CODEL KOLBE STRESSES ARMS MANAGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002363 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/INS, H (PLEASE PASS TO HACFO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER ECON PREF NP SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE STRESSES ARMS MANAGEMENT Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During their August 25-28 visit, a four-member Congressional delegation led by Jim Kolbe, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, stressed to the Government of Nepal (GON) that arms management must occur before Maoists could be allowed into the government. The CODEL stressed to Speaker of the House Subhash Nemwang that the GON could not rely on the UN to disarm the Maoists; the GON and people of Nepal needed to address the problem. During a meeting with business leaders, the CODEL learned about the poor state of Nepal's economy and educated businessmen on the possibilities of Nepal qualifying for the Millennium Challenge Account. Many interlocutors told the CODEL that the Maoists' true intentions remained unknown. Chairman Kolbe expressed hope that the peace process would succeed and that Nepal will profit from economic progress and peace. ARMS MANAGEMENT CRITICAL TO RESTORING MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister KP Oli stressed, and Chairman Kolbe agreed, that the Maoists could not be allowed into the government with arms. Oli suggested that it would take several months to separate the combatants from their arms. Oli explained that Maoist cadre would soon be staying in cantonments and their names would be provided to the GON. The Deputy PM added that the GON must continue to criticize the Maoists for their abuses and encourage them to contribute positively to the peace process. ¶3. (C) During a meeting with leaders of the governing Seven-Party Alliance (SPA),Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal explained to CODEL Kolbe that the main pending issue was when and how Maoist combatants would be separated from their weapons. President of the Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D) Sher Bahadur Deuba said that if the Maoists did not disarm they could not participate in constituent assembly elections. Deuba opined that armed Maoists participating in constituent assembly elections could lead to a situation akin to Hamas or Hezbollah. SPA leaders stated that the U.S. could assist the GON by continuing to emphasize the need for Maoist disarmament and by encouraging the international community to do the same. ¶4. (C) Janak Joshi, a civil servant who heads the Peace Secretariat, told the CODEL that the Maoists were resisting SIPDIS disarmament out of fear. Joshi said that because the Maoists have weapons, the people have not yet had the courage to speak out against them. Joshi opined that if the Maoists disarmed now, without an appropriate level of political power or protection, the people would turn on them. Birendra Basnet, Managing Director of Buddha Air, opined that Maoists would never give up arms because the common people of Nepal would "skin them alive" in retribution. ROLE OF THE UN IN THE PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶5. (C) Deputy PM Oli noted that the UN would be coming to Nepal again soon and would visit Maoist cantonments and count their weapons. Oli explained that the GON had requested that the UN monitor arms and observe constituent assembly elections. He noted that the GON would not ask for UN assistance with mediation and facilitation of peace talks. Oli opined that, given the opportunity, the Maoists would seize power. If the opportunity did not arise, the Maoists would eventually have to show their true intentions by either joining the political mainstream or returning to violence. NC-D President and former PM Deuba made a strong appeal for international monitoring of elections, citing a lack of capacity in Nepal to do so effectively. ¶6. (C) During a meeting with CODEL Kolbe, Speaker of the House Subhash Nemwang said it was still impossible to know whether the Maoists would be willing to participate in the government unarmed. Even the Maoist commitment to the peace process remained unclear. The CODEL emphasized that the GON could not rely on the UN to disarm the Maoists; rather, the people of Nepal had to address the problem. Chairman Kolbe said that in the U.S. view, it was essential that the Maoists separate from their arms before the government recognized them as a legitimate political party. PLANS FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) Staffan Darnoff of the International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES) told the CODEL that, while the Election Commission had competent and dedicated staff, the major challenge to a constituent assembly election was the timeline. He estimated that once constituent assembly policies were agreed to, it would take the GON at least twelve months to prepare for elections. Darnoff commented that the two major factors that made the April 2007 timeline unrealistic were poor voter registration and a pressing need for voter education. (Note: 20-25 percent of the Nepali population is missing from the voter list or not residing in their place of registration due to violence and displacement. End Note.) Sujata Koirala, a member of the Nepali Congress (NC) Central Committee and the Prime Minister's daughter, opined that an April election was completely unrealistic given the lack of understanding of the process outside of the Kathmandu Valley and the current uncertainty about Maoist disarmament. MAOIST MOTIVATION AND THE U.S. TERRORIST DESIGNATION -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) MK Nepal offered three possible reasons why the Maoists had become involved in the peace process: one, the Maoists realized they could not win power militarily; two, the Maoists believed they were well placed to win power in a democratic process; and three, the Maoists realized that to be in power they needed support from people who support democracy. Janak Joshi responded that it remained to be seen whether the Maoists would be true to their word. He noted that now was the first time the Maoists had talked about multi-party democracy, which he viewed as a positive sign. Joshi believed the Maoists assessed that they had reached a "strategic equilibrium." He felt the Maoists had realized they were not going to win by using weapons, so they had resorted to the political avenue. ¶9. (C) MK Nepal suggested that the Maoists could be "lured" into making changes by a U.S. offer to lift the terrorist designation under E.O. 13224. At an August 28 press conference, Chairman Kolbe said "we can review the terrorist tag leveled against them, if the Maoists truly participate in a peaceful political process." Joshi agreed with Representative Baird that, if the Maoist leadership agreed to give up arms and join the political mainstream after so many years of fighting, there remained a risk of low-level cadre forming armed splinter groups. STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶10. (C) CODEL Kolbe heard varying comments on the current status of the peace process. Speaker of the House Nemwang said that the SPA and the Maoists first needed to reach agreement on several open questions, particularly arms management, before the process could move forward. Janak Joshi of the Peace Secretariat explained that the Secretariat faced numerous administrative challenges. Deputy PM Oli said the GON was doing its best to fully democratize the country and live up to the aspirations of the people who supported the GON during the pro-democracy movement in April 2006. ¶11. (C) Industrialist Suraj Vaidya told the CODEL that the Maoists were driving the agenda and noted that the Maoists had been using delaying tactics to their advantage. Vaidya explained that in response to his concerns about Maoist extortion of businesses (and the kidnapping of two of his company's executives),Home Minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula told him he would have to keep negotiating with Maoists for the time being. Finance Secretary Mallik hoped that the National Monitoring Committee for the Code of Conduct and the UN mission would provide a solid practical step to check Maoist violations. OTI ASSISTANCE TO THE PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶12. (C) Karen Kaplan, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) Senior Field Advisor, explained to the CODEL that on their initial field trips, seven GON Cease-fire Code of Conduct monitoring teams had received more than 800 complaints of violations in some 14 districts, most of them directed at the Maoists. OTI had distributed 30,000 copies of a book in Nepali compiling the code of conduct and key peace process documents and explaining how to file complaints with the committee. Kaplan noted that OTI planned to print another 40,000 copies of the book to meet high demand. In addition to receiving complaints, Kaplan shared that the monitoring committee had intervened to free someone kidnapped by the Maoists and obtained freedom of movement for a family the Maoists were not allowing to return to their home. OTI may try to assist Village Development Committee (VDC) secretaries return to their villages by renovating VDC SIPDIS offices and supplying office supplies. (Note: Over 68 percent of VDC secretaries have moved to district headquarters over the past several years due to Maoist threats and violence. End Note.) The Ambassador noted that assisting the VDCs would effectively shame the Maoists, as the VDCs were the key local providers of government services to rural Nepalis. HOW THE U.S. CAN ASSIST NEPAL -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Several Seven-Party Alliance leaders pointed out that U.S. support would be needed to replace destroyed infrastructure and reintegrate internally displaced persons and ex-combatants into normal life after ten years of conflict. Interlocutors suggested that the U.S. mobilize other donors to assist with these crucial issues. They also raised resuming the Peace Corps in Nepal to provide support for health, infrastructure and education programs. ECONOMY DOWN BUT HAS POTENTIAL -------------- ¶14. (C) Finance Secretary Mallik noted the decline in the tourist and manufacturing industries. Mallik requested continued U.S. moral and financial support for the political process and implementation of the peace process. Both NC-D President Deuba and Chairman Kolbe pointed out that Nepal had tremendous opportunities and resources. Chairman Kolbe hoped that the peace process would succeed and enable Nepal to profit from economic progress and peace. Businessmen expressed interest in the Chairman's explanation of the prospects for Nepal to qualify for the Millennium Challenge Account. NO EQUAL TREATMENT FOR ARMIES; ARMY BILL IN THE WORKS -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) Oli explained that Maoist leaders had demanded equal treatment for the Nepal Army (NA) and the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA). Oli stressed that this was not possible because the NA was an institution of the state, while the PLA were insurgents. He added that the NA would never give up their arms. House Speaker Nemwang told the CODEL that he expected the Parliament to pass the Nepal Army Bill, which would place the Army under the control of the Parliament and the Prime Minister, in seven or eight days. According to Nemwang, passage of the bill would be a direct signal to the Maoists that the Army was no longer loyal to the King. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) CODEL Kolbe's August 25-28 visit to Nepal could not have come at a better time. Chairman Kolbe and his three fellow Members of Congress were in a strong position to stress the crucial importance of the GON solving the arms management issue before allowing the Maoists into the government. As elected representatives of the American people, they also spoke with conviction when they insisted that the future of Nepal lay in the hands of the Nepali people. MORIARTY