CHALLENGES FACING THE NEPALI POLICE: SECURING LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002972 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/INS, INL (BOULDIN) DEPT OF JUSTICE FOR ICITAP (BARR, SAKUMOTO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM MARR NP UN SUBJECT: CHALLENGES FACING THE NEPALI POLICE: SECURING LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION REF: A. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ICITAP) REPORT ON NEPAL'S LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES (JULY 2006) ¶B. SEPTEL: LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION: CHALLENGES FACING NEPAL Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) From September 20 to 29, 2006 TDYers Christa Skerry and Holly Benner from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) met with officials from the USG, Nepal security forces, Nepal government officials, journalists, local and international NGOs, the United Nations, and the U.K. Embassy to assess the law and order situation in Nepal (septel). During consultations, consensus emerged that the civilian police, as opposed to Nepal's Armed Police Force (APF) or Nepal Army (NA),were the most acceptable institution to provide security during negotiation and implementation of a peace settlement. The following key challenges face the police: 1) the failure of political leadership to provide firm guidance or direction to the police; 2) limited police capacity, including inadequate training, professionalism, equipment, facilities, and funding; 3) fear of Maoists, particularly Maoist militia; and 4) poor community relations. In para 11, we identify a series of steps that could be taken to address these challenges. Lack of Political Leadership and Direction -------------- ¶2. (C) When asked why the police had not been active in addressing rising criminality and Maoist violations of the Ceasefire Code of Conduct, Nepali security officials, NGOs, and international partners said Government of Nepal political leaders were giving the police no clear direction, orders, or support (septel). Officials from the National Police Academy described their priority challenge as the absence of a national policy governing police activities. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) referred to the low morale of the police, and their lack of mandate "from above" to address Maoist violations. Lack of clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities the various security forces, particularly the Armed Police, would have under a future peace settlement was also reported as an obstacle to the re-establishment of law and order. Many felt the police were cautious in carrying out investigations of Maoist crime because they were unclear how the peace settlement would unfold and feared retribution if the Maoists entered government and/or were integrated into the police force. Limited Police Capacity -------------- ¶3. (C) Police Academy representatives and the Police Inspector General (IG) also described severe capacity challenges with respect to recruitment, training, investigative capabilities, equipment and facilities. Officials of the Police Academy reported that the police presence is estimated to be 500 (civilians) to 1 (police officer) in Kathmandu and 600 - 700 to 1 in the countryside. In the countryside, many police posts have been damaged or destroyed during the 10-year insurgency; facilities will need to be rebuilt or repaired and equipment replaced if the police are to re-establish a credible presence in rural areas. The Home Ministry reported that of the 96,000 police posts operating before the insurgency, only 8,000 to 9,000 now exist. ¶4. (SBU) Many international and local NGOs also described the police as lacking professionalism and capacity. The UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) noted the small percentage of crimes that are investigated and said that, in many of the rural areas where UNOCHA operates, police are "armed with sticks." UNOCHA described the historic and continuing human rights abuses it believes are perpetrated by the police. ¶5. (C) Officials from the Police Academy, the Police IG, and representatives of the Ministry of Home Affairs described their many plans for an improved and expanded police presence, including: a new national training center; strengthened regional training centers; a new "metropolitan police force" in Kathmandu Valley to address urban challenges; the re-establishment of a police presence (police posts) in the countryside; and a renewed focus on strengthening investigative and forensic capability. However, they complained that the wait for a peace settlement and government orders as well as a lack of funds were stalling their plans. Beyond limited training opportunities, they said, the Indians were currently the only bilateral partners offering significant support to the police. A successful UK program, that included community policing, was terminated following the King's takeover last year. The UK Embassy reported that they had no plans to initiate new support. In contrast, the Indian Government has decided to being providing the police trucks and communications equipment. Challenges in Mobilization and Implementation -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Many of those interviewed reported low morale among police, particularly outside of the Kathmandu Valley. After a decade of insurgency, with much of the Maoist violence focused on police, interviewees reported deep-seated fear among the police. UN representatives and local NGOs described "image issues" faced by the police due to ineffective public relations and lack of public confidence in their capabilities. Many also said the police were looked down upon and treated poorly by the Nepal Army, which is regarded as much better equipped and educated, and more successful against the Maoists. ¶7. (C) Police Academy officials described plans to create a force that would be, "more oriented toward, and responsive to, the people," a departure from their previous counter-insurgency focus. They also mentioned their desire to focus on community policing and community partnership programs that emphasized dialogue and interaction between the police and local communities. The Police IG and officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs had plans to reestablish police stations along Nepal's southern border, focused along the East-West highway, as a first step toward reasserting control in more remote areas. Comment/Next Steps: -------------- ¶8. (C) During consultations, the civilian police emerged as both the most acceptable Nepali security institution to enforce law and order during transition, but also as the security institution in most dire need of leadership and capacity building. While police institutions had notional plans on how they could address the current security vacuum, all action was stalled by the wait for direction from political leadership, greater clarity on the terms of a peace settlement, and funds. ¶9. (C) To address the deteriorating security situation, the U.S. should strongly consider additional support to the police. In June, 2006, police experts from the Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) conducted an extensive assessment of Nepal law enforcement capabilities, identifying key areas of need.(reftel) These included: 1) police reform and organizational development; 2) technical skills training; and 3) forensic assistance. Post looks forward to the arrival of an ICITAP police advisor who will be placed with the Nepali police beginning December 2006. ¶10. (C) Capacity building assistance to the police should be tied to a wider U.S. strategy to support reform of Nepal's security sector and must be linked to the ongoing peace process. TDYers identified a further deterioration of law and order since the June ICITAP assessment, as well as near-paralysis of the civilian police force in the face of Maoist criminality. This paralysis was rooted in challenges that went beyond technical and capacity-building needs. An enabling political environment for the police to carry out their duties, including a mandate from political leadership and an identified role for the police in a peace settlement is essential. Morale and fear issues must also be addressed. The fact remains, however, that GON policy, endorsed by the Prime Minister himself, is that a restoration of law and order must wait until the Maoist People's Liberation Army is confined to cantonment sites. ¶11. (C) TDYers identified the following types of police assistance that could be considered as part of a future USG Security Sector Strategy: --Promote dialogue between police institutions and political leadership; --Promote attention to security sector reform in the peace process, including delineated roles for civilian and armed police and clear terms regarding any Maoist integration into future security forces; --Support police capacity building in areas of priority need for addressing deteriorating law and order (reference ICITAP's assessment); --Support a public relations/public outreach campaign on the police's role to build public confidence in the police; --Emphasize re-establishment of police presence outside of Kathmandu; support potential integrated security; governance, and service-delivery platforms in regional centers; --Explore support for community policing efforts; and --Engage other potential donors (UK, UN, EU) on possible budget support for the police. MORIARTY