Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU3274
2006-12-22 06:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
U.S., UK, INDIA, AND THE UN DIALOGUE ON SECURITY
VZCZCXRO2210 OO RUEHCI DE RUEHKT #3274/01 3560655 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 220655Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4288 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5185 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5451 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0623 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3453 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4814 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0734 RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY 2955 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1405 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2278 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003274
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NP UN
SUBJECT: U.S., UK, INDIA, AND THE UN DIALOGUE ON SECURITY
CHALLENGES AND POLICE SUPPORT
REF: KATHMANDU 3217
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003274
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NP UN
SUBJECT: U.S., UK, INDIA, AND THE UN DIALOGUE ON SECURITY
CHALLENGES AND POLICE SUPPORT
REF: KATHMANDU 3217
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) In a December 19 dialogue on security challenges and
police support, the U.S. and UK Ambassadors and Ian Martin,
the UN's Secretary General's Personal Representative to
Nepal, agreed that improved security across the countryside
in the next six to eight months would be vital for reducing
intimidation by Maoists in the lead-up to Constituent
Assembly elections. In a follow-on discussion with
Ambassador Moriarty on December 20, Indian Ambassador
Mukherjee said one of his top priorities was promoting the
re-establishment of police posts. All shared information on
planned priorities/programs to support the police. Martin
said the UN's technical assessment report would request eight
police advisors to assist with election security as part of
the UN's wider election and monitoring mandates. The
Ambassadors and Martin agreed to stay in touch as their plans
for police support and security sector reform developed.
Local Security Urgently Needed for Free and Fair Elections
-------------- --------------
2. (C) In a dialogue on security challenges and police
support December 19 between Ambassador Moriarty, UK
Ambassador Andrew Hall, and Ian Martin, the UN's Secretary
General's Personal Representative to Nepal, all expressed
shared concern that provision of local security in the
lead-up to elections had to be addressed urgently. If
Constituent Assembly elections were to be held in June or
shortly thereafter free from fear and intimidation, all
agreed, the police had to re-establish their presence across
the countryside. During the session, which Ambassador
Moriarty convened to encourage complementary approaches
between the U.S., the UK, India and the UN in policing and
security sector reform, participants agreed that civilian
leadership, namely the Home Ministry, had to be pushed to
provide stronger direction and support to the police force.
Ambassador Moriarty provided a read-out of the session on
December 20 to Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee who voiced
similar priorities. Despite clear language in the November
21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and November 28 Agreement on
the Management of Arms and Armies, Maoists continued to
interfere with the reinstatement of police posts, Ambassador
Moriarty noted.
U.S. Plans
--------------
3. (C) Ambassador Moriarty reiterated the U.S. belief that
the next six to eight months, preceding Constituent Assembly
elections and in their immediate aftermath, was a narrow
window of opportunity to put Nepal on a peaceful and
democratic path. The Ambassador told the other envoys that
he had sent a request to Washington for additional funds
needed during this timeframe for election support and
provision of local security and governance. The Ambassador
said that because of the terrorist designation, the U.S. was
restricted in engaging the Maoists and was unable to support
the cantonment process. Our value-added could be in
promoting improved security and governance at the local
level. The Ambassador also noted our newly-arrived
Department of Justice police advisor, who had a six-month
assignment to help the Nepali police with long-term strategic
planning. He also described ongoing U.S. training
opportunities for the police and an August seminar on
security sector reform that had included police participants.
UK Plans
--------------
4. (C) UK Ambassador Hall said that public safety and
security was one of the UK's top priorities for peace process
KATHMANDU 00003274 002 OF 003
support. He mentioned the UK's history of support to the
police, referencing former UK police advisor, Richard Miles.
Ambassador Hall said that, in the near-term, the UK planned
to shepherd all support through the Ministry of Finance's
Peace Fund. However, the UK would be deploying a small
assessment team the last week of January and first week of
February to determine possible UK support to the police for
election security and mid- to long-term support for police
reform and security sector reform. (Note: In subsequent
discussions with Emboff, a UK aid official said they would
likely provide general budget support to the police over a
five- to seven- year timeframe to implement a "reform-minded"
strategic plan. End note.)
UN Plans
--------------
5. (C) The UN Secretary General's Personal Representative
to Nepal, Ian Martin, said he hoped his mission would be able
to include a small number of police advisors (eight or more)
to assist at the national and regional level on election
security. Martin said the technical assessment mission from
New York that had just left KATHMANDU would include a
recommendation for police advisors in its final report to the
Secretary General. He emphasized that this would be a
SIPDIS
short-term assignment in the lead-up to the election to
bolster the police, and would be tied to the UN's broader
election and monitoring mandates. Additionally, he hoped to
deploy civil affairs personnel to complement military arms
monitors to look at issues such as local governance,
security, and policing. However, in a clear reference to
India, Martin expressed concern that some member states might
see the police advisory support as "mission creep." Martin
also wondered what the Home Ministry and Maoist reaction
would be to such a proposal. Ambassador Moriarty recommended
to Martin that he couch the request as having a focused
timeframe and limited mandate for election security planning.
Indian Plans
--------------
6. (C) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee said encouraging local
security and an expanded police presence in the countryside
in the lead-up to elections was one of his top priorities.
He said he planned to press the Home Ministry and Prime
Minister to insist on the re-opening of police posts and to
provide stronger direction and support to the police.
Ambassador Mukherjee said the Indians had paid for 250
vehicles and USD 12 million in communications equipment
requested by the police. The package is due to arrive in
three weeks. The Indians also continued to offer extensive
training opportunities for the police.
Political Will Needed to Empower the Police
--------------
7. (C) Ambassador Moriarty, Ambassador Hall, and Martin
expressed concern that the civilian leadership lacked
political will to empower the police. They speculated that
the Home Ministry and police were nervous to act without
Maoist buy-in. Ambassador Moriarty said the Maoists were
unlikely and unmotivated to support an increased police
presence because it would limit their freedom of action. In
follow-on discussions, Ambassador Mukherjee said that, during
recent travel outside of Kathmandu, he had witnessed a police
force even more paralyzed than in recent months ("more
pugnacious in their refusal to work"). One police leader in
the east told him that the police were frightened to act
against the Maoists because they still worried the Maoists
would take over the government and soon be their "bosses."
The UK Department for International Development's Alan
Whaites, who accompanied Ambassador Hall, commented that in
his consultations thus far with the police they seemed open
to support and reform. The challenge, he emphasized, was the
political will from civilian leadership to move forward.
Martin agreed that the blockages to a reinvigorated police
presence were "from above." Ambassador Moriarty, Ambassador
KATHMANDU 00003274 003 OF 003
Hall, and Martin agreed that the Indians had the greatest
ability to discuss frankly the need for civilian leadership
to empower and direct the police to stand up to Maoist
interference. The envoys also discussed coordinating
messaging on policing in support of India's lead.
More Communication Needed
--------------
8. (C) The UK Ambassador also cited a lack of communication
between the Home Ministry, security forces and the Election
Commission on plans for election security. Whaites said the
police, in their election security planning, assumed that the
election process would be phased, thus requiring less
manpower across the country. However, the Election
Commission was no longer considering a phased election but
rather a one-day event. Whaites said a country-wide election
on one day would require 65,000 police. Additional auxiliary
officers would have to be added to the existing police force
to reach these numbers. The group discussed ways to
encourage better intra-Nepali Government communication.
Trade-Off: Short-Term Security Needs and Longer-Term Reform
-------------- --------------
9. (SBU) Martin raised the trade-off between bringing new
recruits quickly into the police force to address urgent
needs and the mid- to long-term project of reforming Nepal's
security institutions. The U.S. and UK Ambassadors agreed
that a longer project of reform would need to be designed.
Ambassador Moriarty, however, stressed that the next six to
eight months had to be prioritized in order to make wider
reform efforts possible.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) The meetings were a good start to a dialogue
between the U.S., India, the UK, and the UN on policing and
security sector reform issues. It is reassuring that these
actors recognized the urgent need for re-establishment of
police presence. The U.S. should support the UN Mission's
bid to include police advisors within its mandate. However,
near-term contributions to the police are still paltry.
Eight UN police advisors, UK budget support to the peace
fund, and an Indian equipment package will not end the
paralysis of the police across the country, overcome Maoist
interference with establishment of police posts, or ensure
elections are free from intimidation. We will continue to
work with the Indians, the UK and the UN to deliver parallel
messages encouraging the Home Ministry to give the needed
mandate and direction to its police force. We will also
continue to explore avenues for supporting police planning
and presence for election security (reftel).
DEAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NP UN
SUBJECT: U.S., UK, INDIA, AND THE UN DIALOGUE ON SECURITY
CHALLENGES AND POLICE SUPPORT
REF: KATHMANDU 3217
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) In a December 19 dialogue on security challenges and
police support, the U.S. and UK Ambassadors and Ian Martin,
the UN's Secretary General's Personal Representative to
Nepal, agreed that improved security across the countryside
in the next six to eight months would be vital for reducing
intimidation by Maoists in the lead-up to Constituent
Assembly elections. In a follow-on discussion with
Ambassador Moriarty on December 20, Indian Ambassador
Mukherjee said one of his top priorities was promoting the
re-establishment of police posts. All shared information on
planned priorities/programs to support the police. Martin
said the UN's technical assessment report would request eight
police advisors to assist with election security as part of
the UN's wider election and monitoring mandates. The
Ambassadors and Martin agreed to stay in touch as their plans
for police support and security sector reform developed.
Local Security Urgently Needed for Free and Fair Elections
-------------- --------------
2. (C) In a dialogue on security challenges and police
support December 19 between Ambassador Moriarty, UK
Ambassador Andrew Hall, and Ian Martin, the UN's Secretary
General's Personal Representative to Nepal, all expressed
shared concern that provision of local security in the
lead-up to elections had to be addressed urgently. If
Constituent Assembly elections were to be held in June or
shortly thereafter free from fear and intimidation, all
agreed, the police had to re-establish their presence across
the countryside. During the session, which Ambassador
Moriarty convened to encourage complementary approaches
between the U.S., the UK, India and the UN in policing and
security sector reform, participants agreed that civilian
leadership, namely the Home Ministry, had to be pushed to
provide stronger direction and support to the police force.
Ambassador Moriarty provided a read-out of the session on
December 20 to Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee who voiced
similar priorities. Despite clear language in the November
21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and November 28 Agreement on
the Management of Arms and Armies, Maoists continued to
interfere with the reinstatement of police posts, Ambassador
Moriarty noted.
U.S. Plans
--------------
3. (C) Ambassador Moriarty reiterated the U.S. belief that
the next six to eight months, preceding Constituent Assembly
elections and in their immediate aftermath, was a narrow
window of opportunity to put Nepal on a peaceful and
democratic path. The Ambassador told the other envoys that
he had sent a request to Washington for additional funds
needed during this timeframe for election support and
provision of local security and governance. The Ambassador
said that because of the terrorist designation, the U.S. was
restricted in engaging the Maoists and was unable to support
the cantonment process. Our value-added could be in
promoting improved security and governance at the local
level. The Ambassador also noted our newly-arrived
Department of Justice police advisor, who had a six-month
assignment to help the Nepali police with long-term strategic
planning. He also described ongoing U.S. training
opportunities for the police and an August seminar on
security sector reform that had included police participants.
UK Plans
--------------
4. (C) UK Ambassador Hall said that public safety and
security was one of the UK's top priorities for peace process
KATHMANDU 00003274 002 OF 003
support. He mentioned the UK's history of support to the
police, referencing former UK police advisor, Richard Miles.
Ambassador Hall said that, in the near-term, the UK planned
to shepherd all support through the Ministry of Finance's
Peace Fund. However, the UK would be deploying a small
assessment team the last week of January and first week of
February to determine possible UK support to the police for
election security and mid- to long-term support for police
reform and security sector reform. (Note: In subsequent
discussions with Emboff, a UK aid official said they would
likely provide general budget support to the police over a
five- to seven- year timeframe to implement a "reform-minded"
strategic plan. End note.)
UN Plans
--------------
5. (C) The UN Secretary General's Personal Representative
to Nepal, Ian Martin, said he hoped his mission would be able
to include a small number of police advisors (eight or more)
to assist at the national and regional level on election
security. Martin said the technical assessment mission from
New York that had just left KATHMANDU would include a
recommendation for police advisors in its final report to the
Secretary General. He emphasized that this would be a
SIPDIS
short-term assignment in the lead-up to the election to
bolster the police, and would be tied to the UN's broader
election and monitoring mandates. Additionally, he hoped to
deploy civil affairs personnel to complement military arms
monitors to look at issues such as local governance,
security, and policing. However, in a clear reference to
India, Martin expressed concern that some member states might
see the police advisory support as "mission creep." Martin
also wondered what the Home Ministry and Maoist reaction
would be to such a proposal. Ambassador Moriarty recommended
to Martin that he couch the request as having a focused
timeframe and limited mandate for election security planning.
Indian Plans
--------------
6. (C) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee said encouraging local
security and an expanded police presence in the countryside
in the lead-up to elections was one of his top priorities.
He said he planned to press the Home Ministry and Prime
Minister to insist on the re-opening of police posts and to
provide stronger direction and support to the police.
Ambassador Mukherjee said the Indians had paid for 250
vehicles and USD 12 million in communications equipment
requested by the police. The package is due to arrive in
three weeks. The Indians also continued to offer extensive
training opportunities for the police.
Political Will Needed to Empower the Police
--------------
7. (C) Ambassador Moriarty, Ambassador Hall, and Martin
expressed concern that the civilian leadership lacked
political will to empower the police. They speculated that
the Home Ministry and police were nervous to act without
Maoist buy-in. Ambassador Moriarty said the Maoists were
unlikely and unmotivated to support an increased police
presence because it would limit their freedom of action. In
follow-on discussions, Ambassador Mukherjee said that, during
recent travel outside of Kathmandu, he had witnessed a police
force even more paralyzed than in recent months ("more
pugnacious in their refusal to work"). One police leader in
the east told him that the police were frightened to act
against the Maoists because they still worried the Maoists
would take over the government and soon be their "bosses."
The UK Department for International Development's Alan
Whaites, who accompanied Ambassador Hall, commented that in
his consultations thus far with the police they seemed open
to support and reform. The challenge, he emphasized, was the
political will from civilian leadership to move forward.
Martin agreed that the blockages to a reinvigorated police
presence were "from above." Ambassador Moriarty, Ambassador
KATHMANDU 00003274 003 OF 003
Hall, and Martin agreed that the Indians had the greatest
ability to discuss frankly the need for civilian leadership
to empower and direct the police to stand up to Maoist
interference. The envoys also discussed coordinating
messaging on policing in support of India's lead.
More Communication Needed
--------------
8. (C) The UK Ambassador also cited a lack of communication
between the Home Ministry, security forces and the Election
Commission on plans for election security. Whaites said the
police, in their election security planning, assumed that the
election process would be phased, thus requiring less
manpower across the country. However, the Election
Commission was no longer considering a phased election but
rather a one-day event. Whaites said a country-wide election
on one day would require 65,000 police. Additional auxiliary
officers would have to be added to the existing police force
to reach these numbers. The group discussed ways to
encourage better intra-Nepali Government communication.
Trade-Off: Short-Term Security Needs and Longer-Term Reform
-------------- --------------
9. (SBU) Martin raised the trade-off between bringing new
recruits quickly into the police force to address urgent
needs and the mid- to long-term project of reforming Nepal's
security institutions. The U.S. and UK Ambassadors agreed
that a longer project of reform would need to be designed.
Ambassador Moriarty, however, stressed that the next six to
eight months had to be prioritized in order to make wider
reform efforts possible.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) The meetings were a good start to a dialogue
between the U.S., India, the UK, and the UN on policing and
security sector reform issues. It is reassuring that these
actors recognized the urgent need for re-establishment of
police presence. The U.S. should support the UN Mission's
bid to include police advisors within its mandate. However,
near-term contributions to the police are still paltry.
Eight UN police advisors, UK budget support to the peace
fund, and an Indian equipment package will not end the
paralysis of the police across the country, overcome Maoist
interference with establishment of police posts, or ensure
elections are free from intimidation. We will continue to
work with the Indians, the UK and the UN to deliver parallel
messages encouraging the Home Ministry to give the needed
mandate and direction to its police force. We will also
continue to explore avenues for supporting police planning
and presence for election security (reftel).
DEAN