NEPAL: PUSHING BACK THE MAOIST TIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002284 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IN NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: PUSHING BACK THE MAOIST TIDE Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES F. MORIARTY, REASONS 1.4 (B/D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) We are reaching the crunch point in Nepal. Four months after Nepal's people's movement uprising, the Maoists appear intent on intimidating their way into power. Till now, the Seven Party Alliance government appears to have been more worried about alienating the Maoists than about preserving law and order or blocking a Maoist takeover. With a UN team due in shortly to provide assistance to Nepal's peace process, the GON appears to have finally drawn a line in the sand: it is proclaiming that the Maoists will not be allowed into any interim government until they are separated from their weapons. This is the core issue. If the Maoists enter an interim government while retaining their weapons, they fully expect to bully their partners into handing over power. Conversely, if the Maoists agree to be separated from their weapons, all other issues, including the new constitution and demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, become relatively easy to resolve. ¶2. (C) The United States, we hope working closely with India, must take all possible steps to bolster the GON's resolve and keep it from caving in to the Maoist demands. We need to reiterate our support for the GON's bottom line both publicly and privately. We also need to work closely with the GON to design a process that makes it increasingly difficult for the Maoists to engage in violence. And finally, we need to engage the GON to the maximum extent possible to enhance civilian control over the military, support law enforcement training to reestablish rule of law, and backstop a robust UN role with a clear mandate in promoting a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Nepal. Maoists on the Move -------------- ¶3. (C) Since helping the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) topple the King's government in April, the Maoists have pursued peace talks with the SPA government, while doing everything possible to undercut that government's influence and replace it with their own. Optimists (a declining breed in Nepal) hope that the Maoists genuinely want to enter the political mainstream and are merely trying to strengthen their hands for the negotiations with the government. The totality of Maoist actions since they entered into a ceasefire in late April suggests, however, that such hopes are misplaced. Since the Maoists began coming above ground, they have massively increased extortion, forced the closure of scores of industries, continued recruitment of soldiers, ordered the closure of government office, and have attempted to build parallel government structures. Threats and intimidation against SPA politicians, business people, and the average Nepali who has borne the brunt of the ten-year insurgency have soared. The Government Remains Passive -------------- ¶4. (C) In the face of continuing Maoist provocations, the GON has remained largely passive. In contrast to the Maoists, the GON appears to be making a good faith effort to adhere to the cease-fire code of conduct. As a result, the Nepali Army has been confined to its barracks. More important, the police have done virtually nothing to respond to Maoist breaches of the law. In part, this reflects a belief by many in the police that the Maoists will soon come into the government and might engage in retribution against police who are too active. Perhaps even more important, Home Minister Krishna Prashad Sitaula, the minister in charge of the police, also happens to be the government's chief negotiator with the Maoists. He appears to worry that using the police against the Maoists will inevitably make his negotiations with the Maoists more difficult. He also appears to believe that unilateral concessions on the part of the GON are the best way to win the goodwill of the Maoists in those negotiations. Is the Negotiating Can Coming to a Halt? -------------- ¶5. (C) A series of bilateral talks between the Maoists and the government led to seemingly significant concessions on the part of the government, including commitments to dissolve the Parliament, promulgate an interim constitution, and form an interim governmentcontaining the Maoists. Eventually, however, the government dug in on the ultimate bottom line: the Maoists had to be separated from their weapons, and they would not be allowed to join an interim government until after such separation occurred. The Maoists refused to agree to this proposition in bilateral discussions. Instead, Maoist supremo Prachanda and Prime Minister Koirala sent identical letters to Kofi Anan asking that the UN help Nepal with a variety of peace-related issues. Significantly, however, the letters mentioned neither separation of Maoists from their weapons, nor formation of an interim government. Three Possible Futures - and the U.S. Response -------------- - ¶6. (C) With a UN team scheduled to arrive in Kathmandu in the next week or so, one of three possible futures will likely play out in Nepal over the coming months: -- The first, perhaps most unlikely of the three, would see the Maoists agreeing during the UN-sponsored talks to separate from their weapons. This obviously would be the best possible outcome, and we need to do everything possible to encourage its realization, including by making sure the UN team understands the indispensability to peace of separating the Maoists from their weapons. To increase the possibility of this outcome, we also need to support the infrastructure of peace (e.g., the cease-fire monitoring committee, the peace secretariat, and the soon-to-be-formed peace councils), and by providing technical assistance to government negotiators. Under this scenario, we would also need to move quickly to consolidate the incipient peace, including by working with other donors to come up with packages for addressing disarmament, demobilization, and reconstruction of Maoist combatants and surplus security forces. We would also need to help Nepal move toward a free and fair election to a constitutional assembly. -- The second, somewhat more likely, scenario would see the GON caving to Maoist demands during the negotiations and allowing the Maoists into an interim government while their People's Liberation Army continued to bear arms. We believe that Maoist entry into the GON (since the Maoists would still be on our terrorist list) would legally require that we end direct assistance of all sorts to the GON. More important, the entry of an armed Maoist movement into an interim government would likely lead quickly to Maoist domination of the GON and adoption by the Nepal government of policies inimical to U.S. interests. We would need to coordinate closely with other interested parties, and particularly India, to mitigate the impact that a Maoist-dominated government would have. -- The third, perhaps most likely scenario would see both the Maoists and the GON sticking to their bottom lines and the talks foundering over the Maoist refusal to be separated from their weapons. This scenario would likely lead to Maoist attempts to orchestrate massive demonstrations to pressure the GON to cave; if those demonstrations did not lead to the desired outcome, the Maoists might well return to open violence. This scenario suggests that we and other members of the international community need to encourage the GON to hang tough: if the government cedes power to the Maoists, Nepal is guaranteed a bleak future. If the government refuses to bend, there is a chance the Maoists will. Even if the Maoists do not compromise at this time, the GON will have the domestic and external support necessary to convince the Maoists over time to come in out of the cold. We hope that Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister K.P. Oli will hear this message authoritatively during his September visit to the UNGA. We also need to work closely with Nepal's civilian leadership to make sure that the GON's Security Services are as ready as possible if the Maoists make the wrong choice. And finally, we need to be ready to ship necessary security assistance as rapidly as possible, if the Maoists return to the warpath. Comment/Conclusion -------------- ¶8. (C) The Maoists see fall 2006 as a decisive juncture in their ten-year campaign to seize power in Nepal by force of arms. They recognize the fissures in the fragile Seven Party Alliance, and are doing everything they can to widen the cracks and split SPA cohesion. While PM Koirala has held the line, demanding that the Maoists surrender their weapons before entering a Government of Nepal, his coalition partners have not matched the PM's outspoken rhetoric. Encouragement to hold the line by the international community, especially the U.S., continues to play a critical role in stiffening the ailing Koirala's spine. The U.S. must increase its engagement in Nepal, in terms of bilateral assistance and diplomatic support for the peace process, but also by vigorously promoting the international community's and the UN's role in Nepal. Separating the Maoists from their weapons remains the critical task in this endeavor, the success or failure of which will determine whether Nepal will become a Maoist state. MORIARTY