DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OLI CONCERNED ABOUT MAOIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002931 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL IN NP SUBJECT: DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OLI CONCERNED ABOUT MAOIST INTENTIONS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on November 1, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister KP Oli shared his concerns about whether the Maoists intended to enter the political mainstream peacefully. He explained that the international community was playing an important role in the peace process, but ultimately the solution needed to come from within Nepal. The Ambassador noted that the only acceptable solution to the current political problem was one that diminished the Nepali people's fear of the Maoists. Oli insisted that the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists could reach a peaceful settlement only if the GON convinced the Maoists to give up their ideology of violence. Oli was noncommittal when the Ambassador asked when the GON would decide to begin to enforce law and order against Maoist abuses. Oli worried about India's growing recognition of the Maoist leadership, even though India still formally considered the Maoists terrorists. International Community Plays An Important Role -------------- -- ¶2. (C) In a November 1 meeting, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister KP Oli told the Ambassador that he had been attempting to explain to the Nepali public through the media that the entire world wanted peace, democracy, and prosperity in Nepal. Oli made it clear that the solution to the current problems needed to come from within Nepal and could not come from foreign governments. That said, Oli stressed that the U.S. and other international actors were playing an important role in the current peace process -- a role he hoped would continue to pressure the Maoists to give up violence. Oli doubted whether the Maoists intended to enter into a peaceful political process. Solution Must Address Fear -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Oli that any peace deal had to be a package that diminished the fear of Maoist violence in the minds of the Nepali public. Oli agreed and stated that he saw a three-pronged package as necessary to reduce fear. The Maoists needed to give up their policy and ideology of violence, their instruments and means of violence, and their activities and practices of violence. Oli insisted that, until the Maoists were ready to give up the policy of violence to achieve their ends, there could not be peace in Nepal. He asserted that the Maoists were not yet ready to give up violence, or they would have already done so instead of continuing to use extortion, violence, and abduction as political tools across the country. Government Afraid To Restore Law And Order -------------- ¶4. (C) When asked by the Ambassador when the GON would finally begin to restore law and order, Oli was noncommittal. Oli insisted that he had continuously asked the Prime Minister to order the Home Ministry to use the police to stop Maoist abduction and extortion. However, the PM would not because he feared the Maoists would then walk away from the peace negotiations. The Ambassador asked what legitimate basis the Maoists would have to complain if the GON made them stop their use of violence. Oli implied that he understood but was outnumbered in the cabinet by others who wanted a "breakthrough" in the peace talks at any cost. Oli stated that people who were counting on the Maoists would be "seriously deceived" in the end. In spite of his personal opinion to the contrary, Oli still publicly supported the PM's line that if the GON started doing the "right thing" now and cracked down on Maoist atrocities, the Maoists might indeed feel targeted and go back to a violent struggle. Concern About India's Role -------------- ¶5. (C) Oli told the Ambassador that he had asked the heads of foreign missions not to meet formally with the Maoist leadership during the ongoing negotiations. He complained about the Indian Ambassador's meeting with Maoist supremo Prachanda the day before, even though the Government of India still considered the Maoists terrorists. Oli expressed concern that the meeting gave the impression that the Maoists were already an essential part of Nepali politics. Oli stated that he felt compelled to request India to release the Maoist leaders held in Indian jails during his upcoming trip to New Delhi. Oli wondered out loud why India was rushing to have a relationship with Prachanda when he was not even part of the government. (Note: Indian Ambassador Mukherjee told the Ambassador on November 2 that he had met with Prachanda at the request of the Prime Minister in order to push the Maoists to accept a GON proposal on arms management -- septel.) Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) KP Oli continues to take a strong stand against allowing the Maoists into the government without effective arms management. However, his opinion seems to be in the minority in the Prime Minister's cabinet. Oli's obvious difficulty in "toeing the line" on the issue of restoring law and order is refreshing, but for now, however, Oli appears to be one of a few voices in the cabinet ready to stand up to Maoist demands. MORIARTY