PM -- who is
also head of the Nepali Congress -- had ordered his party
cadre to deploy into the countryside to establish a presence
to counter the Maoists, to be complemented by the
reestablishment of police posts and the return of Village
Development Committee secretaries from district capitals to
their villages. The PM himself had just traveled to his home
of Biratnagar for several days for that purpose.
June Election Mission Impossible?
--------------
4. (C) The PM's advisor said that Koirala was seized with the
issue of law and order and eager to push a GON presence out
into the countryside to fill the security vacuum and begin
providing government services to the population. The PM
believed that this course of action offered the best prospect
of bolstering Nepali voters' confidence in the possibility of
a free and fair election and beginning preparations for the
elections. That said, Chalise continued, the PM was
beginning to accept the possibility that elections might need
to be postponed beyond June. Responding to Charge's urging
to reestablish law and order, Chalise reiterated that a
crackdown of Maoist misbehavior would have to wait for the
PLA to be fully in cantonment. He emphasized the delicacy of
the current situation.
Former PM Pessimistic
--------------
5. (C) NC-D President and former PM Deuba complained to
Charge December 27 that the Prime Minister's fears about his
own mortality were causing him to move the peace process
ahead too quickly. Deuba agreed with the Charge that it made
little sense to rush to bring the Maoists into an interim
government when they had yet to meet any of their previous
commitments. The NC-D President said he had spoken out in
the past and would continue to speak out about the need for
law and order and for an end to Maoist abuses, but he could
not afford politically to become isolated and identified as
opposing the peace process. In November the governing
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists had agreed to
promulgate the interim constitution once arms management was
complete, a position he, Deuba, had supported. Subsequently,
however, PM Koirala had reached a deal with Prachanda to
promulgate the document once arms management was under way.
If he objected, Deuba said, he could have taken the NC-D out
of the government, but that would not have been wise. SPA
unity was more important than ever. He had ordered his cadre
to go into the countryside and was about to leave on a trip
himself to southern Nepal.
SPA Leaders Also Not Optimistic
--------------
6. (C) Several senior leaders from the NC, UML, and NC-D, the
three strongest parties in the SPA, voiced their worries to
Charge December 28 about the GON's failure to enforce law and
order in the face of continuing Maoist abuses. NC Central
Committee Member Arjun Narsingh K.C. spoke of the Maoist
two-track strategy of claiming to want to enter the
democratic mainstream (in order to remain in the peace
process and win international support) while continuing their
extortion and violence. Several of the leaders commented
that the GON's failure to use its police powers forcefully
and soon enough in Nepalgunj, a city on Nepal's southern
Terai region on the border with India, had allowed the
Maoists to win popular acclaim by using their militia to
restore the peace. Nepalgunj was wracked by rioting early
the week of December 25 after a small SPA party, the Nepal
Sadbhabana Party, attempted to impose a general strike in the
city to protest the interim constitution's alleged failure to
address the concerns of Madhesis, Hindi-speaking residents of
the Terai. The leaders seemed resigned that the Maoists
would continue to outmaneuver the democratic parties.
Arms Monitoring Moves Forward
--------------
7. (C) Meanwhile, the first of the initial batch of 35 UN
arms monitors began arriving in Kathmandu. According to
press reports, six monitors -- 1 Canadian, 5 Jordanians --
reached the capital on December 28. An additional nine,
including Indonesians, Uruguayans and Guatemalans, were
expected the week of January 1. The GON had reportedly
received 500 applications for 111 positions for ex-Gurkhas to
work assisting the monitors with the process of separating
Maoist combatants from their arms and guarding the weapons
containers. The containers had already been delivered to
some of the seven main People's Liberation Army cantonment
sites, but lack of road access had prevented containers from
reaching other such sites. Local press also reported that
the UN, the GON and the Maoists were still in the process of
finalizing the 21 satellite cantonment sites.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) PM Koirala has reason to hurry the peace process
along. He is in poor health and has failed to groom a
successor. We do not ascribe to suggestions here that the
Maoists supported expanded powers for the Prime Minister in
the interim constitution negotiations because they expected
to inherit the office when Koirala dies. Nevertheless,
Prachanda, as the second-most dominant Nepali political
figure, will stand to gain the most from the Prime Minister's
death. We has also made very clear to the GON that it will
come under tremendous pressure to stand up the interim
government soon after it promulgates the interim constitution
and establishes the interim parliament -- regardless of
whether arms management is complete or not. As we look back
on 2006, it is evident that Nepal has made huge strides in
overcoming an 11-year Maoist insurgency, but many challenges
remain in 2007 if free and fair elections are to be held and
lasting democracy and peace are to be achieved.
DEAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PEACE PROCESS MOVES FORWARD IN FITS AND
STARTS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) PM Koirala's foreign policy advisor told Charge
December 28 that the Government of Nepal would not promulgate
the interim constitution until UN arms management had begun
in earnest. Chalise noted that Koirala had charged Maoist
Supremo Prachanda with undermining the planned June 2007
Constituent Assembly elections by continuing Maoist
extortion. The Prime Minister had ordered Nepali Congress
cadre to the countryside and was pushing for the
reestablishment of Village Development Committees and police
posts to fill the security vacuum. He admitted that the PM
was beginning to realize the elections might have to be
postponed. Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D) President Deuba
expressed frustration December 27 to Charge that the PM's ill
health seemed to be prompting the PM to give the Maoists too
much in spite of their continuing abuses. He said he would
speak out, but could not afford to become isolated. On
December 28, senior NC, NC-D and Communist Party of Nepal -
United Marxist Leninist (UML) leaders voiced concern to
Charge about the GON's failure to establish law and order and
seemed resigned that the Maoists would retain the political
initiative. Meanwhile, the first UN arms monitors began
arriving in Kathmandu.
No New Constitution Until Arms Management In Earnest
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Dr. Suresh Chalise, PM Koirala's foreign policy
advisor, told Charge December 28 that the GON would not
promulgate the interim constitution until UN arms management
had begun in earnest, at the earliest after the arrival of
the first, full complement of UN arms monitors, expected
January 9. Chalise said that the GON would adhere strictly
to this timetable and insist that UN monitors and monitoring
equipment be up and running before pronouncing that arms
management had commenced and promulgating the interim
constitution as agreed with the Maoists on December 16. He
insisted that the GON would not permit Maoist entry into the
government until UN arms management (separation of the
People's Liberation Army combatants from their weapons and
registration of combatants) had concluded, which could be as
late as March 2007.
PM Koirala Talks Tough With Prachanda
--------------
3. (C) Chalise said that PM Koirala had stood up to Maoist
Supremo Prachanda in a recent meeting, insisting that
Prachanda order Maoist extortion and mayhem to stop, or risk
slippage of Constituent Assembly elections beyond the planned
June 2007 timeframe. The PM's advisor said that Prachanda's
response had been demure, including the Maoist leader
insinuating that he did not have complete control over Maoist
cadre, and that the December 19 nationwide strike had erupted
out of cadre enthusiasm. Chalise noted that the PM -- who is
also head of the Nepali Congress -- had ordered his party
cadre to deploy into the countryside to establish a presence
to counter the Maoists, to be complemented by the
reestablishment of police posts and the return of Village
Development Committee secretaries from district capitals to
their villages. The PM himself had just traveled to his home
of Biratnagar for several days for that purpose.
June Election Mission Impossible?
--------------
4. (C) The PM's advisor said that Koirala was seized with the
issue of law and order and eager to push a GON presence out
into the countryside to fill the security vacuum and begin
providing government services to the population. The PM
believed that this course of action offered the best prospect
of bolstering Nepali voters' confidence in the possibility of
a free and fair election and beginning preparations for the
elections. That said, Chalise continued, the PM was
beginning to accept the possibility that elections might need
to be postponed beyond June. Responding to Charge's urging
to reestablish law and order, Chalise reiterated that a
crackdown of Maoist misbehavior would have to wait for the
PLA to be fully in cantonment. He emphasized the delicacy of
the current situation.
Former PM Pessimistic
--------------
5. (C) NC-D President and former PM Deuba complained to
Charge December 27 that the Prime Minister's fears about his
own mortality were causing him to move the peace process
ahead too quickly. Deuba agreed with the Charge that it made
little sense to rush to bring the Maoists into an interim
government when they had yet to meet any of their previous
commitments. The NC-D President said he had spoken out in
the past and would continue to speak out about the need for
law and order and for an end to Maoist abuses, but he could
not afford politically to become isolated and identified as
opposing the peace process. In November the governing
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists had agreed to
promulgate the interim constitution once arms management was
complete, a position he, Deuba, had supported. Subsequently,
however, PM Koirala had reached a deal with Prachanda to
promulgate the document once arms management was under way.
If he objected, Deuba said, he could have taken the NC-D out
of the government, but that would not have been wise. SPA
unity was more important than ever. He had ordered his cadre
to go into the countryside and was about to leave on a trip
himself to southern Nepal.
SPA Leaders Also Not Optimistic
--------------
6. (C) Several senior leaders from the NC, UML, and NC-D, the
three strongest parties in the SPA, voiced their worries to
Charge December 28 about the GON's failure to enforce law and
order in the face of continuing Maoist abuses. NC Central
Committee Member Arjun Narsingh K.C. spoke of the Maoist
two-track strategy of claiming to want to enter the
democratic mainstream (in order to remain in the peace
process and win international support) while continuing their
extortion and violence. Several of the leaders commented
that the GON's failure to use its police powers forcefully
and soon enough in Nepalgunj, a city on Nepal's southern
Terai region on the border with India, had allowed the
Maoists to win popular acclaim by using their militia to
restore the peace. Nepalgunj was wracked by rioting early
the week of December 25 after a small SPA party, the Nepal
Sadbhabana Party, attempted to impose a general strike in the
city to protest the interim constitution's alleged failure to
address the concerns of Madhesis, Hindi-speaking residents of
the Terai. The leaders seemed resigned that the Maoists
would continue to outmaneuver the democratic parties.
Arms Monitoring Moves Forward
--------------
7. (C) Meanwhile, the first of the initial batch of 35 UN
arms monitors began arriving in Kathmandu. According to
press reports, six monitors -- 1 Canadian, 5 Jordanians --
reached the capital on December 28. An additional nine,
including Indonesians, Uruguayans and Guatemalans, were
expected the week of January 1. The GON had reportedly
received 500 applications for 111 positions for ex-Gurkhas to
work assisting the monitors with the process of separating
Maoist combatants from their arms and guarding the weapons
containers. The containers had already been delivered to
some of the seven main People's Liberation Army cantonment
sites, but lack of road access had prevented containers from
reaching other such sites. Local press also reported that
the UN, the GON and the Maoists were still in the process of
finalizing the 21 satellite cantonment sites.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) PM Koirala has reason to hurry the peace process
along. He is in poor health and has failed to groom a
successor. We do not ascribe to suggestions here that the
Maoists supported expanded powers for the Prime Minister in
the interim constitution negotiations because they expected
to inherit the office when Koirala dies. Nevertheless,
Prachanda, as the second-most dominant Nepali political
figure, will stand to gain the most from the Prime Minister's
death. We has also made very clear to the GON that it will
come under tremendous pressure to stand up the interim
government soon after it promulgates the interim constitution
and establishes the interim parliament -- regardless of
whether arms management is complete or not. As we look back
on 2006, it is evident that Nepal has made huge strides in
overcoming an 11-year Maoist insurgency, but many challenges
remain in 2007 if free and fair elections are to be held and
lasting democracy and peace are to be achieved.
DEAN