MINISTERS ON CONTROLLING THE KING, MAOISTS, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001200 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: MINISTERS ON CONTROLLING THE KING, MAOISTS, AND PEACE PROCESS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d). Trying To Control King's Powers -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate May 9 meetings with the Ambassador, Minister of Finance Ram Sharan Mahat and Minister of Physical Planning and Works Gopal Man Shrestha both expressed concern that the King might try to reassert himself in the future. Shrestha noted that the Parliament was considering how to break the King's ability to use Article 127. Mahat said the government planned to address the ambiguity about "royal control of the army" to make the army answerable and accountable to Parliament. The House wanted nomenclature changes for both the Royal Nepal Army and His Majesty's Government of Nepal. ¶2. (C) Mahat explained that there was an ongoing debate about how to make these changes before constituent assembly elections. Some favored amending the Constitution, which the Supreme Court would more easily uphold but would take time. Others argued that the restored House of Representatives should assert its primacy and announce that any articles of concern in the Constitution would be held in abeyance until the constituent assembly. (Note: In a May 10 meeting, Deputy Prime Minister KP Oli told the Ambassador that some were advocating that the House of Representatives announce an interim Constitution. End Note.) The Ambassador noted that the U.S. strongly favored civilian control of the military and understood the need for the new government to ensure that the King did not seduce the army into supporting a reassertion of royal power. Concern About The Maoists ... -------------- ¶3. (C) Both Ministers expressed concern about the Maoists. Mahat assured the Ambassador that there was a strong feeling among the seven-party alliance that the Maoists could not enter into government while they bore weapons, including in any interim government before constituent assembly elections. Shrestha feared that without the management of Maoist weapons, the Maoists could threaten to kill the seven-party alliance leaders. He also stated that if the government released all the Maoist leaders in Nepal and approved the release of the leaders in India, the government would lose all its leverage in the peace negotiations. ... But Working On The way Ahead -------------- ¶4. (C) Mahat said the 2003 Code of Conduct, the basis for the Maoist draft Code of Conduct, was "too soft, too vague, and too ambiguous." Shrestha noted that the government would propose the Code of Conduct be clarified to contain provisions preventing Maoists from walking about with guns during the cease-fire, appearing in combat dress, and holding public meetings while bearing arms. Shrestha stated the Peace Secretariat would play an active role in addressing these concerns. The seven-party alliance would send representatives to talk with the Maoists, but PM Koirala, CPN-UML General Secretary MK Nepal, and NC(D) President Sher Bahadur Deuba would oversee the discussions within the alliance. Shrestha agreed with the Ambassador that unity among the alliance was "most necessary." Shrestha hoped that all negotiations would be finished within six months. After providing the Maoists with "a safe landing, settling all weapons, and having UN monitoring of the weapons," the alliance would form an interim government including the Maoists to hold constituent assembly elections. However, Shrestha acknowledged that talks might not succeed. Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) Senior leaders seem to understand the urgency and necessity of getting legal controls on the King in place, especially given their doubts as to whether the Maoists really intend to join the political mainstream. Both Mahat and Shrestha appear united on their bottom line, i.e. that the Maoists cannot enter the mainstream until they give up their arms. MORIARTY