Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU3103
2006-11-24 10:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
UN PEACE TEAM CHIEF: UN MONITORS URGENTLY REQUIRED
how-toVZCZCXRO7670 OO RUEHCI DE RUEHKT #3103/02 3281030 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 241030Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4000 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5054 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5313 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0477 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3313 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4685 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0577 RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY 2868 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1329 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2165 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 KATHMANDU 003103
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: UN PEACE TEAM CHIEF: UN MONITORS URGENTLY REQUIRED
***********************
* Missing Section 001 *
***********************
KATHMANDU 00003103 002 OF 004
in Nepal. The SG's Personal Representative underscored the
importance of the tripartite technical agreement on arms
management as the essential foundation for a UN monitoring
mission in Nepal. Pressed by DCM on what mechanism could be
employed to authorize an interim team of 35 monitors, Martin
replied that the issue would be decided by the UNSC and
member states.
Cantonment Issues
--------------
6. (C) The UN peace team leader noted the good cooperation
which initial joint working groups, including the UN, GON and
Maoists, had established while identifying seven divisional
cantonment sites. The issue of 21 sub-camps had initially
been a matter of contention because of the distance of
Maoist-proposed sub-camps from divisional sites. The Maoists
had ultimately been cooperative, however, agreeing that
sub-camps would be no more than two hours by road from
divisional cantonments, and to the greatest extent possible,
located in the same GON administrative district as the
divisional cantonment. Surveys of the 21 sub-camps had yet
to be completed, but the UN peace team had been augmented by
a Swiss colonel with two more military advisors on the way.
Tripartite Agreement
--------------
7. (C) The UN was currently negotiating the text of the
tripartite agreement, which addressed PLA force protection,
permissible activities by the Nepal Army, prohibited
activities, activities that require prior notification, and
the details of UN arms management monitoring. Martin
described the atmospherics of November 23 tripartite talks as
good, but emphasized that he expected difficulties given the
specificity of the agreement and differing perspectives
between the PLA and NA. Despite optimistic claims to the
contrary, the UN rep expected a technical agreement to take
some time, but hoped that his trip to New York would hasten
agreement. Both sides were keenly aware that the status of
the tripartite technical agreement would figure prominently
in his New York consultations, especially with member states.
UN Role Limited to Monitoring
--------------
8. (C) Reiterating his view that a UN presence on the
ground was critical, Martin emphasized that the UN's role
would be limited to monitoring and would not extend to camp
management, which was the responsibility of the GON and
Maoists. That said, the UN was concerned about the
practicalities of cantonment and their ramifications. He
recalled that he had advised the GON and Maoists against
immediate cantonment given the lack of preparation at
cantonment sites, advice that both sides had ignored in a
rush to implement the peace accord. Martin dispelled rumors
that the UN would provide training or salaries for PLA cadre.
On cantonment management, he underscored that the UN had
pressed the GON and Maoists to identify requirements and
approach the international community for assistance.
Human Rights, Cease-fire Monitoring
--------------
9. (C) On human rights and cease-fire monitoring, the SG's
Special Representative said that cantonment alone would not
transform the current climate in Nepal into one free of fear
and intimidation and conducive to a free and fair election.
He recognized that it could take some time to create an
atmosphere in which elections could proceed without
intimidation, pointing out the critical role for both
domestic and international monitors in supporting the
National Election Commission. He worried that elections
after June 2007 would have to slip until September, after the
monsoon, leaving large numbers of potentially disgruntled PLA
in cantonment and potentially undermining the election.
Martin said that the National Cease Fire Code of Conduct
Monitoring Committee (NMCC) had proven ineffective, in part
KATHMANDU 00003103 003 OF 004
because it was too large and unwieldy. In the UN's view, a
smaller and more effective replacement for the NMCC was
required. Civil society participation would be important.
DPA or DPKO Operation
--------------
10. (C) Martin reported that it was unclear whether the UN
monitoring mission to Nepal would take place under the aegis
of the UN Department of Political Affairs as a special
political mission or under the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations as a peacekeeping mission. Either way, DPKO would
have to operationally support a UN monitoring mission to
Nepal. While a political mission could be conducted under
existing budgetary authority, a DPKO deployment would require
specific authorization as well as U.S. Congressional
notification. A third possibility would be funding from the
recently established UN trust fund for the Nepal peace
process.
Recruiting Monitors
--------------
11. (C) On the issue of monitors, the SG's Personal
Representative said that it had proven difficult to find
enough former military monitors, and that DPKO preferred
active duty monitors in any case. Martin said he had
persuaded DPKO and DPA to agree to a mix of former and active
duty monitors. In fact, he added, the issue had gotten
confused because the UN had issued two separate requests to
member states, one a force generation request for UN Military
Observers, the other a request for civilian personnel. Both
would be deployed under identical conditions with civilians
paid by member states and active personnel carried on
existing national defense budgets. Approximately 25 member
states have responded to the UN's requests for monitors.
Minimum 150 Monitors Required
--------------
12. (C) Martin said that the number of monitors would be
determined by the UN's Technical Assessment Team and in part
depend on the number of sites at which the Nepal Army decided
upon to store its weapons under the peace accord. Whether
the NA would store its weapons at a single site or multiple
locations had not yet been resolved. At minimum, however,
the UN peace team believes that more than 150 monitors would
be required.
PLA Child Soldiers, Combatant Registration
--------------
13. (C) Addressing the related issues of forced child
soldier recruitment by the PLA and registration of
combatants, the SG's Personal Representative was emphatic
that no recruitment in violation of the May 25 Code of
Conduct (which prohibited recruitment) would be permitted.
New child soldier recruits were unacceptable, and serving
child soldiers would be immediately demobilized. Martin said
that UNICEF was gearing up for a prominent role in the PLA
combatant registration process. Concerning the actual number
of PLA combatants, he recalled that the PLA had had an
estimated 12,000 fighters in 2005, but that the precise
current number was unknown. The tripartite technical
agreement would address criteria for determining combatants'
status and registration procedures. The agreement would also
cover the number of weapons the PLA could retain for
cantonment perimeter security.
Effective Police Critical
--------------
14. (C) Martin noted that, although the GON and Maoists had
not explicitly requested UN assistance in reconstituting
Nepal's police force, the issue was clearly critical to the
success of the peace process. He had raised it with PM
Koirala and would do so with Maoist Supremo Prachanda. The
UN rep recalled that a UN police advisor had been included in
KATHMANDU 00003103 004 OF 004
the UN's de Mistura peace mission in August, reflecting the
importance the UN attached to restoring law and order as part
of the peace process. He speculated that the interim
government would formally request UN support in
re-establishing a police presence across Nepal, noting that
in any case, police reform would be part of the UN's overall
mission in Nepal.
Dealing with the Maoist Militia
--------------
15. (C) Responding to a question from the German Ambassador
on how the November 21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
dealt with the Maoist militia, Martin said that while the CPA
did not provide for cantonment of militia, it was explicit in
prohibiting continued operation of an armed Maoist militia.
He noted that the GON had stood firm on the prohibition of
unlawful arms provision in the CPA, repeating his view that
the clause directly forbade the continued existence of an
armed Maoist militia.
Comment
--------------
16. (C) Martin's briefing was clearly intended to set the
stage for his upcoming consultations at UN headquarters and
to garner international community support for rapid
deployment of UN monitors to Nepal. Recognizing potential
constraints on rapid UNSC action to authorize immediate
deployment of monitors, Embassy Kathmandu believes that it is
important to fully explore the possibility of simultaneous
deployment of an initial group of UN monitors to Nepal while
a UN Technical Assessment Team is here.
MORIARTY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: UN PEACE TEAM CHIEF: UN MONITORS URGENTLY REQUIRED
***********************
* Missing Section 001 *
***********************
KATHMANDU 00003103 002 OF 004
in Nepal. The SG's Personal Representative underscored the
importance of the tripartite technical agreement on arms
management as the essential foundation for a UN monitoring
mission in Nepal. Pressed by DCM on what mechanism could be
employed to authorize an interim team of 35 monitors, Martin
replied that the issue would be decided by the UNSC and
member states.
Cantonment Issues
--------------
6. (C) The UN peace team leader noted the good cooperation
which initial joint working groups, including the UN, GON and
Maoists, had established while identifying seven divisional
cantonment sites. The issue of 21 sub-camps had initially
been a matter of contention because of the distance of
Maoist-proposed sub-camps from divisional sites. The Maoists
had ultimately been cooperative, however, agreeing that
sub-camps would be no more than two hours by road from
divisional cantonments, and to the greatest extent possible,
located in the same GON administrative district as the
divisional cantonment. Surveys of the 21 sub-camps had yet
to be completed, but the UN peace team had been augmented by
a Swiss colonel with two more military advisors on the way.
Tripartite Agreement
--------------
7. (C) The UN was currently negotiating the text of the
tripartite agreement, which addressed PLA force protection,
permissible activities by the Nepal Army, prohibited
activities, activities that require prior notification, and
the details of UN arms management monitoring. Martin
described the atmospherics of November 23 tripartite talks as
good, but emphasized that he expected difficulties given the
specificity of the agreement and differing perspectives
between the PLA and NA. Despite optimistic claims to the
contrary, the UN rep expected a technical agreement to take
some time, but hoped that his trip to New York would hasten
agreement. Both sides were keenly aware that the status of
the tripartite technical agreement would figure prominently
in his New York consultations, especially with member states.
UN Role Limited to Monitoring
--------------
8. (C) Reiterating his view that a UN presence on the
ground was critical, Martin emphasized that the UN's role
would be limited to monitoring and would not extend to camp
management, which was the responsibility of the GON and
Maoists. That said, the UN was concerned about the
practicalities of cantonment and their ramifications. He
recalled that he had advised the GON and Maoists against
immediate cantonment given the lack of preparation at
cantonment sites, advice that both sides had ignored in a
rush to implement the peace accord. Martin dispelled rumors
that the UN would provide training or salaries for PLA cadre.
On cantonment management, he underscored that the UN had
pressed the GON and Maoists to identify requirements and
approach the international community for assistance.
Human Rights, Cease-fire Monitoring
--------------
9. (C) On human rights and cease-fire monitoring, the SG's
Special Representative said that cantonment alone would not
transform the current climate in Nepal into one free of fear
and intimidation and conducive to a free and fair election.
He recognized that it could take some time to create an
atmosphere in which elections could proceed without
intimidation, pointing out the critical role for both
domestic and international monitors in supporting the
National Election Commission. He worried that elections
after June 2007 would have to slip until September, after the
monsoon, leaving large numbers of potentially disgruntled PLA
in cantonment and potentially undermining the election.
Martin said that the National Cease Fire Code of Conduct
Monitoring Committee (NMCC) had proven ineffective, in part
KATHMANDU 00003103 003 OF 004
because it was too large and unwieldy. In the UN's view, a
smaller and more effective replacement for the NMCC was
required. Civil society participation would be important.
DPA or DPKO Operation
--------------
10. (C) Martin reported that it was unclear whether the UN
monitoring mission to Nepal would take place under the aegis
of the UN Department of Political Affairs as a special
political mission or under the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations as a peacekeeping mission. Either way, DPKO would
have to operationally support a UN monitoring mission to
Nepal. While a political mission could be conducted under
existing budgetary authority, a DPKO deployment would require
specific authorization as well as U.S. Congressional
notification. A third possibility would be funding from the
recently established UN trust fund for the Nepal peace
process.
Recruiting Monitors
--------------
11. (C) On the issue of monitors, the SG's Personal
Representative said that it had proven difficult to find
enough former military monitors, and that DPKO preferred
active duty monitors in any case. Martin said he had
persuaded DPKO and DPA to agree to a mix of former and active
duty monitors. In fact, he added, the issue had gotten
confused because the UN had issued two separate requests to
member states, one a force generation request for UN Military
Observers, the other a request for civilian personnel. Both
would be deployed under identical conditions with civilians
paid by member states and active personnel carried on
existing national defense budgets. Approximately 25 member
states have responded to the UN's requests for monitors.
Minimum 150 Monitors Required
--------------
12. (C) Martin said that the number of monitors would be
determined by the UN's Technical Assessment Team and in part
depend on the number of sites at which the Nepal Army decided
upon to store its weapons under the peace accord. Whether
the NA would store its weapons at a single site or multiple
locations had not yet been resolved. At minimum, however,
the UN peace team believes that more than 150 monitors would
be required.
PLA Child Soldiers, Combatant Registration
--------------
13. (C) Addressing the related issues of forced child
soldier recruitment by the PLA and registration of
combatants, the SG's Personal Representative was emphatic
that no recruitment in violation of the May 25 Code of
Conduct (which prohibited recruitment) would be permitted.
New child soldier recruits were unacceptable, and serving
child soldiers would be immediately demobilized. Martin said
that UNICEF was gearing up for a prominent role in the PLA
combatant registration process. Concerning the actual number
of PLA combatants, he recalled that the PLA had had an
estimated 12,000 fighters in 2005, but that the precise
current number was unknown. The tripartite technical
agreement would address criteria for determining combatants'
status and registration procedures. The agreement would also
cover the number of weapons the PLA could retain for
cantonment perimeter security.
Effective Police Critical
--------------
14. (C) Martin noted that, although the GON and Maoists had
not explicitly requested UN assistance in reconstituting
Nepal's police force, the issue was clearly critical to the
success of the peace process. He had raised it with PM
Koirala and would do so with Maoist Supremo Prachanda. The
UN rep recalled that a UN police advisor had been included in
KATHMANDU 00003103 004 OF 004
the UN's de Mistura peace mission in August, reflecting the
importance the UN attached to restoring law and order as part
of the peace process. He speculated that the interim
government would formally request UN support in
re-establishing a police presence across Nepal, noting that
in any case, police reform would be part of the UN's overall
mission in Nepal.
Dealing with the Maoist Militia
--------------
15. (C) Responding to a question from the German Ambassador
on how the November 21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
dealt with the Maoist militia, Martin said that while the CPA
did not provide for cantonment of militia, it was explicit in
prohibiting continued operation of an armed Maoist militia.
He noted that the GON had stood firm on the prohibition of
unlawful arms provision in the CPA, repeating his view that
the clause directly forbade the continued existence of an
armed Maoist militia.
Comment
--------------
16. (C) Martin's briefing was clearly intended to set the
stage for his upcoming consultations at UN headquarters and
to garner international community support for rapid
deployment of UN monitors to Nepal. Recognizing potential
constraints on rapid UNSC action to authorize immediate
deployment of monitors, Embassy Kathmandu believes that it is
important to fully explore the possibility of simultaneous
deployment of an initial group of UN monitors to Nepal while
a UN Technical Assessment Team is here.
MORIARTY