PRIME MINISTER BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON UPCOMING NEW

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 001432 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IN NP SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON UPCOMING NEW DELHI VISIT Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES F. MORIARTY, REASONS 1.4 (B/D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Ambassador Moriarty, accompanied by A/DCM Schwartz met June 5 with Prime Minister G.P Koirala and Senior Foreign Policy Adviser Chalise on the eve of the Prime Minister,s upcoming visit to New Delhi. Although press accounts have speculated that the trip will focus on economic and trade matters, the Prime Minister immediately volunteered that he had only one goal for his visit ) to obtain Government of India (GoI) consent to participation of a "witness" in the Nepal peace process. Gaunt and repeatedly coughing, the Prime Minister asked the Ambassador to inform Washington of his desire to firmly draw the Maoists into the peace process, while foreclosing Maoist military threats and containing potentially recalcitrant Nepal Army (NA) elements by engaging a credible and independent group of foreign witnesses, preferably including India and the United Nations. End Summary. Traveling With a "Heavy Heart" -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador Moriarty opened the meeting by delivering the signed original of President Bush,s letter of congratulations to Prime Minister Koirala, which the latter received with gratitude. The Prime Minister immediately opened with his planned June 6 ) 9 travel to New Delhi ) travel he is undertaking with a "heavy heart," because of his very strong desire to travel to Bangkok for medical treatment. His health, he said, was "terrible." Nevertheless, the Prime Minister revealed that he is going to New Delhi with a sense of urgency to press the case for India to agree to having a credible "witness" in Nepal,s peace process. Prime Minister Singh, he believes, is a "reasonable and sensible" man who will see the value of India supporting this important role ) not as a mediator or facilitator. If the GoI were reluctant, he warned, he would up the ante by asking the Maoists to issue a public statement in favor of having the talks "witnessed." Negotiations Underway -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) The Ambassador warned the Prime Minister of the fears shared by many in Nepal and in the USG that the Maoists were taking advantage of the GoN,s restraint in responding to Maoist abuses by pushing to legitimize their "parallel government." Pressing demands for the dissolution of Parliament and declining a military agreement were tactics designed to press their advantage. The Prime Minister acknowledged that in an effort to build good will and confidence his government had moved rapidly ) perhaps too rapidly -- to meet what they saw as legitimate Maoist demands, including the restriction of the King's powers and the declaration that Nepal had become a secular state. As a result, the Maoist negotiators had little more that was legitimate to ask of the GoN and their negotiators had little for which to claim credit. ¶4. (S/NF) Turning to the unstable law and order situation in the country, the Ambassador urged the Prime Minister to use the police to press the Maoists when they committed common crimes or violated the code of conduct for the ceasefire. The Ambassador also questioned whether the Home Affairs Minister, Krishna Sitaula, who was the GON's point man managing the police and enforcing law and order, was an appropriate figure to lead the GoN negotiations. The Home Minister's need to assure the people that the government would protect their lives and security appeared at odds with the lead negotiator's need to cajole the Maoists into cooperating. The Prime Minister took the point, and also allowed as how he had personally reprimanded Sitaula for being somewhat soft on the Maoists. PM,s Bottom Lines Remain -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) The Prime Minister reaffirmed his bottom line views: there was a need for a military agreement to assure that weapons were decommissioned and the current cease fire was made permanent; and there would be no dissolution of Parliament until after the Maoists took such steps. Returning to the theme of international "witnesses," the Prime Minister told the Ambassador that he and his government were prepared to take "stern action" against the Maoists, but before doing so, they needed to do everything possible to make talks with the Maoists succeed. If there were a respected witness in the talks, particularly one under some sort of UN umbrella, the GON could push the Maoists hard on ceasefire violations. If the Maoists did not respond appropriately, their intransigence would be revealed to the entire world, and the Maoists would be isolated if they continued to violate agreements. Comment -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The Prime Minister made clear his concerns about Maoist intentions, as revealed by their flagrant violations of the ceasefire code of conduct. He also seems to have a sensible plan with respect to the way forward: get the Maoists trapped in peace talks where their actions will come under continuous international scrutiny, and where they will thus be forced to reveal their true intentions. MORIARTY