OCTOBER 15 PEACE AGREEMENT LIKELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002734 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: OCTOBER 15 PEACE AGREEMENT LIKELY REF: A. KATHMANDU 2732 ¶B. KATHMANDU 2700 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) It appears that agreement on Maoist entry into the interim government, arms management and the Constituent Assembly could be reached at the October 15 Summit Talks. October 13 discussions with USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert, the Prime Minister's (PM's) Defense Advisor Ramesh Jung Thapa and Seven Party Alliance (SPA) talks team member Nidhi reflected consensus that agreement on those key issues is close. Siebert reported that on October 12 the Prime Minster Koirala offered Prachanda his "Three Point Option," which consisted of the following consecutive steps: 1) Maoists join an interim government by November 15 with an agreement to lock up their arms; 2) Maoists lock up their arms; and 3) the Government of Nepal (GON) holds Constituent Assembly elections. Siebert explained that the GON could still claim to have maintained their arms management red line while the Maoists could assert they were entering the GON with arms. Bottom line was that arms management would result. In separate discussion, Thapa declared agreement "80 percent" likely, emphasizing that the GON had held firm on arms management. Emboff's discussions with Bimalendra Nidhi, General Secretary of the Nepal Congress - Democratic (NC-D) and talks team member, also indicated that Prachanda had agreed to arms management. End summary. THE PM'S NEW "EVERYONE WINS" APPROACH -------------- ¶2. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert told Charge and Acting USAID Director that Prime Minister G.P. Koirala and Maoist leader Prachanda met on the morning of October 12 and decided they would carry away an agreed enthusiastic public message about the current status of the talks while postponing the decisions initially scheduled for that afternoon until October 15. This tracked with Siebert's expectations (ref B). According to Siebert, all of the Seven Party Alliance leaders were informed of the message and postponement before scheduled talks began in the afternoon. The PM chaired the afternoon talks, which only lasted two hours, and asked Prachanda to explain the joint decision to the rest of the team, a move Siebert praised as tactically clever. PM'S THREE POINT OPTION 
 -------------- ¶3. (C) The PM had discussed with Prachanda his new "three point option," which called for sequential Maoist entry into an interim government by November 15 with an agreement to lock up their arms, followed by a lock up of Maoist arms, and then Constituent Assembly elections. Siebert described this new tactic as a "sly gimmick" by the PM, as it would allow the GON to achieve arms management without forcing the Maoists to lose face. According to Siebert, the PM had successfully twisted Prachanda's arm. While the Maoists publicly blamed the GON for delaying talks, the Maoist side actually needed time to assess this new situation. More importantly, Prachanda needed time to sell the deal to his cadre. While arms management details had not yet been finalized, the initial proposal foresaw 20-30 percent of the Nepal Army's arms "locked up" while the Maoists would immediately lock up 50 percent and the rest by elections. Siebert emphasized that he did not expect Nepal Army (NA) weapons to be locked up, but rather kept in their usual armories under NA control with some sort of breakable seal. He welcomed the new-found willingness of the UN team headed by Ian Martin to immediately engage in tripartite arms management discussions with the GON and Maoists. UN expertise would be vital to making any formula work. ¶4. (C) Charge welcomed this new approach, but questioned how it could be described as a win-win situation. How could the government say to the public that it continued to hold the line on arms management with the Maoists saying they managed to enter the interim government before disarming? Siebert explained that the Prime Minster had not taken any of the government's positions off the table, but only rearranged the language so that an agreement to manage arms was now the focal point, rather than simply arms management. According to Siebert, the PM had created a sequential package that still required the Maoists to lock up their arms. He noted that the GON reserved the right to cancel elections should the Maoists fail to surrender their weapons. MAOIST ENTRY INTO GON, CANTONMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Siebert said an agreement under which the Maoists would enter government within 30 days of signature, and enter cantonment three days after signing, would greatly reduce Maoist extortion, abductions and violence. Siebert recognized that this construct left a huge time gap in which the GON itself would have to handle cantonment preparation and administration until the UN could staff up to monitor the People Liberation Army (PLA) cantonments. Funding would be a critical issue, which could perhaps be addressed by GON borrowing. He suggested that the World Bank or the Norwegians would be open to funding the cantonments, including feeding the Maoists. CHAOTIC TALKS PROCESS -------------- ¶6. (C) Siebert lamented that the Summit Talks completely fell into free-for-all chaos whenever the PM left the room, because none of the Party or Maoist leaders would support each other's leadership. To improve the situation and initiate some house cleaning of the many points now on the table, the peace facilitation team had provided procedural mechanisms and points of order that they hoped to get on the October 15 agenda. If successful, Siebert expected subsequent meetings of technical working groups to follow. NEPAL ARMY INTERFERENCE? -------------- ¶7. (C) Siebert warned Charge that NA officials had intimated that the NA was considering a statement conveying its support for the monarchy. Siebert reported that he strongly advised the NA officials to stay out of the political arena, abide by Army Chief of Staff General Katawal's public support for civilian rule, and focus on the technical implementation of any agreements. He described the rumored statement as potentially very damaging to the peace process. PM DEFENSE ADVISOR OPTIMISTIC -------------- ¶8. (C) Prime Minister Koirala's Defense Advisor Ramesh Jung Thapa welcomed Charge's reiteration of strong U.S. support for the Seven Party Alliance GON in high-pressure talks with the Maoists, especially its strong stance insisting on separation of Maoists from their arms. Thapa declared that he was 80 percent confident that an agreement would be reached with the Maoists on arms management on October 15. The PM's Defense Advisor credited the hard line taken by the United States, and to a lesser extent India, with a critical role in this positive development. Thapa noted that in discussions with Prime Minister Koirala, Maoist Supremo Prachanda had agreed with the PM that the terms of Maoist arms management had to be acceptable to the international community. Thapa underscored his view that implementation of arms management would be complex and difficult and require expertise from the NA as well as international support from the UN. He emphasized the NA's acceptance of civilian control and its divorce from the monarchy. Thapa noted that he had heard of the rumored pro-royal statement. He insisted, however, that the NA was loyal and that the GON and COAS Katawal, whom he trusted implicitly, would prevent any missteps. SPA TALKS TEAM MEMBER CONFIDENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Emboff's separate discussions with Bimalendra Nidhi, General Secretary of the Nepal Congress - Democratic (NC-D) and member of the talks team, further suggested that the entire gamut of agreements, including separating the Maoists from their arms vis-a-vis establishing an interim government and a Constituent Assembly could result from the October 15 Summit meeting. Nidhi told Emboff that on October 12 Prachanda and the Communist Party Nepal - United Marxist-Leninst (CPN-UML) boss Madhar Kumar Nepal had agreed to NC and NC-D proposals postponing the issue of the monarchy until the Constituent Assembly polls, rather insisting on an immediate stand alone referendum on the monarchy. According to Nidhi, in October 12 meetings with Prachanda, both the PM and NC-D President Deuba continued to insist that any fruitful resolution required the Maoists to first agree to separate themselves from their arms. They reportedly said that neither an interim parliament could be formed nor a Constituent Assembly poll date set without arms management being settled. ¶10. (C) Nidhi reported that Prachanda had emphasized that separation of arms was a sensitive issue and needed to be handled in a phased manner, in particular to gain the acceptance of the Maoist rank and file. Prachanda reportedly further agreed to confine the Maoist PLA into cantonments in the first phase, lock up arms under UN supervision in the second phase, and then separate the Maoist PLA from their arms. However, Nidhi said Prachanda had warned that his own agreement to arms separation did not indicate that the PLA Commanders would also agree. Much persuasion would be required. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Indications are that a GON-Maoist peace agreement sequentially laying out each step of arms management, interim government formation and a constituent assembly could be reached at the October 15 Summit Talks. While far from a panacea, such an agreement would be a further step towards peace in Nepal, accelerating a long-stalled peace process towards a lasting peace. The exact terms of the deal remain unclear, and the devil is very much in the detail in this case. Any agreement would be at the political level and in principle, and would require meticulous follow-on negotiations to implement. Should an agreement be reached, the United States should be prepared to move quickly to welcome the development as a step forward in the peace process while reserving judgment on the details, in particular of Maoist arms management. What happens next will require close scrutiny, careful attention and continued support for the GON by the United States. The prospect of imminent Maoist entry into government raises a host of other issues partially addressed in ref A. Embassy will report significant developments as they occur. DEAN