PEACE PROCESS: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003199 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN NP SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert told the Ambassador December 8 that the Government of Nepal (GON), the Maoists and the UN had established an effective working group to handle the nitty-gritty of the People's Liberation Army cantonments. The approximately USD 2.4 million in cash that the GON had already provided to the Maoists was to cover temporary infrastructure. The GON also planned, Siebert said, to pay for the permanent camp infrastructure out of its own funds. Foreign donors would be asked to contribute to the cost of other sectors, including elections, the police, the various peace structures and internally displaced persons. Siebert said that the details of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other peace structures were still being worked out. The Ambassador indicated that the UN Secretary General's personal representative Ian Martin had SIPDIS predicted December 7 that all 35 UN arms monitors would not be on the ground until mid-January. Former Gurkha soldiers would be a complement to the UN monitors, not a substitute. The Ambassador stressed the need for hundreds of peace monitors to begin work very soon. Camp Administration Getting Organized -------------- ¶2. (C) On December 8, Hannes Siebert, a USAID-contracted peace facilitator, informed the Ambassador that a Government of Nepal (GON)-Maoist-UN working group to coordinate assistance to the main People's Liberation Army (PLA) cantonments had been established and was making good progress in addressing issues as they arose. The group met every four days. The Office of the UN Secretary General's personal representative to the peace process, as well as the UN Development Program were participating. Siebert expressed optimism that this structure would lead to progress on the ground. Emboff noted that Martin's military advisor, Gen. Wilhelmsen, had advised post a few days earlier that the sites of the 21 satellite camps had not yet been finalized in part because of the need to prepare for the UN's technical assessment mission, scheduled to arrive in Kathmandu the weekend of December 8. Show Me the Money -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador and the USAID Mission Director asked, in light of press reports about hundreds of PLA combatants falling sick at a satellite camp in western Nepal, what had happened to the Nepali Rupees 170 million (USD 2.4 million) that the GON had provided to the Maoists. The Ambassador wondered if the Maoists had pocketed some of the money. Siebert responded that the GON had felt it had little choice but to pay cash directly. It was obliged under the November 21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to feed and shelter the PLA, but did not have the flexibility to do so quickly. The payment of cash was for temporary infrastructure. He added that the GON would also pay for the permanent infrastructure at the 28 camps, but not in cash. The Ambassador recalled that Finance Minister Mahat had claimed recently that the GON would obtain receipts but had then rolled his eyes, implying that Mahat expected the Maoists might skim off some of the cantonment funds for other purposes. Siebert explained that foreign donors were going to be asked to contribute to other peace process requirements, such as the elections, the police, the various peace structures and internally displaced persons. Peace Infrastructure Still a Work in Progress -------------- ¶4. (C) The peace facilitator stated that he had already provided the GON and the Maoists with case studies from five countries regarding a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Siebert expected that the interim government would determine the mandate of the Commission, to include how to handle such difficult issues as amnesty and compensation. His advice and expectation, however, was that the Commission would not be established until after the Constituent Assembly election. Regarding peace councils, Siebert said the plan was for them to exist as dispute resolution bodies separate from local government although they would include local government officials and police, as well as party representatives among their members. Details still had to be pinned down, and the Maoist still had not bought off on the concept. The local peace commissions would report to a joint Seven-Party Alliance-Maoist National Peace Commission. Progress was also being made, Siebert stated, to flesh out the High-Level Joint Monitoring Committee, which was another peace structure mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Joint Monitoring Committee, he explained, would serve as an information clearinghouse with representatives from key Nepali organizations, such as the Nepal Human Rights Commission and the successor to the National Monitoring, as well as the UN. The Joint Monitoring Committee would then pass recommendations to the National Peace Commission for action. Arrival of Arms Monitors -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador remarked that Ian Martin had told him and other envoys December 8 that Martin did not anticipate having all of the 35 arms monitors in place as envisioned by the UN Secretary General until mid-January. The problem was that UN hiring procedures had to be followed and they took time. Twenty-two of the 35 monitors, however, had already been tentatively identified. The Ambassador explained that Martin had also pointed out that the deployment could not happen until after the technical assessment mission had completed its evaluation. The Christmas holidays also made it less likely the monitors would be in Nepal before January. Siebert said that Martin had told him he had a special mechanism which allowed him to bring people here on a short-term basis, but that would only cover a handful of personnel, maybe enough for the seven main cantonment sites. He agreed with the Ambassador that such a small group would not be able to begin the process of registration of combatants. Use of Gurkhas -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador reported that Martin had appeared supportive of the idea of deploying ex-Gurkha soldiers to complement the UN monitors. With their command of Nepali and their knowledge of soldiering, they would be particularly well-suited to assist the monitors in determining whether those wanting to enter the cantonments were in fact bona fide PLA combatants. They could not, Martin had noted, however, serve as a substitute for UN monitors. They would, the Ambassador feared, be too susceptible to Maoist intimidation if they were on their own. As force multipliers, however, they could prove excellent. The More Monitors the Merrier -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador stressed that even the eventual 200 arms monitors envisioned by Martin's UN Mission (and Gurkhas) would not suffice to drain the fear out of the countryside. What Nepal needed in the months leading up to the election were hundreds of "peace monitors" with a broad mandate. Siebert said that the GON recognized it needed monitors, as well as an enhanced police presence, but had not yet determined exactly how it would tie international peace monitors into the peace process. This was one of several crucial issues, Siebert noted, that had yet to be decided. Another was the issue of the Maoist militia. The Ambassador said that the GON seemed to hope the militia would fade away. Retraining them, Siebert said, would be extremely difficult. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) While progress is being made, as Siebert conceded, there are still many, many issues that have to be resolved before Nepal's peace process takes hold. The Maoist leadership does not appear to have issued clear instructions to its cadre on how they should be behaving in light of the November 21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As a result, there is no uniformity of Maoist behavior across the country. In some districts, there are improvements, but in most, Maoist militia continue their past practices of extortion and intimidation. Effective arms management and nationwide, robust monitoring of the peace will be key if Nepal is to witness a free and fair election to the Constituent Assembly. MORIARTY