GON STRUGGLES WITH MAOIST CHALLENGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002349

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: GON STRUGGLES WITH MAOIST CHALLENGE


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES F. MORIARTY, REASONS 1.4 (B/D).

Summary
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1. (C) Prime Minister Koirala's Foreign Policy Advisor Dr.
Chalise told DCM August 29 that the GON is acutely aware of
stepped-up Maoist presence in Nepal's urban centers and the
deteriorating law and order situation throughout the country.
He said that the GON was trying to bind the Maoist
insurgents into broader society in order to mainstream them
and wean them from violence. He reiterated that the GON will
not allow the Maoists into the GON until the Peoples
Liberation Army is separated from its weapons. Chalise said
that the GON wants to draw the Maoists further into the peace
process while persuading the Nepali public, EU and UN of the
obnoxious character of the movement. According to the PM's
advisor, the GON will not be strong enough to crack down on
the Maoists and restore law and order until after the Maoist
Peoples Liberation Army is in cantonment under UN aegis.
Comment: We disagree with Chalise's analysis that the GON is
too weak to enforce law and order in Nepal's urban areas and
will push with the Prime Minister the concept that the
primary duty of any government is to ensure the safety and
security of its citizens. End comment.

Maoist Show of Force
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2. (C) PM Foreign Policy Advisor Dr. Suresh Chalise told DCM
August 29 that his government is keenly aware of the stepped
up presence of Maoist cadre in Nepal's urban centers and the
resulting increase in fear and intimidation and decrease in
law and order. He agreed that the Maoists were putting on a
show of force for the UN peace facilitation team which had
arrived in Kathmandu that morning on an open-ended mission.
Chalise shared the assessment that the Maoists were flexing
their muscles for psychological impact while also continuing
extortion, abduction and aggressive efforts to supplant
existing labor unions in enterprises, most visibly in
international hotel chains, with Maoist-led entities.

Mainstreaming the Maoists
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3. (C) Chalise argued, however, that the GON had made
progress in binding the Maoists into broader society at large
in its effort to transform the Maoists into a mainstream
political party. The PM's advisor emphasized that after ten
years of conflict and almost 14,000 killed, Nepalis yearn for
peace. While the Maoists continue to extort, abduct and
intimidate, killings and violence have decreased, he said, a
relief to the long-suffering people of Nepal. He noted the
presence of some 2000 Maoist insurgents in Kathmandu
hospitals for treatment unavailable in the jungles during the
course of the conflict and an across the board engagement in
society at large by the Maoists as evidence of the
insurgents' desire not to return to warfare. Chalise noted,
however, that the Maoists were packing urban centers with
cadre and encouraging rootless rural residents to move to
urban centers in preparation for street unrest in coming
weeks. He worried about fissures in the Seven Party
Alliance, pointing out the divergence between his party, the
Nepali Congress, which supports democracy under a
constitutional monarchy and the CPN-UML, which has lined up
with the Maoists on a republic.

Reestablishing Law and Order
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4. (C) The foreign policy advisor said that the GON had to
bide its time before cracking down on Maoist activities to
restore law and order. In his view, the peace process is too
fragile and the fledgling GON too weak after just three
months in power to challenge the Maoists head on. The GON
had to build more credibility with the people of Nepal, bind
the Maoists further into the peace process and persuade the
EU and UN of the obnoxious character of the Maoist movement
before taking decisive action. Chalise said that the proper
moment would be after the PLA was in cantonment and Maoist
weapons were under a dual lock and key supervised by the UN.
He conceded that the UN could not be a panacea for Nepal's
law and order problems, and the GON law enforcement would
have to reestablish control, but emphasized that the context
must be right. Chalise also noted the civilian GON's unease
at being "dependent" on the security forces. He criticized
Home Minister Sitaula, describing him as wholly ineffective
in his role as chief GON law enforcement officer, but
emphasized what he said was PM Koirala's belief that
dismissing Sitaula would risk derailing the peace process
because of the bond the Home Minister had established with
the Maoists.

Separating Maoists from Weapons
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5. (C) Dr. Chalise insisted that the GON would hold firm on
its refusal to allow the Maoists into the government until
they had been separated from their weapons. He recognized
the continuing pressure that the Maoists would exert on the
GON to make further concessions. Chalise insisted that the
GON was aware of this danger, most recently apparent in
potentially disadvantageous provisions of the interim
constitution, and was adamant about not making further
concessions to the Maoists. He underscored the important
balancing role of the UN and European Union in this equation,
highlighting the criticality of consistent U.S. support for
the GON on arms separation. Waffling by the EU and the UN,
in particular their ambiguity regarding the moral equivalence
of the Maoist cause with GON sovereignty, represented a
significant obstacle to the peace process in the view of the
GON, Chalise repeated.

Accounting for Lost GON Weapons, Maoist Combatants
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6. (C) The foreign policy advisor agreed to convey to the
Prime Minister the need for the GON to provide the UN peace
facilitation team with an accurate accounting of GON weapons
lost to the Maoists. He agreed that such a baseline would be
valuable in testing the bonafides of the Maoists in a phased
approach to UN-supervised arms separation. Chalise
reiterated his conviction that Maoist claims that the PLA
could not relinquish its weapons because of the threat of a
palace-backed Nepal Army operation was a canard -- the
Maoists' real fear is of retribution by angry villagers once
they lay down their weapons. The foreign policy advisor
expressed confidence that the definition of combatants under
a UN-sponsored peace process would encourage the PLA to hand
in weapons. He said that the Nepal Army had told him that to
be categorized as a combatant qualified for cantonment, PLA
members would have to hand in their weapons. DCM expressed
skepticism at this definition of combatant, and the notion
that this would motivate Maoists to hand in weapons. It was
more likely that the Maoists were already hiding weapons.

Comment
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7. (C) The Prime Minister's foreign policy advisor
recognizes the inherent contradictions in the GON's stance
regarding law and order and the Maoist threat. Chalise sees
the increased activity of the Maoists in the Kathmandu Valley
and other urban centers, the resulting fear and intimidation,
and threat of widespread Maoist-led street action in coming
weeks. He does not appear to realize, however, that the

GON's security forces have the capacity to force the Maoists
to rein in many of the ongoing abuses -- and that doing so
would only garner the GON support both domestically and
internationally. Continued bucking up of the GON by the
United States and like-minded members of the international
community, especially India, is vital at this difficult
juncture in Nepal's peace process.
MORIARTY