FORMER PM DEUBA URGES "OUTSIDERS" TO HELP NEPAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001828 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR NP SUBJECT: FORMER PM DEUBA URGES "OUTSIDERS" TO HELP NEPAL REF: A. KATHMANDU 1732 ¶B. KATHMANDU 1744 ¶C. KATHMANDU 1582 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nick Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). GON: HASTE MAKES WASTE -------------- ¶1. (C) In a July 11 meeting, Nepali Congress - Democratic (NC-D) President and former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba told CDA that the Government of Nepal (GON) seemed to be in a hurry to make concessions to the Maoists. Deuba expressed concern that the GON was going to forfeit its gains, such as the reinstatement of Parliament, by giving in to Maoist demands without a plan. He recalled his recent speeches declaring that the Maoists must lay down arms, return seized property, and stop extortion if they wanted to join the government. He acknowledged the positive influence the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the National Monitoring Committee could have on Maoist behavior. He agreed that the GON should promptly replace NHRC and Election Commission members with impartial appointees. However, Deuba stressed to us that the Nepalese alone could not speak out against the Maoists like outsiders--the international community--could. He praised the Ambassador's June 28 speech (ref A) in this regard. Deuba concurred that the Maoists were cleverly exploiting political party differences by approaching party leaders separately. He affirmed that unity among the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) was of paramount importance. MUST-HAVES: CONSULTATION AND IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶2. (C) Deuba was frustrated about not being consulted about the GON's July 2 letter to the UN requesting assistance with arms management (ref B). He claimed that he had had no contact with the UN in Kathmandu. He had been unaware of the contents and hence unable to speak about the letter during his early July visit to New Delhi. Deuba supported a UN peacekeeping role but claimed that the GON was in no position to extend an invitation to the UN at this time. He assented that speed was important to the peace process, but said the GON needed to work on its "real problem" of implementing decisions. Deuba wanted all SPA members to be included in decisions, not just Prime Minister GP Koirala's circle of advisers. The former PM urged that the UN should send monitors and peacekeepers who were willing to speak strongly against GON and Maoist violations. WILDCARDS: NC REUNIFICATION AND NEW DELHI -------------- ¶3. (C) Deuba assured us that he wanted unity between the Nepali Congress (NC) and the NC-D but avowed that he would not desert those who had supported him since Koirala expelled him from the NC in 2002. Deuba described relations between the two factions as a tricky, ongoing give-and-take. He said that he had asked the NC, "You help the Maoists. Why don't you help me?" (Note: Deuba's comment was in reference to a belief among NC-D and other politicos that the NC and the Maoists have some sort of secret understanding. NC leaders have publicly denied the rumor. End Note.) Deuba did not offer any ideas about how the Parties could connect and seemed unconvinced that reunification would occur. He gave more attention to his visit to New Delhi, during which he had been impressed to meet with PM Singh, Congress Party leader Gandhi, and several GOI officials he had not been able to see on previous visits. Deuba remarked that he had held candid discussions with the Indians, and although he "did not know why they suddenly seemed interested" in him, he suggested that the reception indicated GOI support. COMMENT -------------- ¶4. (C) Deuba, although still embittered about being sidelined from political decision-making, appeared slightly less down than he was in his last meeting with us in mid-June (ref C). The former PM's visit to New Delhi may have buoyed his spirit and provided hope that he could become a more relevant player in Nepal's transformation to democracy. Deuba was light on details about his discussions with the Indians but implied that he could be amenable to riding shotgun to an "Indian solution." Deuba's visions of grandeur were perhaps more reflective of his marginalized status than foresight regarding the impending course of Nepal's transformation. DEAN