PEACE AGREEMENT STICKING POINT: MILITARY TRAINING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003118 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL NP SUBJECT: PEACE AGREEMENT STICKING POINT: MILITARY TRAINING IN CANTONMENTS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a meeting on November 28, the lead UN negotiators told the Ambassador that an agreement on arms management between the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists was stalled over the Maoist desire to conduct military training for their combatants in the cantonments. The Ambassador pushed the UN team hard on why military training was preferred over technical and vocational training, but John Norris, the UN political advisor to the negotiations, insisted that military training would be needed to keep up the morale of the Maoist troops and to maintain discipline and command and control in the cantonments. The Ambassador stressed to Norris that an argument like that would be easier to accept if the Maoists had not been systematically engaged in a huge recruitment drive over the last three weeks, specifically targeting youth. The Ambassador said it would be hard to explain the UN's apparent endorsement of military training for these obviously new recruits. The UN team responded that the verification process as the Maoist combatants entered the cantonments would screen out most new recruits from entering the camps. General Jan Wilhelmsen, the UN military advisor in the talks, worried that the UN would move too slowly and bureaucratically to effectively implement of an agreement. The UN team blamed the Nepal Army (NA) for holding up the agreement over what it termed "small issues." Caught Up On Training -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 28, John Norris and General Wilhelmsen told the Ambassador that an agreement between the GON and the Maoists on arms management was coming together, and that it was, "on balance, good, practical, and implementable." However, Norris stated that the big sticking point was the proposed military training of Maoist cadre within the cantonments. The NA objected to the idea of any military training within the camps, as the Maoists wanted to be allowed to conduct all types of training short of live-fire exercises. Norris said that the UN was concerned about what the People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers would do in the camps if they were not allowed to conduct military training. Norris stressed that it would be harder to integrate Maoist combatants into the NA if they could not keep up their military skills. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador strongly stated his disagreement with the UN team on the issue of military training. The Ambassador said that the Maoists had been recruiting thousands of new combatants, many of them children, over the last three weeks and that it was clear the Maoists intended to fill the camps with these new recruits and keep their seasoned fighters out of the cantonments. Why, the Ambassador asked, was the UN pushing for the Maoists to be able to provide military training to new recruits and bulk-up their forces? Norris responded that the ability to integrate into the NA would be an impetus for genuine Maoist combatants to enter the camps, since they wouldn't want those NA positions to go to new recruits. Norris said that there were likely around 20,000 PLA soldiers who would enter into cantonments, instead of the originally claimed 35,000. Of those, he said, around 4,000-6,000 would be eligible for integration into the NA. The desire to get positions in the national army would convince the majority of Maoist combatants to enter the camps. The Ambassador pointed out that since there were only 10,000-12,000 PLA soldiers, even if only 20,000 entered the camps the majority would be new recruits. Norris and Wilhelmsen stressed that without military training in the camps, it would be very difficult for commanders to maintain the discipline needed to keep their cadre from leaving or causing trouble. Verification Will Be Strict KATHMANDU 00003118 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶4. (C) Norris and Wilhelmsen told the Ambassador that the verification process would be strict and comprehensive, and would ensure that only genuine PLA combatants were allowed into the cantonments. Norris said that registration would only be allowed of combatants who were at least 18 years old by May 25, 2006 and who were recruited before May 25, 2006. Identification would be verified through PLA identification cards that were, in turn, verified by the UN. Norris said that both sides had agreed on a long list of questions that could be asked to prove that someone was legitimately a member of the PLA. The Ambassador said that the UN team would face a lot of problems with registration since they would need to say no to a lot of people. He stated that it would be impossible to keep all the new recruits out of the camps. Norris said that would not be a problem, and they were committed to registering only genuine PLA combatants. Why Not Alternative Training? -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked again why the UN was arguing in favor of the Maoists being able to train new recruits to be in their army instead of arguing for alternative technical and vocational training or jobs such as road building for the combatants. Norris responded that the alternative training would also be there, but that a lack of military training would hurt camp management, undermine Maoist morale, and lead the Maoists to conclude that the GON and NA were out to see them "rot." Reality Is Difficult -------------- ¶6. (C) Norris said that the reality of dismantling a guerrilla force was not easy, and the separation of the Maoists from their weapons was more important than whether training was taking place in the camps. Norris suggested that the international community needed to stress to the Maoists that this would be the "first test" for the Maoists in the peace process. The Ambassador said that something like that would have made sense if it were not for the huge recruitment drive the Maoists had embarked on in the past three weeks and their repeated breaking of past commitments. Norris insisted that separation of weapons had to come first. Military training in the camps would effectively be only "busy work" so the combatants had something to fill up their time. Where Are The Weapons? -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked the UN team where all the Maoist weapons were and how they would account for all of them as they entered cantonments. Wilhelmsen said that they had lists from the NA, the Nepal Police, and the Armed Police Force as to which weapons had been captured from them; the UN could work from those lists. He had been trying to convince the Maoists that the more weapons they put into their cantonments, the more the NA would have to lock up as well, giving them an incentive to lock up more of their own. Norris said that each PLA soldier who turned in a weapon would get a mark on their record for preference for integration into the NA. Wilhelmsen also stated that the Maoists had agreed to put their socket bombs and other devices into locked areas in the cantonments as well. The Ambassador asked if there was any talk of amnesty for those who turn in such devices, and Wilhelmsen replied that they were thinking of designing a program for purchase of weapons. Norris stated that it was clear in the agreement that anyone carrying weapons outside of the cantonments could be prosecuted under the law. UN Bureaucracy Could Be A Problem -------------- KATHMANDU 00003118 003 OF 003 ¶8. (C) General Wilhelmsen expressed concern that the UN bureaucracy would turn the UN mission into an "administrative force" instead of a monitoring force with teeth. He worried that the nature of the UN was to insist upon so much security for force protection that it would take too long to get enough people on the ground to effectively monitor the arms management agreement. "If we don't have many monitors out here by April, then we have lost," he stated. The Ambassador agreed and said the U.S. had been working hard in New York to push things forward as quickly as possible. Maoists Will Keep Some Weapons For Security -------------- ¶9. (C) General Wilhelmsen told the Ambassador that both sides had agreed that the Maoists would keep 30 weapons for security at the seven division level cantonments and 15 weapons at the 21 satellite camps. This meant a total of 525 weapons that would be outside of the locked up areas in the cantonments. The UN Blames The NA -------------- ¶10. (C) Both Norris and Wilhelmsen blamed the NA for the holdup on the arms management agreement. Norris said that the NA comes out of the draft agreement quite well, and that the Maoists were "swallowing a bitter pill." Norris was concerned that the NA, a very conservative organization, was too concerned about integration and still maintained a certain "pride of place." Wilhelmsen said that the NA leadership was angry about any changes to the NA and would "like to see the Maoists rot in the camps without getting any benefits while there." Norris said it was clear the NA was holding things up, and claimed that it sent a message that they were uncomfortable with the civilian leadership. The Ambassador pointed out that many of the ideas that had been sticking points thus far had actually come from the civilian leadership, and not from the NA. He also noted that he was not aware of anyone in the Seven-Party Alliance leadership insisting that the Maoists be allowed to conduct military training in the camps. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) It is troubling that after the large-scale recruitment drive by the Maoists over the past three weeks, the UN is arguing in favor of military training for Maoist combatants in the cantonments. The UN team seemed particularly hard on the NA and sympathetic to Maoist concerns in the negotiations. However the NA concerns are likely justified, given the Maoists past track record on previous agreements. The Ambassador made clear that the U.S. wanted to see technical and vocational training of those in the camps, but believed it was not a good idea for the Maoists to be allowed to use the cantonments sites as training grounds for more combatants. On an encouraging note, both Norris and Wilhelmsen clearly understood the need for strong mechanisms for verification and registration of combatants in the camps. It is equally important that the UN get a large monitoring team on the ground as soon as possible to give the arms management agreement, once it is signed, the best possible shot at successful implementation. MORIARTY