ARMS MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT: VAGUE WORDING, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003124 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PREL NP SUBJECT: ARMS MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT: VAGUE WORDING, BUT WEAPONS TO BE SEPARATED REF: KATHMANDU 3118 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On November 28, the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists signed an arms management agreement, in the presence of the UN, creating a concrete mechanism for the separation of Maoist combatants from their weapons. The agreement provides that all Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) members will be placed into cantonments and separated from their weapons, although there is no specified timeline for how soon the Maoists will complete the move into the camps or for how long they will stay in the cantonments. Maoists will be allowed to keep a specified number of weapons for camp security. Maoist PLA soldiers in cantonments will be able to conduct military training, but not live-fire exercises. The agreement also sets out criteria for who will be allowed into the cantonments. It also mentions integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army (NA),but states that the specifics will be worked out later. The agreement sets up a mechanism for monitoring and dispute resolution involving the (NA),PLA, and the UN. There is no mention of Maoist militia in the agreement. Arms Management Agreement Signed -------------- ¶2. (C) In the early evening of November 28, the GON and the Maoists signed an arms management agreement which sets out a mechanism for the separation of Maoist fighters from their weapons. The agreement was signed in the presence of the UN negotiation team by Home Minister Krishna Sitaula for the GON and Krishna Bahadur Mahara for the Maoists. Some 300 journalists jockeyed for position as the agreement was distributed to the media at the Shangri-La hotel. Earlier on November 28, John Norris, the UN political advisor to the negotiations, and Brigadier General (retired) Jan Wilhelmsen, the UN military advisor to the negotiations, had told the Ambassador that the negotiations were held up on the issue of training in the cantonments (reftel). GON Perspectives -------------- ¶3. (C) Shortly before the signing, the DCM shared U.S. concern about military training in the camps with Suresh Chalise, foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Koirala. Chalise conveyed U.S. concerns to the Prime Minister and called the DCM shortly after the signing to say that the concerns about military training had been covered in the agreement, including by the clause in the agreement prohibiting the Maoists from conducting "live-fire exercises." Chalise said that the largest hang-up in the process had been that the NA did not want the words "brigade" or "division" included in the agreement describing the PLA for fear that this might cause PLA "generals" to be integrated into the NA ranks later. Shekhar Koirala, Central Committee Member of the Nepali Congress who was present during negotiations, told Emboff after the signing that he had been under the impression that the UN negotiation team would argue in favor of the GON position during negotiations but that, in reality, the UN had argued in favor of the Maoists. He hoped that the U.S. would push the UN to favor the GON during implementation of the agreement. Provisions For Arms: But No Timelines -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The agreement clearly states how Maoist weapons will be stored within the cantonments. Weapons will only be stored in the seven main cantonments; none will be kept in the 21 satellite camps. For each of the main camps, 30 weapons will remain in the hands of the Maoists for perimeter security of the camps and 15 weapons for each of the KATHMANDU 00003124 002 OF 003 satellite camps -- a total of 525 weapons outside of the locked containers. The UN will monitor the arms storage areas 24 hours a day, and can inspect them at any time. However, there is no timeline for implementation of the agreement, nor a timeline for how long Maoists will remain in the camps. The agreement calls for a four-phase approach to cantonment and containment of weapons: 1) reporting and verification; 2) redeployment and concentration of forces; 3) Maoist army cantonment, NA barracking and arms control; and 4) full compliance with the agreement. The agreement states that a practical timeline for these phases will be established by the parties at a future date, in consultation with the UN. Training; But No Guns -------------- ¶5. (C) The agreement states that the NA will be allowed to continue training its soldiers, with live-fire exercises allowed after 48-hours notice of the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee. The Maoists will also be allowed to conduct normal training "in the spirit of the Peace Accord," without live-fire exercises. Although this verbiage could be read to imply that Maoists could train with but not fire weapons, UN military advisor General Wilhelmsen told the DATT that "normal training" meant "without weapons" and that was clear to both sides. Wilhelmsen stressed that the cantonments were too small for unit-level maneuver training and that any training the Maoists conducted would be routine. John Norris also confirmed separately to the DCM that all Maoist PLA weapons would be locked up except for the ones used to guard the camps. Registration Criteria Clear -------------- ¶6. (C) The agreement states that only PLA combatants who were recruited before May 25, 2006 would be allowed in the camps, and only if they had reached 18 years of age before that date. Maoists with or without weapons will be allowed into the cantonments. Maoists will show their PLA identity card to the UN teams during registration. Norris and Wilhelmsen assured the Ambassador in a separate meeting that the parties had agreed on rigorous questioning to make sure that the combatants who entered the camps were genuine PLA combatants and not of raw recruits coming from the ramped-up Maoist recruitment drive over the past three weeks. The Ambassador had stated that this would be a very difficult job, and had expressed concern that large numbers of untrained, new recruits would be entering the cantonments and receiving training. Monitoring Mechanisms: A Good Start -------------- ¶7. (C) John Norris told the DCM that he felt the UN would be able to implement the agreement to effectively monitor Maoist weapons and combatants. The agreement calls for a Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC) to be formed with a chairman appointed by the UN. The JMCC will have nine members; three from the NA, three from the PLA, and two from the UN. There is no civilian representation on the JMCC. According to the agreement, decisions of the JMCC will be by consensus, with Ian Martin, the UN Secretary General's representative, breaking any deadlocks. The JMCC has three main functions: 1) to assist in implementation of the agreement, 2) to serve as a dispute resolution mechanism, and 3) to assist in confidence building on all sides. ¶8. (C) Joint Monitoring Teams (JMTs) will also be formed to assist the JMCC at the local level. The JMTs will have one representative from the NA, PLA, and UN. The job of the JMTs will be to: 1) liaise with the civilian community on the village level, 2) cooperate with other UN agencies, international organizations and NGOs, 3) share information and defuse local tension, 4) assist in conflict management at a local level, and 5) investigate complaints of possible KATHMANDU 00003124 003 OF 003 violations of the agreement. However, the agreement does not give the JMTs, or the JMCC, the authority to sanction any party for violation of the agreement. Integration Of Maoists Into The NA -------------- ¶9. (C) The agreement mentions possible integration of Maoist combatants into the NA, but does not give specifics as to the process. John Norris told the DCM that both sides agreed to set aside the issue of numbers of Maoists to be integrated for future negotiations, but he thought it would be between 4,000 and 6,000. The agreement states that only Maoists properly registered at cantonment sites will be eligible for future integration. The agreement states that the Interim Government will form a special committee to "supervise, integrate, and rehabilitate the Maoist army combatants." What About The Militia? -------------- ¶10. (SBU) There is no mention of Maoist militia members in the agreement. It is unclear what will happen to Maoist militia groups currently extorting, abducting, and playing a "law enforcement" role across the country. The agreement calls on the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force to "continue the task of maintaining law and order" across the country. The agreement also states that "holding and carrying arms is in violation of the law." This, presumably, is to ban Maoist militia from engaging in violence and intimidation. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The arms management agreement is definitely a step forward on the path toward a peaceful and democratic Nepal. However, how big a step remains to be seen during the implementation of the agreement. There is a significant amount of vagueness in the arms accord, and many of the issues have been pushed off to future negotiations between the parties. While we are unhappy with the idea that the Maoists will likely be able to use the camps to provide some degree of military training to raw recruits, it is some comfort that they will not be conducting training with weapons. It is equally troubling that the issue of Maoist militia is still not being covered explicitly in the agreement, leaving open a loophole for continued Maoist atrocities. We will continue to buck up the GON and the UN to create a strong mechanism with teeth to monitor the agreements and hold the parties accountable for violations. MORIARTY