MINISTERS ON CONTROLLING THE KING, MAOISTS, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001200

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: MINISTERS ON CONTROLLING THE KING, MAOISTS, AND
PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).

Trying To Control King's Powers
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1. (C) In separate May 9 meetings with the Ambassador,
Minister of Finance Ram Sharan Mahat and Minister of Physical
Planning and Works Gopal Man Shrestha both expressed concern
that the King might try to reassert himself in the future.
Shrestha noted that the Parliament was considering how to
break the King's ability to use Article 127. Mahat said the
government planned to address the ambiguity about "royal
control of the army" to make the army answerable and
accountable to Parliament. The House wanted nomenclature
changes for both the Royal Nepal Army and His Majesty's
Government of Nepal.


2. (C) Mahat explained that there was an ongoing debate about
how to make these changes before constituent assembly
elections. Some favored amending the Constitution, which the
Supreme Court would more easily uphold but would take time.
Others argued that the restored House of Representatives
should assert its primacy and announce that any articles of
concern in the Constitution would be held in abeyance until
the constituent assembly. (Note: In a May 10 meeting, Deputy
Prime Minister KP Oli told the Ambassador that some were
advocating that the House of Representatives announce an
interim Constitution. End Note.) The Ambassador noted that
the U.S. strongly favored civilian control of the military
and understood the need for the new government to ensure that
the King did not seduce the army into supporting a
reassertion of royal power.

Concern About The Maoists ...
--------------


3. (C) Both Ministers expressed concern about the Maoists.
Mahat assured the Ambassador that there was a strong feeling
among the seven-party alliance that the Maoists could not
enter into government while they bore weapons, including in
any interim government before constituent assembly elections.
Shrestha feared that without the management of Maoist
weapons, the Maoists could threaten to kill the seven-party
alliance leaders. He also stated that if the government
released all the Maoist leaders in Nepal and approved the
release of the leaders in India, the government would lose
all its leverage in the peace negotiations.

... But Working On The way Ahead
--------------


4. (C) Mahat said the 2003 Code of Conduct, the basis for the
Maoist draft Code of Conduct, was "too soft, too vague, and
too ambiguous." Shrestha noted that the government would
propose the Code of Conduct be clarified to contain
provisions preventing Maoists from walking about with guns
during the cease-fire, appearing in combat dress, and holding
public meetings while bearing arms. Shrestha stated the
Peace Secretariat would play an active role in addressing
these concerns. The seven-party alliance would send
representatives to talk with the Maoists, but PM Koirala,
CPN-UML General Secretary MK Nepal, and NC(D) President Sher
Bahadur Deuba would oversee the discussions within the
alliance. Shrestha agreed with the Ambassador that unity
among the alliance was "most necessary." Shrestha hoped that
all negotiations would be finished within six months. After
providing the Maoists with "a safe landing, settling all
weapons, and having UN monitoring of the weapons," the
alliance would form an interim government including the
Maoists to hold constituent assembly elections. However,
Shrestha acknowledged that talks might not succeed.

Comment
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5. (C) Senior leaders seem to understand the urgency and
necessity of getting legal controls on the King in place,
especially given their doubts as to whether the Maoists
really intend to join the political mainstream. Both Mahat
and Shrestha appear united on their bottom line, i.e. that

the Maoists cannot enter the mainstream until they give up
their arms.
MORIARTY