Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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06KATHMANDU2702 | 2006-10-12 12:18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kathmandu |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002702 |
1. (C) Parliament Spokesman Manohar Bhattarai told SCA/INS Office Director Marcia Bernicat on October 12 that the U.S. should aid the peace process by establishing informal dialogue with the Maoists. He stressed that there were many in Parliament, including himself, who agreed with the Ambassador on the weapons issue. Bhattarai emphasized that, while there were "sensible" Maoists who recognized the importance of the U.S. role in Nepal, he agreed with Bernicat that Maoist rhetoric continued to be full of contradictions. While the Maoists had shown flexibility on a number of their demands, they remained "very rigid" about arms. In response to Bhattarai's assurance that Nepali Congress (NC) and United Marxist-Leninist (UML) Party leaders would not let the Maoists into the government armed, Bernicat underscored the importance of this point to the U.S. government. Bhattarai pointed out that, while Parliament's five year legal mandate had lapsed long ago, it still held moral authority in the eyes of the Nepali public. Bhattarai remained optimistic about Maoist intentions in the peace process. U.S. SHOULD "REACH OUT" TO THE MAOISTS -------------------------- 2. (C) Parliament Spokesman Joint Secretary Manohar Bhattarai, noting that the views expressed were only his own, recommended to visiting SCA India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives Office Director Marcia Bernicat on October 12 that the U.S. help "remove irritants" from the peace process by reaching out to the Maoists indirectly, revealing that the Norwegians had already begun to do so. Despite recent press reports quoting parliamentarians criticizing the Ambassador, many remained in parliament who were supportive of the U.S. stance, including Joint Secretary Bhattarai. Some Maoists, for example second-in-command Bhattarai, were "sensible" and willing to join the mainstream by participating in the peace process and taking on a multi-party system. These more "sensible Maoists" had publicly recognized the importance of Nepal's relationship with the U.S., and were not willing to jeopardize it. When Bernicat noted that the Maoists continued to be very critical of the U.S. role in Nepal, Bhattarai stressed that, while contradictions remained in Maoist policy, he believed the Maoist position would become more pragmatic through dialogue and negotiations. WHAT IF THE MAOISTS TAKE OVER? -------------------------- 3. (C) Bernicat outlined a recent meeting in New Delhi with a terrorism expert who had been highly critical of the peace process, and had stressed that the Maoists were clearly following Maoist doctrine and would sign whatever agreements were necessary to come to power by peaceful means, only to break them later. Bhattarai responded that this was one school of thought, and could be true, but stated he believed that the other parties in government would be able to contain Maoist ambition. Society (the Nepalese people) simply would "not accept" the imposition of Maoist policy in government, he indicated, as the existence of liberal forces had taken root in Nepal. 4. (C) Noting that the situation in Nepal had been far more "hopeless" before the April democracy movement, Bhattarai opined that the Maoists would continue to have "revelations" as they were further exposed to the international community. Up to now, he continued, the Maoists had put forward many demands, but had also shown a willingness to negotiate. On certain demands, however, the Maoists "remained rigid," including arms management. Bhattarai ventured that this was because the Maoists believed the success of their insurgency, in addition to their own safety, depended on arms. "Who could forget Maoist atrocities over the last ten years?" Bhattarai asked, implying retribution could ensue if Maoists laid down their arms immediately. "YOU CAN COME IN, BUT NOT WITH ARMS" -------------------------- 5. (C) General elections or a referendum, Bhattarai noted, could not take place while there were people "roaming around villages with guns." Nepalis living in fear would be easily influenced to cast their vote a certain way, fearing Maoist retribution. Outside of the arms issue, Maoists had shown flexibility toward general agreements such as the composition of the interim government, Bhattarai stated. The UML and NC parties had remained steadfast in telling the Maoists, "you can come in, but not with arms." Bernicat stated that the U.S. government appreciated Parliament's approach and Bhattarai's steadfastness on the arms issue. PARLIAMENT: "LESS HANKY PANKY" -------------------------- 6. (C) Bernicat asked why the Nepali government was so fearful of a breakdown in the latest round of peace talks. What would be worse: to fight the Maoists and push them out of the Kathmandu Valley, or to have the Maoists taint the political process with arms? Bhattarai responded that there "won't be a compromise on arms" with the Maoists, noting "we will not let them in" otherwise. He indicated that Parliament was well focused on the peace process and that there was even "less hanky panky" (corruption) among Parliamentarians than there had been in the past, as they did not want to lose the opportunity to keep the Maoists from returning to the jungle. Despite the expiration of its mandate, the restored Parliament "had given life to the government" and restored accountability in the eyes of the average Nepali. Bhattarai emphasized that he remained optimistic, but was not willing to give up everything to the Maoists. "We are good guys," he concluded, "we must reform them (the Maoists) and also make them good guys." COMMENT -------------------------- 9. (C) While working with the Maoists to hammer out the peace process, parliamentarians and politicians continue to express confidence that the insurgents can be reasoned with. Like Joint Secretary Bhattarai, many believe that the Maoists will change their doctrine as they are increasingly exposed to the international community and the day to day business of governance. It is reassuring to see that there are those in parliament who are categorical that no guns can be brought into a democratic government, and that Nepal's democratic society prefers an elected body, even one whose mandate has technically expired. The recommendation that the USG begin informal talks with the insurgents was echoed in a separate discussion with diplomats, who argue that the international community can play a role in helping to moderate the Maoists if/when they join an interim government. 8. (U) SCA/INS Office Director Marcia Bernicat has cleared this message. DEAN |