Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU1667
2006-06-23 12:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
DEPUTY PM: IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING MAOISTS INTO
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHKT #1667 1741251 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 231251Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2069 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4519 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 4775 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9888 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2761 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4172 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9921 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001667
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL NP
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PM: IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING MAOISTS INTO
GOVERNMENT BEFORE DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
NO MAOISTS WITH WEAPONS IN GOVERNMENT
-------------------------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001667
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL NP
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PM: IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING MAOISTS INTO
GOVERNMENT BEFORE DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
NO MAOISTS WITH WEAPONS IN GOVERNMENT
--------------
1. (C) In a June 23 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister K.P. Oli stressed that it would
be "quite impossible" to bring the Maoists into the
Government of Nepal (GON) before "demobilization and
decommissioning" had taken place. During the meeting, Oli
excused himself to take a phone call from Indian Foreign
Secretary Shyam Saran. Oli told the Ambassador he had given
SIPDIS
Saran, who had raised New Delhi's concerns about GON
concessions to the Maoists, the same clear message that the
Maoists would not be allowed to enter the government until
the weapons issue was resolved. The Ambassador explained to
Oli that the Patriot Act would most likely prevent the USG
from providing assistance of any type if the Maoists were
allowed to join the GON before they had irrevocably given up
violence. Oli noted that once the Maoists had given up their
arms and violent ways the GON planned to request that the
U.S. remove its terrorist designation of the Maoists.
OLI: EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED CAREFULLY
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Noting that he was in Europe when the June 16
negotiations took place, Oli acknowledged his surprise over
how quickly the eight-point agreement was reached. He
commented that the GON needed to be careful implementing the
eight-point agreement now that the agreement was a reality.
Oli assured the Ambassador, however, that the GON was in no
hurry to dissolve Parliament and would only do so when there
was a "good alternative." The Ambassador urged Oli to stop
the GON from making unilateral concessions to Maoists in
negotiations.
OLI WANTS MAOIST EXTORTION AND INTIMIDATION TO STOP
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Oli said that the GON would not accept extremism and
only wanted sovereignty for the Nepali people, peace, and
democracy. He stressed that Maoist extortion and
intimidation should be stopped and conveyed to the Ambassador
that he would talk with PM Koirala about the issue upon his
return from Bangkok on June 26.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) Oli was categorical in stating that the Maoists would
not be allowed in the GON before the weapons issue was
resolved. Political leaders seem clear on this point now;
the real test, however, will come when and if there are
negotiations to decide on terms of reference for weapons
monitoring.
MORIARTY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL NP
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PM: IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING MAOISTS INTO
GOVERNMENT BEFORE DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
NO MAOISTS WITH WEAPONS IN GOVERNMENT
--------------
1. (C) In a June 23 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister K.P. Oli stressed that it would
be "quite impossible" to bring the Maoists into the
Government of Nepal (GON) before "demobilization and
decommissioning" had taken place. During the meeting, Oli
excused himself to take a phone call from Indian Foreign
Secretary Shyam Saran. Oli told the Ambassador he had given
SIPDIS
Saran, who had raised New Delhi's concerns about GON
concessions to the Maoists, the same clear message that the
Maoists would not be allowed to enter the government until
the weapons issue was resolved. The Ambassador explained to
Oli that the Patriot Act would most likely prevent the USG
from providing assistance of any type if the Maoists were
allowed to join the GON before they had irrevocably given up
violence. Oli noted that once the Maoists had given up their
arms and violent ways the GON planned to request that the
U.S. remove its terrorist designation of the Maoists.
OLI: EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED CAREFULLY
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Noting that he was in Europe when the June 16
negotiations took place, Oli acknowledged his surprise over
how quickly the eight-point agreement was reached. He
commented that the GON needed to be careful implementing the
eight-point agreement now that the agreement was a reality.
Oli assured the Ambassador, however, that the GON was in no
hurry to dissolve Parliament and would only do so when there
was a "good alternative." The Ambassador urged Oli to stop
the GON from making unilateral concessions to Maoists in
negotiations.
OLI WANTS MAOIST EXTORTION AND INTIMIDATION TO STOP
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Oli said that the GON would not accept extremism and
only wanted sovereignty for the Nepali people, peace, and
democracy. He stressed that Maoist extortion and
intimidation should be stopped and conveyed to the Ambassador
that he would talk with PM Koirala about the issue upon his
return from Bangkok on June 26.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) Oli was categorical in stating that the Maoists would
not be allowed in the GON before the weapons issue was
resolved. Political leaders seem clear on this point now;
the real test, however, will come when and if there are
negotiations to decide on terms of reference for weapons
monitoring.
MORIARTY