Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU1744
2006-07-05 11:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
GOVERNMENT FORMALLY REQUESTS UN ASSISTANCE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001744
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPKO NP
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMALLY REQUESTS UN ASSISTANCE
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1731
B. KATHMANDU 1373
C. KATHMANDU 1733
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nick Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
MUCH-ANTICIPATED LETTER TO REQUEST UN MONITORING DELIVERED
--------------------------------------------- -------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001744
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPKO NP
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMALLY REQUESTS UN ASSISTANCE
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1731
B. KATHMANDU 1373
C. KATHMANDU 1733
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nick Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
MUCH-ANTICIPATED LETTER TO REQUEST UN MONITORING DELIVERED
-------------- --------------
1. (C) On July 3, the UN officially received a letter from
Prime Minister GP Koirala to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
requesting help with the management and monitoring of Maoist
and government arms. The GON declined to publicly disclose
the contents of the letter "in the interest of the country
and democracy," but a source in the Foreign Ministry
confirmed that the letter contained the same points that UN
Resident Representative Matthew Kahane previewed on June 30
(ref A). The letter asked for assistance with monitoring
human rights through the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR),the 25-point Code of Conduct (ref B)
during the cease-fire, the decommissioning of Maoist arms,
and constituent assembly elections. Suresh Chalise, the
Prime Minster's adviser, told us on July 1 that the GON was
asking specifically for decommissioning of Maoist arms rather
than the more vague "arms management" referred to in the June
16 eight-point agreement (ref C).
AWAITING UN RESPONSE WHILE MAOISTS COMPLAIN
--------------
2. (C) The Maoists have already publicly complained that the
GON did not consult them before sending the letter,
disregarding the GON's reminder that it was a sovereign body
that did not have to consult with anyone. Political party
members were upbeat about the letter and told us that they
hoped the UN would provide permanent peace-keeping forces in
addition to temporary monitors.
3. (C) David Johnson, senior human rights officer at OHCHR
(protect source),told Emboff on July 5 that he suspected a
positive UN reaction; there was likely to be a meeting in New
York before the end of the week to discuss the way to move
forward. Johnson also told Emboff that a UN assessment
mission was likely to come to Nepal "soon" to evaluate the
situation.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) The GON missed the opportunity to go on a public
relations blitz to use the letter to the UN to push for
decommissioning of Maoist weapons. Instead, the confidential
request for arms decommissioning was likely intended to
garner international support before the GON publicly calls
for what it knows the Maoists will find unpalatable. A
prompt, positive response and engagement from the UN is
critical; the Maoists are unlikely to change their behavior
without the prospect of effective monitoring.
DEAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPKO NP
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMALLY REQUESTS UN ASSISTANCE
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1731
B. KATHMANDU 1373
C. KATHMANDU 1733
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nick Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
MUCH-ANTICIPATED LETTER TO REQUEST UN MONITORING DELIVERED
-------------- --------------
1. (C) On July 3, the UN officially received a letter from
Prime Minister GP Koirala to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
requesting help with the management and monitoring of Maoist
and government arms. The GON declined to publicly disclose
the contents of the letter "in the interest of the country
and democracy," but a source in the Foreign Ministry
confirmed that the letter contained the same points that UN
Resident Representative Matthew Kahane previewed on June 30
(ref A). The letter asked for assistance with monitoring
human rights through the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR),the 25-point Code of Conduct (ref B)
during the cease-fire, the decommissioning of Maoist arms,
and constituent assembly elections. Suresh Chalise, the
Prime Minster's adviser, told us on July 1 that the GON was
asking specifically for decommissioning of Maoist arms rather
than the more vague "arms management" referred to in the June
16 eight-point agreement (ref C).
AWAITING UN RESPONSE WHILE MAOISTS COMPLAIN
--------------
2. (C) The Maoists have already publicly complained that the
GON did not consult them before sending the letter,
disregarding the GON's reminder that it was a sovereign body
that did not have to consult with anyone. Political party
members were upbeat about the letter and told us that they
hoped the UN would provide permanent peace-keeping forces in
addition to temporary monitors.
3. (C) David Johnson, senior human rights officer at OHCHR
(protect source),told Emboff on July 5 that he suspected a
positive UN reaction; there was likely to be a meeting in New
York before the end of the week to discuss the way to move
forward. Johnson also told Emboff that a UN assessment
mission was likely to come to Nepal "soon" to evaluate the
situation.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) The GON missed the opportunity to go on a public
relations blitz to use the letter to the UN to push for
decommissioning of Maoist weapons. Instead, the confidential
request for arms decommissioning was likely intended to
garner international support before the GON publicly calls
for what it knows the Maoists will find unpalatable. A
prompt, positive response and engagement from the UN is
critical; the Maoists are unlikely to change their behavior
without the prospect of effective monitoring.
DEAN