NEPAL: INDIAN AMBASSADOR WANTS TO GET THE PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003168

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIAN AMBASSADOR WANTS TO GET THE PROCESS
MOVING


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C/NF) In a December 6 meeting with the Ambassador, Indian
Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee stressed that the
logistical realities of the peace agreements between the
Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists needed to move
quickly in order to succeed. Mukherjee worried about
continued Maoist violations of their commitments and the
recent increase in Maoist recruitment. He told the
Ambassador that the GON may stall on the completion of an
Interim Constitution to give the UN more time to begin
functioning effectively. Mukherjee stated that large numbers
of international observers would be needed to make the
registration and separation of Maoists from their weapons a
success, and indicated that India would have no problem with
former British and Indian Gurkha soldiers performing that
function. Additionally, Mukherjee said that he planned to
explore whether the Government of India (GOI) would be
willing to provide a large physical presence on the ground
during the coming months, including perhaps active-duty
Indian Gurkhas. Mukherjee indicated his support of
tripartite discussions with Britain and the U.S. on plans to
help build the capacity of the Nepal Police.

International Community Needs To Move Quickly
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2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on December 6, Indian
Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee stressed that the
logistical support for the peace agreements between the GON
and the Maoists needed to move forward quickly in order to
succeed. Mukherjee said that the GOI was already planning to
provide the storage containers for Maoist weapons before the
arms management agreement was even signed, and he expected
them to be in Nepal by December 8. The Ambassador worried
that there were not yet monitors on the ground to start the
process of registration of combatants and storage of weapons
in the camps. Mukherjee agreed, and further worried that it
may be January before UN monitors are on the ground to begin
the process.

Lack Of Confidence In the UN
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3. (C) Mukherjee stated that he lacked some confidence in the
UN negotiators, especially John Norris, the UN's political
representative to the peace negotiations. Mukherjee
particularly objected to Norris's constant claims of,
"nothing can happen in terms of camp management until the
Maoists approve of it," noting that even the Maoists were not
propagating such an extreme position. Mukherjee wondered how
the international community could get the World Food Program
(WFP) into the Maoist cantonments quickly to feed people.
Finance Minister Ram Sharan Mahat had asked the WFP to take
the lead, but WFP Country Representative Richard Regan had
said it would take more than a letter from the Finance
Ministry, according to Mukherjee. The Ambassador replied
that he would push Ian Martin, the UN Secretary General's
Personal Representative, to start nailing down the details of
assistance to the camps by WFP and other UN agencies.

Continued Maoist Atrocities Are a Concern
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4. (C) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee expressed concern about
Maoist actions both inside and outside Kathmandu. He said he
was approached all the time by Indian industrialists
complaining about Maoist excesses against them. Mukherjee
believed the Maoist central leadership had not clarified a
policy against these abuses, which would therefore likely
continue. Mukherjee indicated that he had heard the same
reports the Ambassador had been hearing about the reasons for
continued Maoist recruitment: 1) to bulk up the numbers in

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the camps and get close to the 35,000 combatants the Maoists
claim to have, and 2) to keep the seasoned combatants out of
the cantonments so they could continue to intimidate the
public in the lead-up to the planned Constituent Assembly
elections in June 2007. Both Ambassadors agreed that
effective monitoring and registration in the camps would be a
difficult task, but a necessary one.

Interim Constitution May Be Stalled
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5. (C) Mukherjee told the Ambassador that, since it could be
January before enough UN monitors arrived to effectively
register combatants and monitor the cantonment process, the
GON might stall on the signing of an Interim Constitution
until then to give the UN time to get set up. The Ambassador
said that would not be a bad idea. Mukherjee agreed, stating
that the last thing India wanted was for gun-toting Maoists
to be in the government. Mukherjee made it clear that such
an outcome would be a huge blow to the peace process.

Former Gurkhas Okay with India
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6. (C) The Ambassador asked Mukherjee about the GOI's
position on the possible use of former British and Indian
Gurkha soldiers as UN monitors. Mukherjee said that the GOI
was supportive of the idea, as long as it was implemented
quickly. Using Gurkhas would make sense, he said, since they
already speak the language and know the culture of Nepal.
The Ambassador worried that Gurkhas may face some pressure or
intimidation from the Maoists, since they were originally
Nepali themselves. Mukherjee stressed the importance of
other international monitors being present and the UN giving
legitimacy to the Gurkha monitors to avoid this problem.

A Push for Serving Gurkhas
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7. (C/NF) Mukherjee said that he was considering asking New
Delhi to abandon its aversion to a large presence on the
ground in Nepal. Only India could rapidly provide the large
numbers of experts of various types that would be needed to
set the stage for free and fair elections. In addition to
experts on the conduct of elections, there were also in India
large numbers of people with experience in a variety of UN
exercises. Moreover, the Indian Army had some 45 battalions
of Gurkha troops, all of whom hailed from Nepal, spoke the
language, were under Indian Army discipline, and were inured
to the physical discomforts they would experience as part of
a monitoring mission to Nepal.


8. (C) Mukherjee worried, however, that given the historical
relationship between India and Nepal, a large Indian presence
in the run-up to the Constituent Assembly election would
ensure that India received the blame if anything went wrong.
The Ambassador replied that those who were anti-Indian in
Nepal would blame New Delhi for anything that went wrong,
even if there were not a single Indian brought in to help
with the process. The coming 7-10 months would determine
Nepal's future. If at all possible, India should grab the
opportunity to make sure things turned out right.

Tripartite Discussions on Nepal Police
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9. (C) Mukherjee remained concerned about the state of the
Nepal Police and the lack of enforcement of law and order
across the country. The Ambassador told Mukherjee that the
U.S. was planning on providing technical support to the
police, and so was the UK. Mukherjee expressed interest in
the Ambassador's suggestion of discussions between the three
countries on a unified plan of action for strengthening the
capacity of the civil police to enforce law and order.

Comment

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10. (C/NF) Mukherjee appears increasingly nervous that the
Maoists are not serious about separation from their weapons
and coming into the political mainstream and recognizes that
steps need to be taken soon to make a free and fair election
in Nepal possible. In that context, he appears prepared to
push his government to get more directly involved in the
peace process in Nepal by providing large numbers of experts,
perhaps including arms monitors. We agree with Mukherjee's
analysis: nobody else can provide the presence in Nepal that
India can. It would be a huge foreign policy victory for
India if it could play a major role in pulling off a
sustainable peace in Nepal; and if the peace process fails,
India will undoubtedly bear the brunt in dealing with the
aftermath of that failure.
MORIARTY