NEPALI CONGRESS-DEMOCRATIC LEADERS WORRIED ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002130 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: NEPALI CONGRESS-DEMOCRATIC LEADERS WORRIED ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS REF: KATHMANDU 2046 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During an August 1 meeting with Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D) President Sher Bahadur Deuba, Spokesperson Minendra Rijal and Central Committee Member Prakash Sharan Mahat, the Ambassador expressed his concern about the Maoists' expanded influence and stressed to the NC-D leaders that the Government of Nepal (GON) needed to stand up to the Maoists. Deuba opined that the reason the Maoists were setting up camps in the districts surrounding Kathmandu Valley was so they could infiltrate Kathmandu in civilian clothes. All three NC-D leaders worried about the civil-military relationship and Deuba was suspect that the Nepal Army (NA) might return to siding with the King. Rijal said that the Carter Center was interested in election monitoring in Nepal. The Ambassador and his NC-D interlocutors agreed that the next step in the peace process had to be arms management. The Ambassador explained that the Government of India could be supportive of UN involvement for arms management and preparations for constituent assembly elections. The Ambassador said the U.S. could support a UN role in Nepal if it was based on a serious agreement without loopholes for the Maoists to exploit. End Summary. AMBASSADOR WORRIED, ENCOURAGES NC-D LEADERS -------------- ¶2. (C) During his August 1 meeting with NC-D President Sher Bahadur Deuba, Spokesperson Minendra Rijal and Central Committee Member Prakash Sharan Mahat, the Ambassador explained that he was worried about the Maoists' actively expanded influence and infiltration of government institutions. He expressed concern that the Maoists were planning how to take control of the government. Deuba questioned why Amik Sherchan of the pro-Maoist People's Front Nepal (PFN) was made a Deputy Prime Minister and said "if the Maoists could influence the government so much then what was the point of having a government." Noting recent reports of Maoists removing criminals from police stations to be tried in Maoist People's Courts, Mahat said that some government officials were indifferent to Maoist advances. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador explained to his NC-D interlocutors that he had told Prime Minister G.P. Koirala on July 29 that the GON needed to assert its authority more in the face of Maoist provocateurs (reftel). The Ambassador had cautioned PM Koirala of the danger that, if the GON did not give power to the Maoists at the negotiating table the Maoists would return to fighting. Deuba wondered why the Maoists had recently set up camps in the districts surrounding Kathmandu and opined that maybe the Maoists would infiltrate Kathmandu wearing civilian clothes rather than military fatigues. Rijal said GON negotiators could not let Maoists believe they would get everything they wanted in negotiations, though he believed that was the impression the Maoists' had. The Ambassador asserted the GON had the power, legitimacy, and support of the people on its side and should stand up to the Maoists. NC-D WORRIED ABOUT CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) Deuba worried about the loyalty of the NA and the possibility that it might support the King in a coup. The Ambassador noted that there were no indications the palace was interfering with the NA. Mahat said that an army general had explained to him that the NA wanted to support the GON, but suggested to Mahat the GON needed to dismantle the 5,000-member strong palace security force. Rijal suggested that the PM should appoint a new NA Chief and then include a reduction in the palace force into the new Chief's terms of reference. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador stressed that the GON needed to assert control over the NA and added that the GON should not be afraid of the army, but rather view it as a tool. Deuba noted that he had offered the PM to meet with the NA generals if the PM was unable because of his health. Mahat agreed that security needed to be under the full control of the GON and added that the GON needed to work faster to institutionalize the NA under the GON. Deuba proclaimed that the NA should be a professional army that could run on its own and added that the NA needed to be trained to fight properly. Mahat noted that the NA lacked confidence that it could defeat the Maoist PLA on the battlefield. The Ambassador acknowledged that at the request of the PM he was not involved directly much with the NA. He added that the PM was seeking the NA's advice on how to handle the Maoists. The Ambassador noted, however, that the NA and Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) had begun to seek assistance with confidence building measures. DEUBA ON MEETING THE MAOISTS -------------- ¶6. (C) Deuba explained that during two meetings with Maoist leaders, they had flattered him by saying what a nice and straightforward person he was. Deuba said he told the Maoists to cease extortion and the Maoists had promised him they would publicly announce their intention to return all seized property to the rightful owners, which he noted they had yet to do. Deuba believed the Maoists were "so smart" in trying to create friction among the Parties by meeting with leaders of the Seven-Party-Alliance (SPA). Mahat questioned whether the U.S. could meet the Maoists if they did not change their actions. The Ambassador replied that talking with the Maoists would only serve to give the Maoists more legitimacy and undercut the USG position that the Maoists were terrorists. INDIA ON UN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶7. (C) The NC-D leaders were interested in India's position on UN involvement in the peace process. The Ambassador explained that the head of the UN pre-assessment team, Staffan de Mistura, had told him the Government of India (GOI) had no problems with UN involvement in arms management and preparations for and monitoring of constituent assembly elections. The Ambassador noted that the GOI's only concern was that it did not want UN assistance to Nepal to have to go through the UN Security Council. The Ambassador said the GOI was more concerned now than a few months ago of the need to disarm the Maoists. Deuba said the GOI was worried that PM Koirala gave too many concessions to the Maoists. He added that the GOI would object to Pakistanis being involved in UN assistance to the peace process. Deuba suggested that the U.S. had leverage in the UN and could help lobby the UN to assist the GON with arms decommissioning. The Ambassador noted that the GOI would also have to agree on any UN agreement in order to push the UN process forward. U.S. SUPPORT FOR UN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE PROCESS -------------- --- ¶8. (C) The NC-D leaders were also curious whether the U.S. would financially support UN involvement in the peace process. The Ambassador said he had told de Mistura that it would be hard for the U.S. to be supportive unless the agreement was serious enough; the agreement needed to put Maoist weapons under effective control and not contain any loopholes for the Maoists. The Ambassador explained that the UN pre-assessment team was hoping to get an agreement based on consensus between the Maoists and the GON before they left Nepal on August 3 (Note: The UN team left without an agreement). He added that the lack of such an agreement would be a good indication that the Maoists intended to delay the arms management issue as long as possible. HOME MINISTER SITAULA NOT HELPING THE PEACE PROCESS -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador said that PM Koirala had told him he was taking effective control of the police, even though Home Minister Sitaula was retaining his position, and had instructed the Inspector General of Police (IGP) to enforce the law. The PM had said Home Minister Sitaula would also retain his role as chief negotiator of the GON talks team. Deuba thought Sitaula should be replaced. The Ambassador agreed that having the Home Minister also in charge of the police and the GON talks team was a conflict of responsibility. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) The NC-D leaders seemed worried about the Maoists, but also about the possibility of the NA rising up in support of the King. Their eagerness for information from the Ambassador about the peace process reflected how out of the loop they are regarding peace negotiations. Deuba was upbeat, and his offer to the PM to meet with the NA the only glimpse that he is upset about not being a major player in the peace process. The NC-D leaders, like most of the SPA leaders we have talked to in recent days, were clear that the Maoists need to give up arms before joining the government. MORIARTY