FOREIGN MINISTER OLI PESSIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003033 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL PREF NP SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER OLI PESSIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR PEACE REF: A. KATHMANDU 3014 ¶B. KATHMANDU 2931 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a November 10 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister KP Oli expressed strong personal reservations about the November 8 agreement between the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists (ref A). Oli worried that the November 8 agreement set a bad example by letting the Maoists into government and Parliament without having taken part in legitimate elections. Oli felt he had been purposely left out of negotiations during his trip to New Delhi, and said that Prime Minister Koirala and other political players were more interested in their own positions than in creating a sustainable peace in the country. The Deputy Prime Minister was pessimistic about the prospects for monitoring or holding the Maoists accountable for any breach of the November 8 agreement. Oli also discussed the future of the Bhutanese refugees living in Nepal and his upcoming talks with the Bhutanese government on the issue. Personal Opinion: November 8 Peace Agreement Not Good -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 10, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister KP Oli told the Ambassador that the GON's official view was that the November 8 agreement between the GON and the Maoists was a "great achievement, and the GON and the Maoists should be congratulated for their hard work toward peace." However, Oli made it clear that his personal opinion was that the agreement was not a step forward, but merely a vehicle for the Maoists to continue to pursue their agenda. ¶3. (C) The Deputy Prime Minister explained that there were three main risks to the agreement for the GON. First, the Maoists had not declared an end to their policy and ideology of violence. Second, the figure of 35,000 soldiers that the Maoists claimed they would put in the camps was ridiculously high; the Maoist People's Liberation Army had at most 15,000 soldiers. This, the Maoists would use the movement into cantonments as an excuse to recruit and train new soldiers. Finally, the Maoists now had the opportunity to assert themselves in the interim government and legislature, without having participated in legitimate elections. Oli stated that he was sure that Lilamani Pokharel, MP for the United People's Front, and others from civil society would join a coalition with the Maoists, giving them the largest party in the interim legislature. Oli feared that, with Maoists in the government, if the Maoists decided to cause problems, the rest of the government would have to capitulate. The Deputy PM worried that Maoist abuses would continue to occur, and that the agreement would not stop them. Everyone Wants To Please The Maoists -------------- ¶4. (C) Oli told the Ambassador that everyone wanted to please the Maoists, "but no one seems to see the risks." Oli said that the GON had continued to give in to the Maoists during negotiations because of threats and intimidation. He also said that the Maoists had extorted "billions of rupees" and were spending them to help get their way. Oli stated that now that the Maoists were entering into the government through negotiations, the people will feel more like the Maoists have won through intimidation. The Deputy PM reiterated that he felt like the only one in the Cabinet who opposed the Maoists, and that he had intentionally been excluded from the negotiations leading up to the November 8 agreement. (Note: Oli was in New Delhi when the negotiations began, and was in the process of returning when they concluded. End Note.) Arms Management Will Be Ineffective -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked Oli how the GON could make the arms management process as effective as possible, in order to drain the fear of the Maoists in the countryside. Oli stated that it was impossible in the current situation to do so, because the Maoists maintained effective control over their weapons. The November 8 agreement gave them the only key, so they could get their weapons back at any time. Although Oli hoped that the November 16 peace agreement might be more specific in limiting Maoist access to their weapons once they were locked up, he doubted the Maoists would agree. Oli worried that, having accepted the Maoist position on an interim government, an interim legislature, and cantonments, the GON would continue to accept the Maoist position on other issues as well. Where Do Maoist MPs Come From? -------------- ¶6. (C) Oli wondered where the Maoist MPs would come from in an interim legislature. The Deputy PM said that the Maoists did not have people of the "caliber" to sit in Parliament or run a government and suggested that perhaps Maoist militia members would be MPs. Oli worried that the Prime Minister and the leaders of the other Seven-Party Alliance parties were only looking out for their own best interests and not on holding the Maoists accountable for their actions. Oli stated that, "Prime Minister Koirala is just looking for his Nobel Prize." Expanded Police Force From Maoists -------------- ¶7. (C) Oli acknowledged that the police force would be expanded to enforce law and order during the transitional period. He feared, however, that many of these new recruits would come from the Maoist militia. The Ambassador told Oli that he had been assured that Maoists would not be integrated into the police force. The Deputy PM responded that it was impossible to tell a Maoist from a non-Maoist when recruiting for the police force. Meeting With Bhutan About Refugees -------------- ¶8. (C) Oli was convinced that his upcoming meeting with the Bhutanese Foreign Minister on November 21 would not resolve the refugee issue. The Deputy PM said he did not believe Bhutan would agree to repatriate any refugees. He stated that, if that was the case, he would be ready soon to look at "other options." The Ambassador repeated the U.S. offer to take at least 60,000 refugees and thanked Oli for allowing the UNHCR to conduct a census of the camps. Oli responded that Nepal had a fear that resettlement in a third country would encourage Bhutan to expel more refugees. He insisted that Nepal would not allow more refugees to cross the border into Nepal in the future. Oli said he had spoken with the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister when he was in New Delhi and they had said the Government of India would be supportive, although Oli did not explain what they meant by this. Oli stated that he would "stop the bilateral talks" if the November 21 meeting did not lead to a breakthrough. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Oli seems more and more like the odd-man out in the Cabinet as peace talks between the GON and the Maoists move toward their conclusion. Unfortunately, the Deputy PM is one of the few voices in the Seven-Party Alliance willing to hold the Maoists accountable for their past and present actions. Oli is convinced that the interim government will be filled with people who are "Maoists or Maoist sympathizers," but he has increasingly less room to make his case in public. We will continue our efforts to buck up Oli and a few others like him (e.g. Finance Minister Ram Sharan Mahat). A comprehensive peace deal may be signed later this week but it will be even more important for leaders like Oli to speak openly about Maoist abuses in the days and weeks ahead. MORIARTY