Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2030
2006-07-28 12:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

MAOIST ARMS ISSUE MUST BE SOLVED FIRST, CPN-UML

Tags:  PGOV NP 
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2864
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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002030 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV NP
SUBJECT: MAOIST ARMS ISSUE MUST BE SOLVED FIRST, CPN-UML
LEADERS AGREE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1664


B. KATHMANDU 1976

C. KATHMANDU 1731

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002030 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV NP SUBJECT: MAOIST ARMS ISSUE MUST BE SOLVED FIRST, CPN-UML LEADERS AGREE REF: A. KATHMANDU 1664 ¶B. KATHMANDU 1976 ¶C. KATHMANDU 1731 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On July 27 the Ambassador met separately with CPN-UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal and Speaker of the House Subash Nemwang (also CPN-UML) to discuss what the Government of Nepal could do to resolve the arms management issue. Both interlocutors agreed that the issue of Maoist arms had to be resolved before the peace process could move forward. MK Nepal acknowledged that he had little knowledge of what the GON's position was on arms management. He was worried about ongoing Maoist intimidation and the creation of Maoist camps in the districts surrounding Kathmandu Valley. Nemwang noted that Parliament was the vehicle through which ground work for constituent assembly elections would be done and dates ultimately announced. He added that Parliament could do its part to monitor GON activities to affect GON action during this delicate transition period. End Summary. MK NEPAL AGREES ARMS MANAGEMENT FIRST, BUT OUT OF THE LOOP -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a July 27 meeting with the Ambassador, MK Nepal said the GON and Maoists needed to come to an agreement on arms management, which was the most important issue now. MK Nepal stressed that his Party was for democratization of the Army and reform in the military. For the Maoists, the CPN-UML wanted decommissioning of Maoist weapons leading to complete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). He said it was acceptable to the CPN-UML for the PM, or an emissary of the PM, to come to a common understanding on arms management with the Maoists. He mentioned that he had heard that the PM had sent proposals on arms management to the Maoists and said that he had no objection to this. This was in contrast to previous meetings where MK Nepal animatedly talked about the alleged "special relationship" between the Nepali Congress (NC) and Maoists (ref A). He suggested the GON should appoint someone to be the sole interlocutor with the UN on the arms management issue. Noting that he had read in the newspaper that the Maoists had recently met with PM Koirala and Nepali Congress (NC-D) leader Sher Bahadur Deuba, MK Nepal acknowledged that he did not know what ha
d been going on regarding the arms management issue. WORRIED ABOUT THE WAY FORWARD -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador worried that the GON was not doing enough to demonstrate it could serve and protect the people of Nepal. MK Nepal lamented that there was no clear plan to correct the present "anarchic" situation in Nepal, and said that Nepalis and the CPN-UML were worried about who would take the initiative to give direction to the country. He said the GON's power was concentrated in PM Koirala, but it was difficult for anyone to meet with him due to his poor health. In response to the Ambassador's comments that by year's end the Maoists could either be in the government with weapons or back in the jungle fighting, MK Nepal was silent, shook his head for a few moments, and said the issues were complicated. He eventually replied that the GON should ensure that there would be no Maoist takeover by force, and stressed the need for a strong monitoring mechanism of Maoist activity to prevent Maoist intimidation. He added, however, that even if the Maoists partially disarmed, they would still be able to intimidate people and threaten them with physical harm. GON ALLOWING MAOIST INTIMIDATION TO CONTINUE -------------- ¶4. (C) MK Nepal complained that a CPN-UML activist had recently been badly beaten by a group of Maoists in the Bouddha area of Kathmandu over labor issues in his factory. He lamented that the police did nothing to intervene in this case and noted that no one was punishing people for violent intimidation and extortion. The Ambassador pointed out that arresting the perpetrators was the GON's job, regardless of whether they were Maoists or not, and suggested that MK Nepal mention the incident to Home Secretary Sitaula. MAOIST FORCES NEAR KATHMANDU -------------- ¶5. (C) MK Nepal voiced his concern about the Maoist creation of People's Liberation Army camps in the districts surrounding Kathmandu. He suggested that the GON should dictate to the Maoists where the camps should be and monitor the identities of the Maoist cadre in the camps. He expressed frustration that the GON was silent about the Maoist camps and suggested the GON needed to consult military experts for assistance (ref B). INTERIM PARLIAMENT AND CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) MK Nepal mentioned that once the GON declared a date for constituent assembly elections the Parliament could be expanded by adding members to the Upper House, to include Maoists. He suggested that constituent assembly election ballots could have two sections, one to vote on whether Nepal should be a monarchy or republic, and the other to select candidates for the assembly. ¶7. (C) In his July 27 meeting with the Ambassador, Speaker of the House Subash Nemwang explained that the Upper House of Parliament had 42 vacant seats (out of a total of 60) and that the GON could think about adding Maoists to the Upper House of Parliament, after arms management was completed. Importantly, as positions to the Upper House were not filled by election but by appointment by the Lower House. Nemwang opined that Maoists would win only five to seven percent of the vote in a free and fair constituent assembly election. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE CLEAR ARMS ISSUE MUST COME FIRST -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Speaker of the House Nemwang unequivocally told the Ambassador that the management of Maoist arms had to be resolved before an interim constitution and government could be considered. He stressed that dissolving the House was out of the question at the moment and could only be addressed after the House announced dates for constituent assembly elections. NEMWANG ASSERTS PARLIAMENTS ROLE -------------- ¶9. (C) Nemwang asserted that Parliament wanted to make the peace talks a success and play an active role in the peace process. He noted that only Parliament could proclaim constituent assembly elections and only Parliament could pass the many laws necessary to prepare for elections. Nemwang said the Parliament was questioning bureaucrats and ministers to ensure full implementation of the historic May 18 proclamation and other Parliamentary decisions. Nemwang noted that he personally chaired the House of Representatives Proclamation Implementation Special Committee responsible. He added that the Parliament could also monitor the GON, as it did by requesting the GON to make the July 2 GON letter to the UN public (ref C). COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) MK Nepal, in addition to expressing frustration over being out of the loop with respect to the peace process, appeared more worried then ever about Maoist actions and intimidation. While also clearly concerned about the Maoists, Newmang seemed clear on his role as Speaker of the House and sure of the vitality and relevance of the institution of Parliament and its role during the peace process. Their shared view on the need for arms management to come first reflects broadened consensus on this point among Nepali political leaders. Clear ideas on just how to implement arms management are much less in evidence. MORIARTY

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