PEACE PROCESS: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003199

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert told
the Ambassador December 8 that the Government of Nepal (GON),
the Maoists and the UN had established an effective working
group to handle the nitty-gritty of the People's Liberation
Army cantonments. The approximately USD 2.4 million in cash
that the GON had already provided to the Maoists was to cover
temporary infrastructure. The GON also planned, Siebert
said, to pay for the permanent camp infrastructure out of its
own funds. Foreign donors would be asked to contribute to
the cost of other sectors, including elections, the police,
the various peace structures and internally displaced
persons. Siebert said that the details of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and other peace structures were
still being worked out. The Ambassador indicated that the UN
Secretary General's personal representative Ian Martin had

SIPDIS
predicted December 7 that all 35 UN arms monitors would not
be on the ground until mid-January. Former Gurkha soldiers
would be a complement to the UN monitors, not a substitute.
The Ambassador stressed the need for hundreds of peace
monitors to begin work very soon.

Camp Administration Getting Organized
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2. (C) On December 8, Hannes Siebert, a USAID-contracted
peace facilitator, informed the Ambassador that a Government
of Nepal (GON)-Maoist-UN working group to coordinate
assistance to the main People's Liberation Army (PLA)
cantonments had been established and was making good progress
in addressing issues as they arose. The group met every four
days. The Office of the UN Secretary General's personal
representative to the peace process, as well as the UN
Development Program were participating. Siebert expressed
optimism that this structure would lead to progress on the
ground. Emboff noted that Martin's military advisor, Gen.
Wilhelmsen, had advised post a few days earlier that the
sites of the 21 satellite camps had not yet been finalized in
part because of the need to prepare for the UN's technical
assessment mission, scheduled to arrive in Kathmandu the
weekend of December 8.

Show Me the Money
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3. (C) The Ambassador and the USAID Mission Director asked,
in light of press reports about hundreds of PLA combatants
falling sick at a satellite camp in western Nepal, what had
happened to the Nepali Rupees 170 million (USD 2.4 million)
that the GON had provided to the Maoists. The Ambassador
wondered if the Maoists had pocketed some of the money.
Siebert responded that the GON had felt it had little choice
but to pay cash directly. It was obliged under the November
21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to feed and shelter the PLA,
but did not have the flexibility to do so quickly. The
payment of cash was for temporary infrastructure. He added
that the GON would also pay for the permanent infrastructure
at the 28 camps, but not in cash. The Ambassador recalled
that Finance Minister Mahat had claimed recently that the GON
would obtain receipts but had then rolled his eyes, implying
that Mahat expected the Maoists might skim off some of the
cantonment funds for other purposes. Siebert explained that
foreign donors were going to be asked to contribute to other
peace process requirements, such as the elections, the
police, the various peace structures and internally displaced
persons.

Peace Infrastructure Still a Work in Progress
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4. (C) The peace facilitator stated that he had already
provided the GON and the Maoists with case studies from five
countries regarding a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Siebert expected that the interim government would determine
the mandate of the Commission, to include how to handle such
difficult issues as amnesty and compensation. His advice and
expectation, however, was that the Commission would not be
established until after the Constituent Assembly election.
Regarding peace councils, Siebert said the plan was for them
to exist as dispute resolution bodies separate from local
government although they would include local government
officials and police, as well as party representatives among
their members. Details still had to be pinned down, and the
Maoist still had not bought off on the concept. The local
peace commissions would report to a joint Seven-Party
Alliance-Maoist National Peace Commission. Progress was also
being made, Siebert stated, to flesh out the High-Level Joint
Monitoring Committee, which was another peace structure
mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Joint
Monitoring Committee, he explained, would serve as an
information clearinghouse with representatives from key
Nepali organizations, such as the Nepal Human Rights
Commission and the successor to the National Monitoring, as
well as the UN. The Joint Monitoring Committee would then
pass recommendations to the National Peace Commission for
action.

Arrival of Arms Monitors
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5. (C) The Ambassador remarked that Ian Martin had told him
and other envoys December 8 that Martin did not anticipate
having all of the 35 arms monitors in place as envisioned by
the UN Secretary General until mid-January. The problem was
that UN hiring procedures had to be followed and they took
time. Twenty-two of the 35 monitors, however, had already
been tentatively identified. The Ambassador explained that
Martin had also pointed out that the deployment could not
happen until after the technical assessment mission had
completed its evaluation. The Christmas holidays also made
it less likely the monitors would be in Nepal before January.
Siebert said that Martin had told him he had a special
mechanism which allowed him to bring people here on a
short-term basis, but that would only cover a handful of
personnel, maybe enough for the seven main cantonment sites.
He agreed with the Ambassador that such a small group would
not be able to begin the process of registration of
combatants.

Use of Gurkhas
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6. (C) The Ambassador reported that Martin had appeared
supportive of the idea of deploying ex-Gurkha soldiers to
complement the UN monitors. With their command of Nepali and
their knowledge of soldiering, they would be particularly
well-suited to assist the monitors in determining whether
those wanting to enter the cantonments were in fact bona fide
PLA combatants. They could not, Martin had noted, however,
serve as a substitute for UN monitors. They would, the
Ambassador feared, be too susceptible to Maoist intimidation
if they were on their own. As force multipliers, however,
they could prove excellent.

The More Monitors the Merrier
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7. (C) The Ambassador stressed that even the eventual 200
arms monitors envisioned by Martin's UN Mission (and Gurkhas)
would not suffice to drain the fear out of the countryside.
What Nepal needed in the months leading up to the election
were hundreds of "peace monitors" with a broad mandate.
Siebert said that the GON recognized it needed monitors, as
well as an enhanced police presence, but had not yet
determined exactly how it would tie international peace
monitors into the peace process. This was one of several
crucial issues, Siebert noted, that had yet to be decided.
Another was the issue of the Maoist militia. The Ambassador
said that the GON seemed to hope the militia would fade away.
Retraining them, Siebert said, would be extremely difficult.

Comment
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8. (C) While progress is being made, as Siebert conceded,
there are still many, many issues that have to be resolved
before Nepal's peace process takes hold. The Maoist
leadership does not appear to have issued clear instructions
to its cadre on how they should be behaving in light of the
November 21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As a result,
there is no uniformity of Maoist behavior across the country.
In some districts, there are improvements, but in most,
Maoist militia continue their past practices of extortion and
intimidation. Effective arms management and nationwide,
robust monitoring of the peace will be key if Nepal is to
witness a free and fair election to the Constituent Assembly.
MORIARTY