PARTIAL PEACE DEAL POSSIBLE BEFORE DASHAIN?

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002598 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: PARTIAL PEACE DEAL POSSIBLE BEFORE DASHAIN? REF: KATHMANDU 2491 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On September 22, peace facilitator Hannes Siebert and UN Secretary General Annan's representative to the peace process Ian Martin told the Ambassador that the Government of Nepal and the Maoists were getting closer to agreement on several of the key peace documents. There were also, they said, ongoing discussions, about how the peace structures could be made more effective and resilient and the proper role for the UN. The peace facilitator expressed frustration that thus far the other donors had chosen to remain on the sidelines. In a meeting with the Pol-Econ chief, also on the 22nd, a senior Home Ministry official went so far as to predict a peace deal the week of September 25, before the Dashain holiday. Siebert warned, however, that the crucial issue of Maoist arms management had not yet been resolved. End Summary. Government Team Makes Progress -------------- ¶2. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert told the Ambassador September 29 that the Government of Nepal (GON) had made considerable progress in the previous week in finalizing its position on several of the key peace progress documents. Those documents include a Cease-fire Agreement, a Human Rights Accord and a Peace Accord. (Note: The current cease-fire is based on unilateral declarations in late April by both the GON and the Communist Party of Nepal ((Maoist)) ((CPN-M)). The only underlying document is the May 26 25-Point Cease-fire Code of Conduct Agreement.) Siebert stated that the Peace Secretariat, the agency in the Prime Minister's Office which provides support to the GON negotiating team, had passed proposed texts to the high-level Peace Committee. The Peace Committee, which brings together representatives from all of the parties in the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) coalition government, was to have approved the three documents on September 21. According to Siebert, the CPN-M finalized its position on the three documents some time ago. Restructuring of Peace Process Architecture -------------- ¶3. (C) Siebert also described the ongoing efforts to strengthen the peace architecture. One of the problems that had become apparent during the Maoist-declared general strike on September 13 (reftel) was the lack of a dispute settlement mechanism in the case of an allegation of a serious breach of the peace. The GON's chief negotiator -- and Home Minister -- Sitaula had been compelled to spend hours talking to Mahara, the CPN-M spokesman and a member of the Maoist negotiating team, to work out a settlement. Siebert said that the current plan was to create an overarching joint national peace committee which would include senior representatives from the GON side and the Maoist side to resolve these sorts of disputes. In general, the goal, according to Siebert, was to create a more robust peace structure that would be able to survive a major shock to the peace process. Working With the National Cease-fire Monitoring Committee -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The USAID-contracted peace facilitator informed the Ambassador that the Danes and the Norwegians had expressed interest in combining the National Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (NMCCC) with the independently chartered National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The Ambassador voiced reservations about this idea, noting that the NHRC needed to retain its independence and should not amalgamated into a party-based structure like the NMCCC. In a subsequent meeting on September 22 with UN Secretary General Annan's personal representative to the peace process, Ian Martin agreed that cease-fire monitoring needed to be strengthened but this was not the way to do it. The two organizations should, Martin stated, remain separate. What did make sense was for the NMCCC to take advantage of the NHRC's expertise. Siebert also took the opportunity to express his extreme frustration that so-called "like-minded donors," including the Danes, the Norwegians, and the British, had yet to provide any assistance to the Peace Secretariat. Role of the UN -------------- ¶5. (C) Martin explained during his meeting with the Ambassador that he continued to be hampered by the absence of a team, but that he was also hearing positive indications of progress in the peace process. He stated that he had obtained a draft of the Cease-fire Agreement and had already passed it to UN Headquarters in New York for review. In his meetings with senior GON officials, he had, he said, appealed to them not to sign the Cease-fire Agreement this week. It needed to be vetted first. Martin also noted how quickly the situation seemed to change. The previous week all the talk had been of a third people's movement. That evening, in contrast, he said he planned to talk to New York about the possibility of sending cease-fire monitors on short notice. Deal Possible This Week? -------------- ¶6. (C) The most optimistic report post heard late last week came from a Joint Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs who met with the Pol-Econ chief and two officers from S/CRS on September 22. Pratap Kumar Prathak, who serves as an ex officio representative from the Home Ministry to the peace process, described the chances of a deal the week of September 25 before the major national (Hindu) holiday of Dashain began on September 29 as 80 percent. He added that he was confident that the CPN-M's People's Liberation Army would go into cantonments in the coming weeks and that the international community would be willing to provide the funds for the PLA's food and lodging. Once they were in camps, Prathak maintained that 80-90 percent of the problems the country was currently experiencing with Maoist threats and extortion would end. They extorted, he said, because they needed money to eat. He conceded, however, that the Maoists were also using threats to maximize their negotiating power with the GON. Potential Roadblocks -------------- ¶7. (C) In contrast, Siebert admitted to the Ambassador that, as much as he hoped for peace, he was extremely worried that the process would break down. He noted, for instance, that the Maoists had first proposed at the end of June that the GON feed and house its combatants. The Government did not appear to have anywhere near the USD 10 million the CPN-M wanted and, according to his information at least, aside from a potential contribution from the Norwegians, the international community had not yet shown great interest. He also emphasized that he had seen no indication yet that the GON and the Maoists had been able to come to an agreement on the crucial issue of Maoist arms management. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Based on what we are hearing, it now appears that there will be a significant meeting of the GON and the Maoists on September 28 on the eve of the Dashain holiday. Intense preparations are already under way. Leaders of the two other major parties in the Seven-Party Alliance, Madav Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal -- United Marxist Leninist and Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress (Democratic),met September 23 with Maoist Supremo Prachanda. It looks as though the Maoists want to move smartly toward a summit in order to pressure the GON to concede on the arms issue. MORIARTY