UML LEADER SEEKS GREATER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001238 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP SUBJECT: UML LEADER SEEKS GREATER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN NEPAL REF: KATHMANDU 1195 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) CPN-UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal told the Ambassador in a May 11 meeting that the government needed the international community to continue to play a positive role in dealing with both the King and the Maoists. He hoped to have international observers monitoring the cease-fire, the decommissioning of Maoist weapons, and the Maoist political commitment. Distrusting of the Maoists, MK Nepal judged that the government had to give the Maoists space and time, while quietly preparing for the possibility they did not intend to enter the mainstream. In the meantime, the government would start to act to try to put legislative limits on the King's power. End Summary. Getting the Government Going -------------- ¶2. (C) MK Nepal hoped that the Cabinet would be able to settle the question of electing a Speaker for Parliament by May 12. He noted that the Nepali Congress (NC) had agreed that CPN-UML Member of Parliament Subash Nemwang, a member of an ethnic group from the hills and a lawyer, should become the next Speaker, however, NC -Democratic still had reservations. MK Nepal predicted that negotiating with the smaller parties in the seven-party alliance about the allocation of Cabinet ministries would be tricky, but manageable. Once the Speaker was named, Parliament would address the questions of civilian control of the Army, dismissing the State Council ("Rajparishad"),and other pressing issues. He said Parliament planned to use a Statement of Intent to declare its position on these issues, based on the King's April 24 statement and transfer of power. Subsequently, Parliament would discuss with experts the legal mechanisms of enacting the changes. The Ambassador agreed on the importance of moving quickly to box in the King and establish civilian control of the military. Negotiating with the Maoists -------------- ¶3. (C) The CPN-UML General Secretary worried that Prime Minister GP Koirala's health was not good. In addition, there did not seem to be any proper management in place within the Nepali Congress (NC) party. He feared both of these factors could negatively affect negotiations with the Maoists. He said the seven-party alliance had not yet settled whether the government's negotiating team should consist of Cabinet members or people outside the government. Doing the latter would relieve the ability of the Maoists to directly pressure the government. Also undecided was whether Home Minister Krishna Sitoula would be part of the negotiating team, which could be awkward if the Maoists used his participation to focus negotiations on abuses by the police. Need An International Role -------------- ¶4. (C) MK Nepal stressed that while Nepal did not need a "mediator" for the negotiations, it needed to have an international "witness" to the talks with the Maoists. In addition to an international observer, who could also extend advice and expertise when requested, he thought civil society and human rights representatives should also be present at the talks. Both the international and domestic observers could condemn either side for breaking commitments. MK Nepal set forth three areas where Nepal needed international cooperation and monitoring was needed to hold the Maoists accountable: -- Monitoring a cease-fire. He suggested using non-security force personnel, possibly strengthening the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. He noted that the international monitors would work together with domestic bodies. -- Decommissioning and demobilization of Weapons. He suggested the cantonment of Maoist cadre and weapons under UN supervision. He noted that India wanted to play a bigger role on this issue, but worried that Nepal did not want to see other countries' armies marching in Nepal. Although this should be done under UN auspices, he would prefer to have as minimal a military presence as possible. He preferred UN observers to a UN peace-keeping operation. -- The Maoist political commitment. He worried that the Maoists might not abide by a commitment not to take up arms, intimidate people, coerce people to attend gatherings, or extort people. Dealing With the Two Armies -------------- ¶5. (C) MK Nepal said the Maoist military force was "the private army of the Maoists, not the people's army." He insisted they needed "new brainwashing" to change their thinking, plus training to bring them up to the mark. He noted the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) was competent and had the training of a professional army, although he noted that it too needed reform. He acknowledged that integrating the two could take some time and would be dangerous. He emphasized that the government would have to approach integrating the Maoist armed cadre into Nepal's army with great caution, although it could never say this to the Maoists. MK Nepal also acknowledged that the government had to be prepared for the eventuality that the Maoists might "betray their commitments and take the course of Pol Pot." Dealing With Royal Institutions -------------- ¶6. (C) MK Nepal stated that, while the government had to keep up the morale of the security forces, it also had to punish those who had tried to suppress the people's movement. He stressed that the government should delink the organization from the individuals and make it clear that it did not intend to dismantle the army. However, he said that there was no need to have an Army Secretariat within the Palace. He said Parliament planned to change the army's name to the Nepal Army. He admitted he was unsure what to do about the King's occupying the post of Supreme Commander, noting that international practice varied in countries with ceremonial monarchies. The Ambassador suggested that Parliament could clearly define what role the King would play in the future with respect to the army. ¶7. (C) MK Nepal also said that Parliament would abolish the State Council ("Rajparishad"). He stressed that the government would investigate the "royal courtiers" because they "must be punished and put behind bars to prevent them from creating trouble in the future." He added that the government would act to take away the security perks provided to the royal courtiers. "We have to take into account the public's wrath." Wait To Resume Security Assistance -------------- ¶8. (C) MK Nepal asked that the international community continue to play a positive role in warning the King, his courtiers, and the military so that they would not be able to come back to power. He requested that the U.S. wait some time before resuming security assistance. He feared that a resumption of security assistance would provide the Maoists with an excuse to back out of peace negotiations. MK Nepal said that the Maoist position regarding monitoring and content of a Code of Conduct, for the cease-fire, as well as Maoist willingness to place their arms under UN supervision before they joined the government would be signs as to Maoist intentions. The Army and other security forces should have some "preparation," MK Nepal explained, as "preparedness must be there if talks fail," but he reiterated the government's request to hold off on international security assistance for now. The Ambassador said the government should move quickly to make clear that the army was under civilian control by making legislative changes that remove the possibility of the King again using the army. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The UML leader is worried about the Prime Minister's health and lack of leadership, but also about how to consolidate the reinstated democratic system in Nepal. Concerned by Maoist actions and doubtful of Maoist intentions, he, like our other contacts, is trying to prepare in case the Maoists choose not to renounce violence and come into the mainstream. MORIARTY