PEACE DEAL APPEARS UNLIKELY ON EVE OF THIRD DAY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002700 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: PEACE DEAL APPEARS UNLIKELY ON EVE OF THIRD DAY OF TALKS REF: KATHMANDU 2680 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) USAID contracted peace facilitator Siebert and leaders of two of the three major political parties in the Government of Nepal (GON) told the Charge d'Affaires and visiting SCA India, Nepal, Sri Lanka Office Director Bernicat in separate meetings on October 11 that they did not expect the GON and the Maoists to reach a peace deal on October 12. Siebert said the two sides were still divided on the role of the monarchy, the composition of the interim legislature (and the interim government),and arms management. They were divided as well over the electoral process, citizenship rights and the country's federal structure, but the latter matters were not intractable. If no progress could be made on the first set of issues on the 12th, Siebert anticipated progress on the second set of issues. According to four senior politicians from the center-right Nepali Congress Party (NC) and the center-right Nepali Congress - Democratic (NC-D),it would take more time for all the open issues to be resolved. Although all of the politicians expressed their concern about ongoing Maoist threats, violence and extortion, they did not challenge the GON's policy of ignoring Maoist abuses until Maoist combatants go into cantonments. Siebert's colleague Olivier also briefed Charge and Bernicat on the status of planned peace councils and the difficulties they would face. Status of the Talks -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting on October 11, the eve of the third day of peace talks between the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M),Hannes Siebert, South African USAID-contracted peace facilitator who is working closely with GON peace negotiators, briefed on the peace talks. Siebert told the Charge d'Affaires and Marcia Bernicat, Director of the India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives (INS) Office in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA),that he did not expect a final deal would be reached on October 12. There were too many open issues. He said the announcement on October 10 by chief negotiators on both sides that constituent elections would be held by mid-June 2007 had represented an important symbolic step. The peace facilitator spoke of the two sides' 
"extraordinary willingness" to reach an agreement. Siebert, who has been involved in Nepal's peace process since 2004, indicated he was personally encouraged that progress would continue. What was not resolved on the 12th would be picked up again on the next day of talks, perhaps on the 15th. Hard Issues -------------- ¶3. (C) One of the major stumbling blocks to a peace accord, Siebert stated, was the future of the monarchy. Another was the composition of the interim parliament and the interim government. The peace facilitator described the situation with the legislature as a "nightmare." Every politician in the country seemed to want to become a member of the interim parliament. Siebert confirmed as well what we had heard about three Maoist proposals on the thorny issue of Maoist arms management: (1) in return for immediate declaration of a republic, Maoists would give up all arms; (2) in return for 25-30 percent of the Nepal Army's (NA's) weapons going under seal, the Maoists would separate from 50 percent of their weapons; and (3) the Maoists would go into cantonments but not separate from any of their weapons; in that case, they also would not expect a seat in the interim government or parliament (reftel). Large Parliament Likely -------------- ¶4. (C) In a separate meeting the evening of October 11, Arjun Narsingh KC of the Nepali Congress (NC) and Minendra Rijal of the Nepali Congress (Democratic) (NC-D) told Emboff they agreed that a 300-person interim parliament made no sense. Many of the MPs in the restored Parliament who would form the bulk of the membership of the interim parliament had played absolutely no role, they said, in the restoration of democracy in April. They were resigned, however, to a large interim parliament legislature. Rijal did voice concern that the center-left and left parties would end up with more seats in the parliament than the center-right parties -- NC, NC-D and its minor party allies. On the interim government, Siebert had previously told the Charge and the SCA/INS Director that one formula under discussion proposed to give the NC four ministers, the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) four ministers and the Maoists four ministers, with much smaller numbers for the other parties. Allocation of portfolios had not been discussed. Arms Management Still Unresolved -------------- ¶5. (C) Rijal also told Emboff that if the parties had been prepared to accept one of the three proposals that the Maoists put on the table, they would have done so on the 10th. What was obvious, Rijal said, was that the CPN-M wanted to position itself in the public eye as having acted reasonably, in the event it chose to leave the talks. It could claim it offered the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) three options, and they accepted none of them. It also allowed the Maoists to play on public sentiment against the monarchy and made the SPA appear to be protecting the King. It was extremely unhelpful, Rijal and Narsingh complained, as did Chakra Prasad Bastola of the NC, that CPN-UML General Secretary Madav Nepal was trying to copy the Maoist populist SIPDIS supposed peace-loving strategy inside the talks. They told the Charge and Ms. Bernicat that the CPN-UML leader did so, knowing full well the danger of allowing the Maoists to keep their arms, but guessing, correctly, that PM Koirala of the NC and President Deuba of the NC-D would not allow the CPN-M at the end of the day to retain them. It would take at least several more sessions, Bastola speculated, to resolve the issue of arms management. Other Issues Easier -------------- ¶6. (C) There were divisions as well over the electoral process, citizenship rights and the country's federal structure, Siebert had said, but he did not think these issues were intractable. The two sides were actually very close to agreement on them on October 10. He ventured that if no progress could be made on the first set of issues on the 12th, the GON and the Maoists might make an announcement on one of these easier issues to demonstrate that progress continued to be made. Narsingh and Rijal agreed that a deal was possible soon on these issues. Narsingh assured Emboff that whatever federal system were adopted, it would not be a system which carved the country up into ethnically homogeneous provinces. That Maoist demand was simply unacceptable. There were better ways, he and Rijal agreed, to resolve Nepal's long-standing problems of caste and ethnicity. No Alternative to Maoist Abuses -------------- ¶7. Ms. Bernicat repeatedly raised the question how success was possible when the Maoists were being allowed to commit abuses with impunity. All of the politicians present were concerned, but seemed to have no alternative to the GON's current policy of waiting until the Maoists are in cantonments to reestablishing law and order. Each recognized in turn the impunity with which Maoists continue to perpetrate abuses. Comment -------------- ¶9. Kathmandu remains gripped in a heady atmosphere of expectation. Hundreds of mostly Maoist protesters gather during each session in front of the talks venue, the Prime Minister's Residence. They graphically represent the rapt anticipation and hope of Nepalis across the political spectrum for a lasting peace. With talk of an interim government taking office as early as November 15, many hope these aspirations will be realized in the near future. DEAN