UN POLITICAL ADVISOR ON ARMS MANAGEMENT AND UNSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003049

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NP UN
SUBJECT: UN POLITICAL ADVISOR ON ARMS MANAGEMENT AND UNSC
RESOLUTION

REF: USUN 2155

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Nicholas Dean. Reasons
1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) During a November 13 meeting with DCM, John Norris,
political advisor to Ian Martin, the UN Secretary General's
Personal Representative to Nepal, provided an update on
progress toward a detailed arms management agreement among
the governing Seven-Party Alliance (SPA),the Maoists, and
the United Nations. He also gave his perspective on
obtaining a UN Security Council resolution on Nepal. Norris
was optimistic the SPA and Maoists would reach a technical
agreement on arms management details; the team had completed
their visits to all seven proposed primary cantonment sites.
Norris said that the Government of Nepal (GON) would deliver
a general letter of request for UN assistance which would
reference the November 8th peace agreement as well as
previous SPA-Maoist agreements. The GON request would trigger
a letter from the Secretary General to the Security Council
to develop a resolution. Norris seemed confident that the
initial letter from the Secretary General to the Security
Council would be sufficient to enable the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to deploy a first wave of
40-50 monitors. Simultaneously, the SPA and Maoists need to
conclude negotiations on the details of the arms management
arrangement.

Tripartite Agreement on Arms Management Still Under Discussion
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2. (C) John Norris, political advisor to Ian Martin, the UN
Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal, told

SIPDIS
the DCM November 13 that the UN was still hashing out a
technical agreement between the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA)
and the Maoists regarding arms management. He remained
positive regarding both sides' continued commitment to the
process. The quick completion of assessment visits to the
proposed seven primary Maoist cantonment sites by combined
GON, Maoist and UN teams, Norris said, was a positive sign.
He mentioned that differences might emerge as the parties
finalized sticky details such as the exact number of People's
Liberation Army (PLA) combatants to be cantoned and how
eligibility for cantonment would be determined. Without a
technical agreement, Norris said, it would be impossible for
the UN mission to move the New York bureaucracy to do much
more than send an initial wave of monitors. He emphasized
that worldwide experience had shown that the more specific an
arms management agreement, the greater its potential for
success.

Some Arms Management Details
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3. (C) In terms of arms management details, Norris stressed
the importance of an effective registration and vetting
process for Maoist combatants as they entered cantonment
sites. Information gathered during this initial phase, he
said, would be vital for determining the future eligibility
of the PLA to join GON security forces. Norris said a
limited number of weapons would be set aside for protection
of the camps by the Maoists. DCM asked how a "limited number"
would be defined. Norris clarified, "just a handful." He
agreed with the DCM that it was essential to have an accurate
accounting of PLA weapons by serial number and to demand full
compliance with arms surrender provisions.

Maoist Command and Control Issues
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4. (C) Norris cited the potential internal management and
command-and-control issues the Maoists could face as they
finalized an arms management deal. He said the recent Maoist
Central Committee Meeting focused on determining the exact
number of weapons and fighters under their control as well as
detailing their force structure/order of battle. The UN has
requested order of battle from both the PLA and Nepal Army.
What Does Satellite Site Really Mean?
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5. (C) Norris said the UN had now visited all of the seven
proposed primary, or division-level cantonment sites, but
none of the satellite, or brigade-level sites that surround
the primary camps. Norris said the UN would push for close
proximity between the main and satellite sites as well as
requiring Maoists to register all the combatants at the main
sites before they dispersed to satellite camps. However,
Norris described proposed satellite sites that were an hour
drive from main cantonment areas. When asked why the Maoists
were pushing for multiple sites, Norris said he thought they
were "testing the fence," determining how far they could go
in dictating arms management parameters. However, Norris
remained confident that the Maoists would continue to display
flexibility on arms management parameters when challenged by
UN technical expertise. Norris also said the GON seemed to
be hanging tough on pushing for proximate sites. DCM
reiterated U.S. position that the sites should be
sufficiently close for effective monitoring, i.e. adjacent.

Toward a Security Council Resolution
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6. (C) Norris said that everyone, including the Prime
Minister, New Delhi and New York, were on the same page
regarding the need for a UN Security Council resolution.
Norris said that Nepal's Permanent Representative to the UN
was planning to deliver a simple, general request letter to
the UN referring to the November 8th as well as previous
peace agreements. This approach would avoid an additional
negotiation process between the GON and Maoists regarding
language for the request. The PermRep's request would spark
a letter from the Secretary General to the Security Council
requesting their attention to the matter. At that juncture,
the process of developing language for a resolution would
begin.

Letter from UN Secretary General Sufficient to Start
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7. (C) Norris seemed confident that the initial letter from
the Secretary General to the Security Council would be
sufficient to enable UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) to deploy an initial wave of 40-50 personnel for
monitoring. Simultaneously, the SPA and Maoists needed to
finish negotiations on the details of the arms management
arrangement. While DPKO is somewhat grumpy about this
piecemeal approach, Norris said, it offered the best
opportunity to get monitors on the ground quickly. Norris
said the monitors would be divided amongst the main
cantonment sites with frequent travel to the satellite sites.


Maoists Eager to Avoid UN Condemnation
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8. (C) Norris reiterated the UN mission would be a
monitoring mission, and would have limited enforcement
mechanisms. He did sense, however, that the Maoists remained
eager to avoid condemnation, and become a legitimate
political player, in the eyes of the international community.
He felt the content of the resolution would have to be
limited enough for India's acceptance, but detailed enough to
provide the necessary technical assistance requested of the
UN.

Need to Restore Local-Level Governance to Combat Militia
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9. (C) Norris said the Maoist militias were not under the
current arms management arrangement. He said, however, that
they would also be expected to turn in their weapons for
storage under lock-and-key like the PLA. He mentioned the
importance of re-establishing governance and security in the
countryside to address the issue, including re-empowering
Village Development Councils (VDCs) and security forces and
deploying both local and international monitors countrywide.
He described the UN's role as an "umbrella" for international
and local monitoring, ensuring that the countryside would be
covered by a range of observers, including arms management
monitors, electoral observers, police advisors and human
rights monitors. Norris stressed that, while he believed an
arms management deal would be worked out, his primary concern
remained how to promote local governance and security in the
countryside in the run-up to elections.


Comment
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10. (C) While Norris seemed optimistic regarding progress
on arms management details, we remain concerned regarding the
limitations the UN keeps professing. With a narrow
monitoring mandate, complex and important details such as who
will register/vet combatants as they enter camps, manage and
provide security within the camps, and transition combatants
from camps back to communities, among others, are left
unanswered. As the retainer of vast international
experience in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
processes, we hope the UN will weigh in strongly on technical
best practices and the international community will step in
with needed support to arms management efforts not under the
UN purview.


11. (C) Norris said that the Maoist militia, who are not
covered under the current cantonment scheme, will also be
required to turn in their weapons for storage under lock and
key, but he did not provide any details regarding how this
process would occur or what would be the militia's incentive
to hand over weapons. As the primary threats to law and
order in the countryside and potential perpetrators of
intimidation in the lead-up to elections, the militia issue
must be addressed.


12. (C) Progress toward a UN Security Council Resolution
seems to be unfolding as Norris predicted (reftel). We hope
to see a quick mobilization of arms monitors as well as a
Security Council Resolution as soon as possible that will
give an agreement between the SPA and Maoists "teeth" and
promote Maoist adherence to provisions. Although we
recognize the resolution will detail a UN monitoring mission,
we hope the resolution's content will reinforce the
agreements reached between the sides, recognizing that
violations are in the face of international law and Security
Council authority.
MORIARTY