UN POLITICAL ADVISOR ON ARMS MANAGEMENT AND UNSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003049 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV NP UN SUBJECT: UN POLITICAL ADVISOR ON ARMS MANAGEMENT AND UNSC RESOLUTION REF: USUN 2155 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During a November 13 meeting with DCM, John Norris, political advisor to Ian Martin, the UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal, provided an update on progress toward a detailed arms management agreement among the governing Seven-Party Alliance (SPA),the Maoists, and the United Nations. He also gave his perspective on obtaining a UN Security Council resolution on Nepal. Norris was optimistic the SPA and Maoists would reach a technical agreement on arms management details; the team had completed their visits to all seven proposed primary cantonment sites. Norris said that the Government of Nepal (GON) would deliver a general letter of request for UN assistance which would reference the November 8th peace agreement as well as previous SPA-Maoist agreements. The GON request would trigger a letter from the Secretary General to the Security Council to develop a resolution. Norris seemed confident that the initial letter from the Secretary General to the Security Council would be sufficient to enable the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to deploy a first wave of 40-50 monitors. Simultaneously, the SPA and Maoists need to conclude negotiations on the details of the arms management arrangement. Tripartite Agreement on Arms Management Still Under Discussion -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) John Norris, political advisor to Ian Martin, the UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal, told SIPDIS the DCM November 13 that the UN was still hashing out a technical agreement between the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists regarding arms management. He remained positive regarding both sides' continued commitment to the process. The quick completion of assessment visits to the proposed seven primary Maoist cantonment sites by combined GON, Maoist and UN teams, Norris said, was a positive sign. He mentioned that differences might emerge as the parties finalized sticky details such as the exact number of People's Liberation Army (PLA) combatants to be cantoned and how eligibility for cantonment would be determined. Without a technical agreement, Norris said, it would be impossible for the UN mission to move the New York bureaucracy to do much more than send an initial wave of monitors. He emphasized that worldwide experience had shown that the more specific an arms management agreement, the greater its potential for success. Some Arms Management Details -------------- ¶3. (C) In terms of arms management details, Norris stressed the importance of an effective registration and vetting process for Maoist combatants as they entered cantonment sites. Information gathered during this initial phase, he said, would be vital for determining the future eligibility of the PLA to join GON security forces. Norris said a limited number of weapons would be set aside for protection of the camps by the Maoists. DCM asked how a "limited number" would be defined. Norris clarified, "just a handful." He agreed with the DCM that it was essential to have an accurate accounting of PLA weapons by serial number and to demand full compliance with arms surrender provisions. Maoist Command and Control Issues -------------- ¶4. (C) Norris cited the potential internal management and command-and-control issues the Maoists could face as they finalized an arms management deal. He said the recent Maoist Central Committee Meeting focused on determining the exact number of weapons and fighters under their control as well as detailing their force structure/order of battle. The UN has requested order of battle from both the PLA and Nepal Army. What Does Satellite Site Really Mean? -------------- ¶5. (C) Norris said the UN had now visited all of the seven proposed primary, or division-level cantonment sites, but none of the satellite, or brigade-level sites that surround the primary camps. Norris said the UN would push for close proximity between the main and satellite sites as well as requiring Maoists to register all the combatants at the main sites before they dispersed to satellite camps. However, Norris described proposed satellite sites that were an hour drive from main cantonment areas. When asked why the Maoists were pushing for multiple sites, Norris said he thought they were "testing the fence," determining how far they could go in dictating arms management parameters. However, Norris remained confident that the Maoists would continue to display flexibility on arms management parameters when challenged by UN technical expertise. Norris also said the GON seemed to be hanging tough on pushing for proximate sites. DCM reiterated U.S. position that the sites should be sufficiently close for effective monitoring, i.e. adjacent. Toward a Security Council Resolution -------------- ¶6. (C) Norris said that everyone, including the Prime Minister, New Delhi and New York, were on the same page regarding the need for a UN Security Council resolution. Norris said that Nepal's Permanent Representative to the UN was planning to deliver a simple, general request letter to the UN referring to the November 8th as well as previous peace agreements. This approach would avoid an additional negotiation process between the GON and Maoists regarding language for the request. The PermRep's request would spark a letter from the Secretary General to the Security Council requesting their attention to the matter. At that juncture, the process of developing language for a resolution would begin. Letter from UN Secretary General Sufficient to Start -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Norris seemed confident that the initial letter from the Secretary General to the Security Council would be sufficient to enable UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to deploy an initial wave of 40-50 personnel for monitoring. Simultaneously, the SPA and Maoists needed to finish negotiations on the details of the arms management arrangement. While DPKO is somewhat grumpy about this piecemeal approach, Norris said, it offered the best opportunity to get monitors on the ground quickly. Norris said the monitors would be divided amongst the main cantonment sites with frequent travel to the satellite sites. Maoists Eager to Avoid UN Condemnation -------------- ¶8. (C) Norris reiterated the UN mission would be a monitoring mission, and would have limited enforcement mechanisms. He did sense, however, that the Maoists remained eager to avoid condemnation, and become a legitimate political player, in the eyes of the international community. He felt the content of the resolution would have to be limited enough for India's acceptance, but detailed enough to provide the necessary technical assistance requested of the UN. Need to Restore Local-Level Governance to Combat Militia -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Norris said the Maoist militias were not under the current arms management arrangement. He said, however, that they would also be expected to turn in their weapons for storage under lock-and-key like the PLA. He mentioned the importance of re-establishing governance and security in the countryside to address the issue, including re-empowering Village Development Councils (VDCs) and security forces and deploying both local and international monitors countrywide. He described the UN's role as an "umbrella" for international and local monitoring, ensuring that the countryside would be covered by a range of observers, including arms management monitors, electoral observers, police advisors and human rights monitors. Norris stressed that, while he believed an arms management deal would be worked out, his primary concern remained how to promote local governance and security in the countryside in the run-up to elections. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) While Norris seemed optimistic regarding progress on arms management details, we remain concerned regarding the limitations the UN keeps professing. With a narrow monitoring mandate, complex and important details such as who will register/vet combatants as they enter camps, manage and provide security within the camps, and transition combatants from camps back to communities, among others, are left unanswered. As the retainer of vast international experience in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes, we hope the UN will weigh in strongly on technical best practices and the international community will step in with needed support to arms management efforts not under the UN purview. ¶11. (C) Norris said that the Maoist militia, who are not covered under the current cantonment scheme, will also be required to turn in their weapons for storage under lock and key, but he did not provide any details regarding how this process would occur or what would be the militia's incentive to hand over weapons. As the primary threats to law and order in the countryside and potential perpetrators of intimidation in the lead-up to elections, the militia issue must be addressed. ¶12. (C) Progress toward a UN Security Council Resolution seems to be unfolding as Norris predicted (reftel). We hope to see a quick mobilization of arms monitors as well as a Security Council Resolution as soon as possible that will give an agreement between the SPA and Maoists "teeth" and promote Maoist adherence to provisions. Although we recognize the resolution will detail a UN monitoring mission, we hope the resolution's content will reinforce the agreements reached between the sides, recognizing that violations are in the face of international law and Security Council authority. MORIARTY