CPN-UML PARTY LEADER WORRIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000252 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL NP SUBJECT: CPN-UML PARTY LEADER WORRIED REF: A. 05 KATHMANDU 2969 ¶B. KATHMANDU 208 ¶C. KATHMANDU 244 ¶D. KATHMANDU 47 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) UML leader MK Nepal, who remains under house arrest, welcomed the Ambassador's visit to his home on January 25. He claimed he had not been in touch with UML party cadre or Maoists recently. MK Nepal speculated that Maoist second-in-command Baburam Bhattarai was making strong statements to prove his loyalty to Maoist chief Prachanda. MK Nepal remained optimistic that Maoist internal debate about their ability to prevail militarily was a sign that Maoists were ready to pursue a political solution. However, he admitted to being concerned over reports that Maoists were restricting Party activities in the districts. The UML leader worried that the people would see the political parties as weak if they agreed to dialogue with the King, and explained that the Parties would talk with the King if he postponed the municipal election, dissolved the Cabinet, and agreed to hand "total power" to the Parties. Nevertheless, leaving a door open to the King, MK Nepal noted that the Parties could not agree to "any sort of active monarchy," but that the UML could support a role for the monarchy, if an active Parliament voted on the issue. End Summary. No Recent Contact with Maoists -------------- ¶2. (C) In a January 25 meeting with the Ambassador, MK Nepal explained that he had confirmed with Maoists that their policy of not targeting American interests or people remained unchanged as had been requested by the Charge on December 30 (ref A),but claimed that he had not been in contact with the Maoists since the Ambassador had asked him on January 19 about specific incidents involving Embassy employees (ref B). MK Nepal explained he was worried about reports from UML cadre in some districts that Maoists were not allowing party activities and were targeting Party cadre. He noted that he had only read about such incidents in the papers and had not been in direct contact with his party members. UML Leader Speculates on Internal Maoist Thinking... -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) MK Nepal opined that some Maoists were convinced they could prevail militarily, while others were convinced they could not and so wanted to work through a political process. The Ambassador pointed out that the publicly announced Maoist strategy of using armed struggle, while the Parties used unarmed struggle, to topple the government, could be a Maoist internal compromise: the movement would use violence, but not only violence, to foment a revolution. Noting a Baburam Bhattarai article from the January 18 weekly Budhabar (ref C),the Ambassador again warned that the Maoist strategy seemed completely divorced from the stated goals of the 12-point understanding with the Parties, and cautioned that the Maoists would dominate any government formed with the Parties if the plans for revolution succeeded. ¶4. (C) While admitting that he was not "fully one-hundred percent sure" about the Maoists' change in attitude, MK Nepal took as a "good sign" the fact that the Maoists appeared to be debating the issue of armed and political struggle. MK Nepal noted that when he met Maoist leaders several years ago in Lucknow, India, Bhattarai had been more accommodating than Prachanda. However, recently Bhattarai had appeared more aggressive than Prachanda, including in public statements and in negotiations leading to the 12-point understanding. The UML leader explained that he had advocated for explicit language in the 12-point understanding binding the Maoists to accept the outcome of a constituent assembly and not return to violence. While Prachanda seemed ready to accept this point, Bhattarai had argued against it. MK Nepal speculated that Bhattarai was working to show "ferocity" and prove his loyalty to Prachanda. The Ambassador countered that Prachanda could be locking Bhattarai into being a public advocate of violence to diminish the latter's stature internationally. ...But Not Optimistic King Will Reach Out -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador urged the Parties to respond if the King reached out. MK Nepal cautioned the Ambassador about being optimistic that the King would reach out, saying "you have been hopeful many times," but "all trends show no results." He feared the people would see the Parties as weak if they did not speak out strongly against the King. MK Nepal asserted that if the King postponed the election, dissolved the Cabinet, and agreed to hand "total power" to the Parties, then the Parties would talk to the King. He noted that the Parties could not agree to "any sort of active monarchy," but that the UML could support a role for the monarchy if an active Parliament voted on the issue. Saying "let wisdom prevail in the mind of the King," MK Nepal explained that "the King should be wise" and "think of the nation and the monarchy." He lamented the expenses incurred supporting the King's visits to the districts, pointing out that the money could have been used to pave roads and do other development work in the cities. MK Nepal clarified that the Maoists were only a threat because they had weapons, and that the best situation for the Parties might be a "stalemate" between the two armed parties in Nepal's conflict, the King and the Maoists. That would allow space for the Parties. MK Nepal Under House Arrest -------------- ¶6. (C) MK Nepal welcomed the Ambassador's visit to his home, noting that security forces had had him under house arrest since January 20. He reported that security forces had allowed some visitors (e.g. Danish Ambassador on January 24) but not others, including party cadre. (Note: Government had prevented diplomats from visiting political leaders under house arrest after the King seized power February 1. End note.) While he did not have exact numbers, MK Nepal estimated that about 200 political cadre from all parties and civil society leaders were still in government custody following the government's recent spate of arrests. (Note: Ian Martin, UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights Representative, told Emboff on January 24 that the government still held in custody about 200 of the 400 party cadre and civil society activists arrested since January 17. End note.) Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) MK Nepal appeared less confident that the Maoists would opt to come into the political mainstream than in his January 4 meeting with the Ambassador. Although more nervous, he clearly still wants to believe that the seven-party alliance can cooperate with the Maoists without ultimately being devoured by them. However, to a greater degree than in recent meetings, he left the door ajar for reconciliation with the King. MORIARTY