IMPLEMENTING NEPAL'S PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003104 SIPDIS SIPDIS ROME FOR FODAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR EAID UN NP SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING NEPAL'S PEACE REF: A. KATHMANDU 3091 ¶B. KATHMANDU 3014 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Nicholas Dean; Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Three days after the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists signed the "Comprehensive Peace Agreement," the Government and the Maoists are moving to implement its provisions, but considerable challenges lie ahead. Maoist extortion and violence as well as illegal recruitment are continuing. The Government, the Maoists and the United Nations Mission have begun negotiating the technical agreement which will govern the monitoring of Maoist combatants in camps and the locking-up of their weapons. The structures which will administer and monitor the camps and the overall process are being established, and the GON has disbursed funds for this purpose. People's Liberation Army combatants have begun collecting near the designated cantonment sites even though the actual sites are not yet ready. Meanwhile, a number of countries have indicated their willingness to provide arms monitors, in at least one case, based only on a letter from the Secretary General to the UN Security Council. That same donor expects UN monitors to find a permissive environment in Nepal. Three Days After the Peace, Maoist Abuses Continue -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) Three days after Prime Minister GP Koirala and Maoist Supremo Prachanda inked the 14-page "Comprehensive Peace Agreement" formally ending the 11-year Maoist insurgency (Ref A),attention has turned to implementing the Agreement's provisions. Based on limited reporting, Maoist extortion and violence in the countryside and Kathmandu has not abated in the immediate aftermath of the signing. Forced recruitment by the Maoists, including of children, is also ongoing. When challenged, the Maoists engaged in the violations have reportedly claimed the illegal activities will cease as soon as their combatants are in the cantonments or, in some cases, as soon as the Maoists join an interim government. According to the November 8 Agreement between the Government and the Maoists (Ref B),cantonment was supposed to be complete by November 26, the interim government formed by December 1. The UN Secretary General's personal representative to the peace process Ian Martin, has stated publicly that the UN was not consulted on the timeline and that the first deadline, at least, will not be met. (Comment: Senior Government officials have told us privately that the December 1 date is also unrealistic since it depends on cantonment and completion of the interim constitution.) Tripartite Technical Arms Agreement Under Discussion -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The section on the management of armies and arms in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is almost identical to the corresponding section in the November 8 agreement. Two of the seven main cantonment sites are different, but that is because the United Nations found two of the sites could not be supported logistically. What is still lacking, however, is the technical agreement on monitoring of Maoist arms and combatants and Nepal Army soldiers and arms. According to Ian Martin's military advisor, Gen. Wilhemsen, the agreement will describe the process for registering Maoist combatants and detail how their weapons are to be catalogued and stored. According to a member of the Government negotiating team, Minister of Tourism Pradeep Gyawali, agreement could be reached as soon as November 24. Ian Martin indicated publicly on November 23 that progress was being made, but gave no expected completion date. Camp Oversight Structures Taking Shape -------------- 4 (C) A committee headed by Prime Minister Koirala will reportedly have overall responsibility for directing and managing the combatants and the camps. The Chief Secretary of the Government, Bhoj Raj Gmire, will head the committee in charge of implementation. A Home Ministry official informed Emboff November 24 that Sushil Jung Rana, who was until recently the regional administrator for one of Nepal's five development regions, will be the Government's central coordinator for camp management. He will be based in the Peace Secretariat, which is part of the Prime Minister's Office. USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert told the Ambassador November 24 that the Home Secretary and a Maoist to be named will play key roles in coordinating the cantonment process. The Home Ministry, for instance, has been tasked to handle the logistics of setting up the camp infrastructure. Siebert added that the Maoists themselves would be responsible for the internal management of the camps. Local government, to include local peace councils, and police officials would, he said, be involved at coordinating the process on the ground. Government Funds, Role of Other Domestic Organizations -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Siebert stated to the Ambassador that the Government had already authorized Nepali Rs. 780 million (approximately USD 10 million) for the peace process. (Note: Of this total, the press is reporting the Government has put N.Rs. 100 million in a Peace Fund at the Peace Secretariat, of which it is releasing N.Rs. 70 million directly to the Maoists -- a first -- to set up and manage the cantonments. The combatants themselves are expected to do much of the construction. End Note.) The peace facilitator said that Nepal's Armed Police Force would be providing tents and other logistical support. The Ministry of Education would ensure the combatants were provided with education and entertainment. The Cabinet, Siebert noted, had already approved a 15-page plan spelling out next steps, but it had failed to consult with the Maoists. Siebert pointed out that the 25-member National Monitoring Committee for the Cease-fire Code of Conduct was going to be abolished and replaced with a smaller body with five to ten members, including the five peace process observers. A high-level peace committee with representatives from the Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists was also in the offing. The Role of the UN Mission and the World Food Program -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The UN Mission is insisting, Siebert said, that its role will be one of monitoring only, although it will sit on the coordinating committees. It will also constitute its own committees on cantonment, arms management and the satellite camps. In response to a question from the Ambassador, the peace facilitator replied that, for now, the World Food Program would not be feeding the combatants. Absent specific authority in the form of a UN Security Council Resolution, it was only allowed to feed ex-combatants. Siebert told the Ambassador that Martin was planning to leave Kathmandu for New York on November 25 to push for a UN Resolution. His principal goal was to obtain authority for an initial deployment of 35-40 arms monitors. People's Liberation Army Already Assembling -------------- ¶7. (C) According to press reporting, People's Liberation Army combatants have already begun assembling at the seven principal cantonment sites in Kailali (far-western Nepal), Surket (mid-western),Rolpa (mid-western Nepal),Nawalprasi (western Nepal),Chitwan (central Nepal),Sindhuli (central Nepal) and Ilam (eastern Nepal). Sarad, the Maoist military commander of the PLA's "Fifth Division" which is to have its main camp in Dahabana and satellite sites in Tila, Masina and Simpani (Rolpa),complained publicly November 23 that "eighty percent" of his Maoist cadre had already reached the sites, but the camps were not ready. A similar problem had arisen in Chitwan according to Pathik, the Maoist "district-in-charge" there. Many of the Maoists are now living in local villagers' homes. Finnish Charge d'affaires Kari Karanko told Emboff November 24 that Finland and other members of the "like-minded group" of donors (including the United Kingdom, Denmark and Switzerland) had presented a proposal to reprogram their bilateral assistance programs in the areas of the camps to provide infrastructure, such as water and housing. He suspected, however, that the Government would decline the offer. Monitors Offered; Permissive Environment Expected -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Kikkan Haugen, the Norwegian Counsellor (DCM),told the DCM November 24 that the Norwegian Embassy and Oslo's position was that a letter from the UN Secretary General to the Security Council should be sufficient to authorize the deployment of an initial group of UN monitors as a bridge until a Security Council resolution could be enacted. Norway had a list of civilian personnel who could be deployed as early as the week of November 27. However, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was insisting, Haugen said, that the usual rules for selecting UN monitors had to be followed and that they had to be active duty military personnel. DPKO was also talking about the need for a force protection package, including helicopters and ambulances to be deployed with the monitors. Ian Martin's Norwegian military adviser, Gen. Wilhemsen (please protect),was finding the lack of flexibility at the UN in New York to be extremely frustrating. Haugen listed a number of countries which were prepared or preparing to deploy monitors in addition to Norway, including Brazil, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Yemen. Finnish Charge Karanko told Emboff that Finland could provide eight and Norway five on very short notice. Haugen added that Oslo had repeatedly argued that UN monitors would encounter a permissive environment in Nepal where both the Government and the Maoists wanted them, not DPKO's nightmares of Iraq, Afghanistan or Sudan. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Lack of planning and unrealistic timelines set by the Government and the Maoists have hampered peace process implementation. The Prime Minister appears personally engaged in ensuring that the cantonment process is successful and has assigned some of his most senior civil servants to the task of coordination and implementation, which is positive. The technical arms management agreement will take time to negotiate, but both sides are likely to agree in the end to something that the UN is prepared to administer. The other immediate challenge for the Government (and the Maoists) will be to get the camps up and running quickly. Nepal's cold months are approaching and it is in no one's interest for Maoist combatants to become restless and angry because they have no place to sleep or food to eat. Broader public dissatisfaction may also begin to mount if the Government does not make good on its promises to promulgate an interim constitution, establish an interim parliament and create an interim government. Without combatants in camps and their weapons locked up, and effectively monitored, none of these other steps can take place. MORIARTY