NEW UN SPECIAL ENVOY UNDER NO ILLUSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002348 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER UN NP SUBJECT: NEW UN SPECIAL ENVOY UNDER NO ILLUSIONS REF: A. KATHMANDU 2166 ¶B. KATHMANDU 2253 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On August 29, the UN Secretary General's newly appointed special envoy, Ian Martin, told the Ambassador he was under no illusions about the difficulty of bridging the differences between the Government and the Maoists on the key question of managing Maoist arms. Martin stated that he was already trying to tamp down unrealistic Government of Nepal (GON) expectations. He also maintained that the UN's existing HUMAN RIGHTS work in the country, which he had headed for a year, would not suffer from his departure. End Summary. UN Secretary General Taps Martin As Peace Envoy -------------- -- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador held a fruitful discussion on August 29 with Ian Martin, four days after UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced he was naming Martin his Personal Representative in Nepal for support to the peace process. In making the announcement, Annan stressed the urgency of "follow-on consultations with all concerned parties in Nepal in order to build on the common understanding that now exists, so that detailed planning for UN assistance may proceed." The statement added that Martin would be assisted by a small multi-disciplinary team of UN officials. Martin's appointment followed a week-long UN assessment mission to Nepal in early August which prompted separate but identical letters dated August 9 from the GON and the Maoists to the Secretary General (ref A). The so-called 5-Point Agreement SIPDIS asked, first of all, that the UN continue its HUMAN RIGHTS monitoring through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human RIGHTS (OHCHR). It also requested UN aid in four other areas: (1) to assist in monitoring the GON-Maoist Code of Conduct; (2) to deploy qualified civilian personnel to monitor and verify the cantonment of Maoist combatants and their weapons and to assist in managing the arms and armed personnel of both sides; (3) to monitor the Nepal Army; and (4) to provide election observation for constituent assembly elections. Some Issues Easier Than Others -------------- ¶3. (C) Martin, a seasoned UN official who ran the Office of the High Commissioner for HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR) in Nepal from May 2005 until the Secretary General's announcement, briefly reviewed how he planned to handle each issue. He indicated OHCHR would have the lead on monitoring the Code of Conduct. Martin insisted, however, that he would continue to pay attention to HUMAN RIGHTS violations in his new capacity as Annan's special peace envoy. As a personal matter, he had no intention of sacrificing his lifelong commitment to HUMAN rights even if it complicated his efforts to promote peace. Moreover, he was convinced that the peace process would only succeed if respect for HUMAN RIGHTS improved. Strong HUMAN rights monitoring was essential. Martin stated that he anticipated one person on his team would look into how the UN could complement the existing work of the National Cease-fire Code of Conduct Monitoring Committee. In this regard, he also mentioned a potential role for peace councils, and the need for international assistance to them. In addition, Martin expressed an interest in knowing what USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives was doing to assist the monitoring committee. He agreed with the Ambassador that the fourth point in the 5-Point Agreement, monitoring the Nepali Army, would be straightforward. Finally, as the Ambassador pointed out, Martin agreed that the UN had considerable expertise in election observation. Arms Management the Biggest Challenge -------------- ¶4. (C) The UN special envoy said he was under no illusions about the difficulty of his task and he did not disagree with the Ambassador's assertion that the crucial language in the GON-Maoist 5-Point Agreement concerned arms management. Martin described the agreement's lack of clarity on the issue of arms management as a major challenge. What was necessary, he said, was a two-step approach. The problem was that step one, confining Maoist combatants to cantonments with their weapons, was not sufficient. There would have to be a second step separating the Maoists from their arms. The Ambassador voiced concern that the Maoists would look for some reward after the first step -- if they agreed to go into cantonments at all. What really mattered, the Ambassador reiterated, was that the Maoists not be allowed to participate in the interim government until arms separation was complete. The Ambassador encouraged Martin to take advantage of the GON's excellent information on Maoist-captured GON weapons to ensure the Maoists did not cheat. Martin said he had not come to Nepal "as a political mediator," but that he would try to understand the various parties' positions and look for common ground. He stated that he had already had a short meeting with Prime Minister Koirala. OHCHR Work Will Not Suffer -------------- ¶5. (C) Martin said he was confident that OHCHR would continue its work without him. The UN had already begun looking for internal and external candidates to head the office. He told the Ambassador that before stepping down he had tried to obtain additional funding for the office, but that it was an uphill battle. OHCHR's office in Nepal was already the High Commissioner's largest operation in the world. Obtaining additional voluntary funding in the current international environment was hard. In response to a question from the Ambassador, the special envoy stated that he had also begun looking at ways to get more of OHCHR's information out into the public domain. Martin added that David Johnson, an American, was the officer-in-charge until a new chief was selected and that he was authorized to take all required action. (Note: Johnson had told us that he does not feel empowered to act and is worried the office will drift for the next two months or so until a successor to Martin is named. End Note.) Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Martin's appointment is good news. He knows Nepal well and has stature and respect from his previous work as the Secretary General's special envoy in East Timor. He is clear-eyed about the Maoists. His task, however, is gargantuan. Martin will work out of a temporary OHCHR office until he can find larger, more appropriate quarters. He told the Ambassador he intended to bring a serving Brigadier General onto his team who would have credibility with both the Nepali Army and the Maoist People's Liberation Army. It will take time for Martin to get his team up and running, a constraint which many politicians here have trouble understanding. Martin dampened expectations at his August 29 debut press conference, stating publicly that the issue of arms management needed further definition if the UN were to play a useful role. We could not agree more. Biographic Note -------------- ¶7. (C) Ian Martin, a Briton, was Secretary General of Amnesty International from 1986 to 1992. He has served in United Nations' peacekeeping or HUMAN RIGHTS missions in Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. In 1999, he was the Special Representative of the Secretary General for the East Timor Popular Consultation, and recently undertook a troubleshooting assignment as Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Timor-Leste after the outbreak of violence there. He was the Representative of the High Commissioner for HUMAN RIGHTS in Nepal from May 2005 until August 25, 2006. MORIARTY