Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2636
2006-09-28 13:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS UNGA RESOLUTION ON

Tags:  PGOV PTER JP NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002636 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER JP NP
SUBJECT: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS UNGA RESOLUTION ON
ARMS MANAGEMENT

REF: KATHMANDU 2587

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002636 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER JP NP SUBJECT: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS UNGA RESOLUTION ON ARMS MANAGEMENT REF: KATHMANDU 2587 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a September 27 meeting with the Ambassador, Japanese Ambassador Tsutomu Hiraoka acknowledged that, while a resolution from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on arms management was an option, the Government of Nepal was not very interested in the idea. The Ambassador explained that the Government of India, as well as the Maoists, seemed to oppose a large UN role in Nepal. The Ambassador told Hiraoka that all direct USG assistance to GON would have to cease if armed Maoists were allowed in the government. He also stressed that, if the Maoists did not get what they wanted at the negotiating table before the end of October, they would likely begin fomenting a third people's movement that could lead to urban violence targeted at the GON. JAPANESE SUGGEST UNGA RESOLUTION ON ARMS MANAGEMENT -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) During a September 27 meeting with the Ambassador, Japanese Ambassador Tsutomu Hiraoka suggested that an UNGA resolution on arms management could be an viable option to solving the arms management impasse between the GON and Maoists. Hiraoka, however, was quick to add that the GON did not seem keen on this idea. The Ambassador explained that the Government of India (GOI) was not in favor of a large UN role in Nepal. He said the GOI would not favorably view a UN Security Council resolution and would likely be just as set against an UNGA resolution. The Ambassador added that the Maoists also were against a large UN presence here but that both the GOI and Maoists could agree to a small civilian UN presence for something like arms management. Ambassador Hiraoka noted that Nepal's Ambassador to the UN in New York was against UN Security Council action as well. CURIOSITY OVER USG POSITION IF ARMED MAOISTS ALLOWED IN GON -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In response to a question from his Japanese counterpart, the Ambassador explained that he was worried Nepali Congress (NC) negotiators still had not developed a concrete plan on arms management. He said he had heard several people say that the GON might allow the Maoists into the government without resolving the arms management issue. The Ambassador stated that, if armed Maoists joined the GON, the USG would have to cease all direct USG funding to the GON, which would amount to approximately USD 1 million out of USD 45 million in total USG assistance to Nepal. Hiraoka was curious whether the Ambassador would come out with any public statements should armed Maoists join the GON. The Ambassador replied that he would seek guidance from Washington in that event. MAOIST STRENGTH LARGELY A BLUFF? -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador stressed that the appearance of Maoist strength was largely a bluff, caused by GON unwillingness to enforce law and order (reftel). He argued that the longer the Maoists were allowed to undercut the GON, the longer it would take for the GON to turn the situation around. The Ambassador opined that, if the Maoists did not get what they wanted at the negotiating table between Nepal's Dashain (September 29 - October 4) and Tihar (October 21 - 24) holidays, they would likely gear up for a third people's movement, which could lead to urban fighting targeted directly at the GON. COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) The Japanese continue to be curious about the USG position on providing assistance should armed Maoists join the GON. They appear to be inclined to adopt a position similar to ours should armed Maoists join the GON. In the past, the Government of Japan has helpfully stressed the need for arms management before the Maoists join an interim government. We should continue to coordinate closely with the Government of Japan on Nepal. MORIARTY

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