AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS HMGN POSTPONE MUNICIPAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000199 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM NP SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS HMGN POSTPONE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, CALL CEASE-FIRE REF: KATHMANDU 107 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate meetings on January 18 with Home Minister Kamal Thapa, Vice-Chairman Tulsi Giri, and Vice-Chairman Kirti Nidhi Bista, and in a January 19 meeting with Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey, the Ambassador pushed for His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN) to postpone the municipal elections (scheduled for February 8),announce a cease-fire, and reach out in a meaningful way to the political parties. All appeared deeply concerned about the current situation and receptive to the proposal. All expressed nervousness about raising concrete proposals with the King and refused to speculate on how he might react. Giri said that he planned to travel east to the King's camp on January 19 and said he would discuss the Ambassador's proposals with him; the other three also indicated that they would raise the proposals with the King. That said, Giri and Thapa both worried that HMGN might lose face and wanted the Parties to act first. In response to Pandey's opinion that the King could appeal to the political parties and call for a cease-fire after the municipal elections, the Ambassador countered that HMGN should not wait. The Ambassador urged the government to demonstrate magnanimity, vision, and statesmanship. The Vice-Chairmen also told the Ambassador that HMGN would take "aggressive" steps to prevent Maoist infiltration of the Parties' January 20 demonstration. End Summary. Package: Postpone Elections, Call for Cease-Fire -------------- --- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador separately advised the three HMGN officials that the USG would welcome an announcement by HMGN postponing the municipal elections, calling for dialogue with the political parties, and seeking negotiations among HMGN, the Maoists and the Parties for a comprehensive cease-fire with effective monitoring. The Ambassador explained that such a package would only do harm to the Maoists - if they decided against a cease-fire, it would show the domestic and international community that they had no interest in a peaceful future, while a genuine cease-fire would lessen the grip of Maoist terror over the countryside. A dramatic government announcement could also pressure the political 
parties to enter a dialogue. The Ambassador noted that the government could make clear during its announcement that municipal elections were not being cancelled but merely postponed, perhaps for 30-60 days. The Ambassador urged the government to demonstrate magnanimity, vision, and statesmanship. Thapa: Concern about The Parties' Reaction ... -------------- - ¶3. (C) Home Minister Kamal Thapa (and new head, although contested in the Supreme Court by Pashupati Rana, of the pro-Palace RPP party),said he saw some "positive sides" to the proposal and would take it up with the King. He added that he was unsure how the King would interpret the proposal. However, he remained hesitant and feared that such an announcement might make HMGN look weak with regard to both the Parties and the Maoists. He worried that there was no indication that the political parties would come for reconciliation. Thapa said that the political parties needed to provide the government a "basis of understanding," such as accepting the 1990 Constitution and abandoning talk of a constituent assembly as well as accepting the King's "election agenda," before he could urge the King to accept the proposal. Although the Ambassador pointed out that Thapa was asking the Parties to give up everything when the government would offer nothing to the Parties to save face, Thapa nevertheless maintained that if the Parties took such actions, then HMGN could postpone the municipal elections. However, he added that he would raise the proposal with the King. ... And the Maoists -------------- ¶4. (C) Thapa also posited that since the Maoists had resumed violence, the proposed announcement would make it seem as if the government were going backwards. Thapa stressed that the timing was not good for such a move, especially given the political parties' planned January 20 demonstration. He proposed waiting until after the municipal elections to pursue a cease-fire with the Maoists and reaching out to the political parties. In reply, the Ambassador stressed that it would likely be much more difficult after the elections to regain the Parties' trust. Concerned Giri: King Wants to Talk with NC Leader Koirala -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's outlining of the package described above, an obviously nervous Giri expressed his understanding that the legitimate political forces needed to reconcile. Worrying that the extreme left was beginning to dominate the seven-party alliance, V-C Giri said he had asked Nepali Congress (NC) President G.P. Koirala to come in and talk with the King. Giri noted that, if the NC leader did so, then the two could then announce the postponement of elections. He lamented that the NC leader had not yet responded to his queries. The Ambassador explained that this option forced Koirala to take a lot of risk for an uncertain reward. The Ambassador stressed that an announcement by the King of a package postponing elections to allow time to discuss with the political parties a way to include them in elections and calling for negotiations among the HMGN, Maoists, and Parties on a cease-fire would generate positive response from domestic and international public opinion. It would also provide Koirala with cover and allow him to talk with the King. Giri undertook to convey the Ambassador's proposal to Gyanendra when he flew east to the King's camp on January 19. (Note: The King left the capital January 1 for a three week tour of eastern Nepal. End Note.) ¶6. (C) Vice-Chairman Bista agreed that there was "no doubt" the proposal was a good idea. He added that the King was "not that obstinate" and would listen to reason. However, Bista doubted that the proposal would lead anywhere. Bista, who had read Maoist Deputy Baburam Bhattarai's op-ed in Samay (reftel),asserted that the Maoists would not agree to a government-proposed cease-fire, but would pursue their goal of a totalitarian government. Pandey: Timing Problematic -------------- ¶7. (C) Although agreeing with the merits of the proposal, Foreign Minister Pandey first protested that things had moved too far for HMGN to be able to act at this time. He, too, argued that HMGN would "lose face" because the King would not be able to act before the political parties' January 20 demonstration against the elections. The FM proposed that immediately after the municipal elections, the King could appeal to the political parties and there would be room to start negotiations for reconciliation. The Ambassador pushed back, noting "there was no time like the present," and HMGN should demonstrate statesmanship and find a way to compromise with the political parties, not force them to capitulate. The Ambassador noted that the King could still act after January 20, as long as it was before the elections. HMGN Will Prevent Maoist Infiltration on January 20 -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador encouraged both Vice-Chairmen to consider the freedoms of peaceful assembly and speech as HMGN considered how to deal with the legitimate security concerns arising from the seven-party alliance's demonstration planned for January 20. V-C Giri responded that, given HMGN's ban on demonstrations that day, he expected there would be arrests if the political parties tried to move forward with their plans. HMGN had tried to avoid a confrontation with the Parties, but after the Maoists' January 14 attack in Kathmandu Valley, security concerns had forced them to institute preventive measures. Bista explained that HMGN could "not sit idle," but had to be stricter and more aggressive to respond to the threat of Maoist infiltration. He added that HMGN knew it had to be careful to avoid a "mishap" on January 20. Considering Acting on RCCC -------------- ¶9. (C) V-C Giri told the Ambassador that HMGN was considering advising the Supreme Court that it would be acceptable to rule that the Royal Commission to Control Corruption (RCCC) was unconstitutional, thereby releasing former PM Sher Bahadur Deuba. However, Giri added that such a Supreme Court ruling would allow other challenges to the King's authority under Article 127 of the Constitution - perhaps making it "difficult for the King to use Article 127." The Ambassador emphasized that the USG would welcome a decision that the RCCC was unconstitutional and a subsequent release of the former Prime Minister. The Ambassador noted that the Supreme Court could both issue a narrow ruling that the RCCC was unconstitutionally formed while preserving the King's Article 127 authority. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) All four interlocutors, presumably shaken by the bloody Maoist attacks inside the Kathmandu Valley on January 14, were noticeably concerned. They all profess to understand the need for compromise between the Palace and the political parties, but, aware that the King has staked his prestige on holding the elections, seem reluctant to raise possible alternative solutions with him. On January 19, in early-morning arrests, the HMGN detained large numbers of political leaders, temporarily cut off telephone lines and extended curfew hours (septel). MORIARTY