UN REP MARTIN WAITING FOR COALITION TO AGREE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002495 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM UN NP SUBJECT: UN REP MARTIN WAITING FOR COALITION TO AGREE ON PEACE PACKAGE OFFER REF: A. KATHMANDU 2348 ¶B. KATHMANDU 2491 Classified By: DCM Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Ian Martin, UN Secretary General Annan's personal representative for the peace process, told the DCM September 11 that in spite of their rhetoric, the Maoists were prepared to move ahead. He remarked that they had recently hammered out a unified position and had taken steps to ensure their various constituencies would accept any eventual result. They were even prepared, Martin claimed, to address management of their arms as long as they saw progress happening on the political side. A major problem he faced, Martin said, was that the Seven-Party Alliance coalition Government of Nepal (GON) had yet to decide what its position was. Ultimately, he could only act when both sides were ready. Maoists Still On Board with the UN -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting on September 11, UN Secretary General Annan's personal representative in Nepal (Ref A) told the DCM that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) had not abandoned its willingness to work with the United Nations on the peace process, including on the issue of arms management. Ian Martin denied that his initial meeting with them, which he described as "preliminary," had been rocky. In spite of critical rhetoric, the Maoists had no intention, in his opinion, to go back on the commitments they had made to the UN (de Mistura) mission that proceeded Martin's arrival. It was unfortunate, he said, from an operational perspective that the Government of Nepal had publicly defined the principal role of the UN as a means to pressure the Maoists on arms, but that problem could be overcome. Maoist Position Prepared -------------- ¶3. (C) The Secretary General's personal representative stated that the Maoists had used their recent Central Committee meeting outside Kathmandu to hammer out a unified position. They had also taken steps to ensure that their various organizations -- People's Liberation Army (PLA),militia, women, students -- were in agreement. Maoist Supremo Prachanda's insistence on September 3 that Prime Minister Koirala should immediately hold high-level talks with him and nine of the other top Maoist leaders, in Martin's view, revealed Prachanda's awareness that any deal would have to enjoy broad support within the CPN-M. A Deal on Arms Management Still Possible -------------- ¶4. (C) Martin also maintained that there was still a possibility of brokering a deal on Maoist arms management. The Maoists, he said, were even willing to deploy the PLA in cantonments under UN supervision -- under the right circumstances. He argued that the Maoist's demand since the Central Committee meeting on a package deal before deployment in camps was not really something new. It was wrong to look at the identical letters PM Koirala and Prachanda had sent to Secretary General Annan in August (the so-called Five-Point SIPDIS Agreement) in isolation from the Eight-Point Agreement with its political agreements to which the preamble of the Five-Point agreement specifically referred. The Maoists had always been calling, he stated, for agreement on political issues before arms management. The governing Seven-Party Alliance (SPA),on the other hand, insisted on arms management before a political deal. Martin told the DCM that the answer was simultaneous talks on all points. Seven-Party Alliance Unable to Formulate A Position -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The UN representative identified the lack of a unified SPA position on what it was prepared to offer the Maoists as one of the biggest stumbling blocks to progress in the peace process. Martin reported that Indian Ambassador Mukherjee had recently told PM Koirala the GON had to put a package on the table. It was frustrating, Martin said, that the government seemed to lack a sense of urgency. This was particularly true of the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist and the Nepali Congress Party (Democratic) leaders, but the PM's own Nepali Congress Party was also internally divided and unable to agree. Working out the differences within the coalition was much harder than the parties claimed, yet it was a necessity. Given the inability of the GON negotiating team to develop a coherent position, it was tempting, Martin admitted, for the international community to go around the team in the hopes of advancing the peace process. The difficulty with that approach was that it undermined the very bodies that should be in charge. UN Mostly in Waiting Mode -------------- ¶6. (C) The reality, Martin stressed, was that he could provide some assistance to the two sides, but that ultimately, his team had to wait until the Maoists and the GON were ready. He said he hoped to have an electoral expert join his team soon and he also mentioned that UN headquarters had already identified a potential candidate to serve as his military liaison officer. Martin also expressed the hope that he would soon be able to relocate from his current office in the building housing the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal to the building the UN Development Program occupied. He had to wait, however, on UN headquarters budget approval. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Martin's critique of the Government of Nepal's failure to formulate a negotiating position for the peace process talks is on the mark, but we do not share his perceived inability to do much at present. Without overstating his role, Martin can help move the process forward, if only incrementally. With respect to the Maoists, we share his assessment of their preparation. They have a program and are prepared to carry it out. Where we differ is in our assessment of their ultimate intentions. While we cannot rule out the possibility that they are prepared for peace and that they desire to join the democratic political mainstream, the preponderance of evidence indicates they are preparing instead to use all means, including violence and force, to seize power. We will continue encouraging the UN to engage more proactively while pushing the SPA to maintain a united front. Martin's active role in helping defuse the September 13 Maoist general strike by facilitating inspection of alleged Nepal Army weapons (Ref B) suggests that, when push comes to shove, the UN may be more appropriately proactive. MORIARTY