FORMER AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER OPTIMISTIC FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001294 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016 TAGS: ECON EAID EINV PREL PGOV NP SUBJECT: FORMER AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER OPTIMISTIC FOR NEPAL'S FUTURE REF: KATHMANDU 1283 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Afghanistan's former Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani, in Nepal for two weeks of consulting for the World Bank (WB) on the transition of the Government of Nepal (GON),stressed the need for rapid progress on the part of the new government during May 21 discussions with several Ambassadors. He said the GON needed to establish its credibility by setting priorities regarding development assistance. He emphasized that the GON's credibility depended on how well the GON could accomplish its goals and change the life of the average Nepali for the better in the near term. Ghani thought the GON bureaucracy was competent at the joint secretary level and could perform well if given orders from GON leaders. Ambassador Moriarty and Ghani agreed that the GON might need to move forward with the constituent assembly process, regardless of whether the Maoists were on board, an opinion not shared by some European Ambassadors. End Summary. FORMER AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER SEES THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Ashraf Ghani, former Finance Minister of Afghanistan, in Nepal for two weeks consulting for the WB, offered three possible scenarios for the future of Nepal during discussions on May 21 with the Ambassadors of the United States, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Russia and India, as well as WB Country Director Ken Ohashi. Ghani envisioned three possible outcomes of Nepal's transitional period: 1) the Maoists would take over, leading to a collapse of the state; 2) the GON would not collapse but would fail to address the underlying causes of the Maoist insurgency leading inexorably to a negative future; or 3) the GON would achieve legitimacy and authority by implementing programs and policies that make a difference in the average Nepali's life. GHANI RECOMMENDS GON ESTABLISH PRIORITIES QUICKLY... -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In order for the GON to achieve legitimacy, Ghani stressed, it should form priorities by deciding what could reasonably be accomplished within a limited time frame. He suggested that the GON should define and accomplish three or four priorities regarding development assistance fairly 
quickly, and thus achieve legitimacy by delivering on stated promises within a self-imposed deadline. Ghani cautioned however, that announcing priorities and deadlines could also backfire if the GON did not meet its own goals, and that announcing too many priorities could wear the GON thin. Ghani explained that a donors conference in which the GON set priorities in advance could be effective, if hard preparatory work was properly done. Ghani thought the involvement of a large organization like the United Nations (UN) could help ease the GON's transition. He explained that even though the UN did not want to go to Afghanistan, it was UN involvement that had paved the way for other organizations to come in and assist Afghanistan. Ghani stressed that any representative appointed by a multi-lateral organization would have to be a competent individual to make things work. He even implied that the right person could be involved in facilitating talks between the GON and Maoists. ...AND IS OPTIMISTIC FOR A POSITIVE FUTURE FOR NEPAL -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The former Afghan Finance Minister was surprisingly upbeat on Nepal's chances for a bright future. Ghani said he was pleasantly "shocked" at the capacity of the GON. He believed the joint secretary level of the GON contained very competent officers, who would be able to execute any orders given from their political masters. Ghani noted that the GON did an impressive job of tracking government revenue and expenditures down to the district level. Ghani commented that he thought the GON leadership was realistic and understood its weakness and past failures. DIFFERING VIEWS ON MAOIST INVOLVEMENT WITH TRANSITION -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Norwegian Ambassador suggested that donors should wait for Maoist agreement before pressing ahead with development projects. Ghani reiterated however, that the GON needed to gain legitimacy by delivering services. Ambassador Moriarty and Ghani agreed the GON would have to consider pushing forward the constituent assembly process regardless of whether Maoists were on board or not, a prospect that left the European Ambassadors visibly uncomfortable. Ambassador Moriarty commented that donor mentality in Nepal was geared solely at economic development and not toward bringing political stability. He noted that economic aid programs did not limit the influence of the Maoists. He suggested that the GON and donors may have to force the Maoists to make choices which would reveal their true intentions rather than seeking Maoist approval for development work in the country. He said donors should support the GON's priorities (reftel). COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) Ghani stressed the need for the GON to push forward regardless of Maoist intentions, and the importance of the GON setting and accomplishing three or four priority development goals, to establish credibility with the people of Nepal. Ghani continued to reiterate his positions throughout the evening of conversation, which we hope will prove helpful in persuading other donor countries of the need to support the GON during this critical transition period. MORIARTY