PM'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR UPBEAT ON PEACE TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002773

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UN NP
SUBJECT: PM'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR UPBEAT ON PEACE TALKS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) PM Koirala's Foreign Policy Advisor, Dr. Suresh
Chalise, was upbeat regarding the prospects for a peace deal
between the (Government of Nepal) GON and Maoists in a
meeting with CDA October 18. He said that the PM had
instructed him to deliver a hard-line message to the UN peace
team on the need to separate the Maoists from their arms in a
meeting later that day. The PM's advisor believed that the
Maoists are under pressure to join the GON quickly while they
still have momentum and before popular resentment cuts off
their avenue to power. The GON is not prepared to crack down
on Maoist abuses until after the Maoists are in cantonment.
The GON welcomes Indian involvement in the peace process,
including the UN peace team's lightning October 17 visit to
New Delhi. Chalise said the PM was confident the GON cannot
be overwhelmed by the Maoists, a view, he added, many others
in the GON share. End summary.

GON Maintaining Hard Line on Arms Separation
--------------


2. (C) Chalise began the discussion by noting that he had
been instructed that morning by Prime Minister Koirala to
deliver an uncompromising message on arms management to the
UN peace team headed by Ian Martin. He said that the PM had
told him to make clear to Martin that the GON rejected any
suggestion of equivalence between the Nepal ARMY and the
People's Liberation Army. The GON insists that the Maoists
lay down their weapons before entering the GON, Chalise
reiterated. The GON took a dim view of the proposal by the
UN to consider the "Sudan model," which the PM's advisor
suggested would involve Maoist entry into the GON with arms.
Responding to CDA's query as to why the Maoists would
contemplate surrendering their weapons, the PM's advisor
declared that the Maoists recognize that they cannot win by
force of arms and are eager to join the GON by alternate
means.

Pressure on Maoists
--------------


3. (C) The PM's advisor argued that the Maoists enjoy little
support among the Nepali people, are increasingly isolated
because of their continuing criminal behavior, and smart at
the opprobrium of the international community. He said that
the Maoists recognized that they had a window of opportunity
to enter the government and that this window was beginning to
close as popular resentment of their activities increased.
The GON sought to capitalize on the Maoists' eagerness to
join the GON as soon as possible to extract concessions from
the insurgents. Chalise added that, while differences
remained between the GON and Maoists on arms management and
the monarchy, the Maoists had been unequivocal in identifying
"rehabilitation and reintegration" of PLA fighters as a top
priority.

India, the U.S. and the International Community
-------------- --


4. (C) Chalise welcomed the newly active role of India in
Nepal's peace process, epitomized by UN peace team leader Ian
Martin's flying one-day visit to New Delhi on October 17.
"Who cares what color the cat is, at long as it catches
mice," he observed, welcoming the more proactive Indian
stance which emerged over the weekend of October 14-15.
Regarding the United States, Chalise expressed the GON's
appreciation for our consistent stance on arms management and
law and order. Describing the GON-Maoist peace talks as
"extremely delicate," he said that continued U.S. engagement
along these lines with the international community and
especially "educating" the UN were vital. The PM's advisor
reiterated the importance of pressure from the broader
international community in curbing the more egregious
excesses of the Maoists and in motivating them to moderate
their behavior in order to enter the government.

Law and Order: Not Yet --------------


5. (C) Pressed by CDA on the need to restore law and order,
especially outside Kathmandu, the PM's advisor emphasized
that the GON recognizes the problem but does not believe that
the time is ripe for action yet. The advisor repeated
earlier claims that the GON has a plan to restore law and
order, beginning with replacement of the Home Minister, but
cannot do so until after peace talks are concluded
successfully and the PLA is in cantonment. He underscored
the fact that Nepalis have suffered the ravages of an
insurgency for over a decade, emphasizing that Nepalis would
be more than willing to endure three or four months of
lawlessness in order to secure a lasting peace. Regarding
the threat posed by the Maoist militia, Chalise discounted
estimates that they number as many as 100,000 and said that
the problem was manageable.

Tension Down, GON Alert, Summit after Tihar
--------------


6. (C) Dr. Chalise agreed that tension levels related to the
insurgency in Nepal and the prospect of a violent Maoist
uprising had decreased markedly in recent weeks. He conceded
that this might be the result of a combination of wishful
thinking and sharply reduced rhetoric on the part of the
Maoists. Talks are ongoing at the GON-Maoist negotiating
team level. Pleasant as this was, the PM's advisor
emphasized, the GON remained wary of Maoist intentions,
although hopeful that the variety of forces pushing the
Maoists toward the political mainstream would carry the day.
Chalise expected summit talks to resume after Tihar. (Note:
The last day of Tihar is October 24. End note.) He
emphasized that Prime Minister Koirala would maintain a hard
line on arms management, expressing appreciation for CDA's
underscoring of U.S. support for the GON.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The most striking part of Chalise's remarks was the
calm confidence which he exuded. Judging by his foreign
policy advisor's assessment as well as his own public
pronouncements, Prime Minister Koirala's government appears
confident that it cannot be overwhelmed by the Maoists.
Equally telling, however, were the advisor's repeated
references to the importance of external support in
bolstering the GON and external pressure in helping to drive
the Maoists toward an acceptable peace deal. The powerful
effect of India's entry into the fray, the development of the
day which has Kathmandu's chattering classes agog, testifies
to the continued importance of robust U.S. engagement at this
critical juncture. U.S. support should continue to take the
form of backstopping the GON while respecting the delicacy of
the current phase of peace negotiations. Equally
importantly, U.S. activity should include continued
engagement with other diplomatic actors here (India in
particular, the UK and EU countries),and especially the UN.
DEAN