Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU1184
2006-05-08 11:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN NEPAL?
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001184
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM KPKO NP
SUBJECT: GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN NEPAL?
REF: NEW DELHI 3048
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).
Looking At Greater UN Involvement
-----------------------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001184
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM KPKO NP
SUBJECT: GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN NEPAL?
REF: NEW DELHI 3048
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).
Looking At Greater UN Involvement
--------------
1. (C) Tamrat Samuel, visiting special advisor to the UN
Undersecretary General for Political Affairs, joined by UN
Resident Representative Matthew Kahane, and UN Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) head Ian Martin
discussed with the Ambassador on May 8 the prospects for
increasing UN involvement as Nepal transitions to democracy
and, hopefully, peace. Samuel explained the purpose of his
visit was to get a sense of what the government of Nepal
(GON) might request. He said that he needed to explain to
the GON that the UN might not be able to bring in a large
international force, but a mix of civilian and international
monitoring could be possible under a UN mandate. Martin
stated that resource and mandate issues could make it
difficult for it to be done under the OHCHR umbrella. He
noted that New York/DPKO logistics would likely be needed to
get vehicles, personnel, etc. on the ground to have a
national reach.
Getting India On Board
--------------
2. C) Samuel said that a military planner from UN DPKO, Col.
Ian St. Claire, planned to join him in Nepal on May 9. The
Ambassador emphasized the importance of the GOI's buy-in to a
UN role both in monitoring the cease-fire, which New Delhi
seemed to think was unnecessary, and possible subsequent
decommissioning of weapons. Our UN interlocutors
acknowledged the importance of India. Samuel said that he
and St. Clair planned to travel next to New Delhi to discuss
possible UN involvement in Nepal with the GOI. The
Ambassador also suggested the need to have an objective
witness observe the peace talks, noting that the GOI could
not play such a role by itself. Here again, India would need
to be on board with the concept.
Checking Maoist Intentions
--------------
3. (C) The Ambassador underscored that the international
community should not act as if it were a given that the
Maoists truly intended to come in from out of the cold; that
would only increase the pressure on the GON to conclude a
less than acceptable deal. Samuel agreed that the
international community should fully support the government's
efforts. He stressed that the idea was "for the Maoists to
come in and play by the rules of mainstream politics, not to
create a new mainstream." Samuel stated that was why the two
sides needed to clearly spell out in detail the
responsibilities of each side under the cease-fire in the
code of conduct, in addition to the mechanisms for monitoring
it.
Comment
--------------
4. (C) Events are progressing rapidly here. Members of the
Nepal Government's Peace Secretariat are negotiating with the
Maoists on a code of conduct for the cease-fire. The need
for international monitoring of the cease-fire is clear to
us, especially given continued Maoist extortion and
abductions. Based on discussions here, it may well take some
effort to convince New Delhi to come on board.
MORIARTY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM KPKO NP
SUBJECT: GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN NEPAL?
REF: NEW DELHI 3048
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).
Looking At Greater UN Involvement
--------------
1. (C) Tamrat Samuel, visiting special advisor to the UN
Undersecretary General for Political Affairs, joined by UN
Resident Representative Matthew Kahane, and UN Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) head Ian Martin
discussed with the Ambassador on May 8 the prospects for
increasing UN involvement as Nepal transitions to democracy
and, hopefully, peace. Samuel explained the purpose of his
visit was to get a sense of what the government of Nepal
(GON) might request. He said that he needed to explain to
the GON that the UN might not be able to bring in a large
international force, but a mix of civilian and international
monitoring could be possible under a UN mandate. Martin
stated that resource and mandate issues could make it
difficult for it to be done under the OHCHR umbrella. He
noted that New York/DPKO logistics would likely be needed to
get vehicles, personnel, etc. on the ground to have a
national reach.
Getting India On Board
--------------
2. C) Samuel said that a military planner from UN DPKO, Col.
Ian St. Claire, planned to join him in Nepal on May 9. The
Ambassador emphasized the importance of the GOI's buy-in to a
UN role both in monitoring the cease-fire, which New Delhi
seemed to think was unnecessary, and possible subsequent
decommissioning of weapons. Our UN interlocutors
acknowledged the importance of India. Samuel said that he
and St. Clair planned to travel next to New Delhi to discuss
possible UN involvement in Nepal with the GOI. The
Ambassador also suggested the need to have an objective
witness observe the peace talks, noting that the GOI could
not play such a role by itself. Here again, India would need
to be on board with the concept.
Checking Maoist Intentions
--------------
3. (C) The Ambassador underscored that the international
community should not act as if it were a given that the
Maoists truly intended to come in from out of the cold; that
would only increase the pressure on the GON to conclude a
less than acceptable deal. Samuel agreed that the
international community should fully support the government's
efforts. He stressed that the idea was "for the Maoists to
come in and play by the rules of mainstream politics, not to
create a new mainstream." Samuel stated that was why the two
sides needed to clearly spell out in detail the
responsibilities of each side under the cease-fire in the
code of conduct, in addition to the mechanisms for monitoring
it.
Comment
--------------
4. (C) Events are progressing rapidly here. Members of the
Nepal Government's Peace Secretariat are negotiating with the
Maoists on a code of conduct for the cease-fire. The need
for international monitoring of the cease-fire is clear to
us, especially given continued Maoist extortion and
abductions. Based on discussions here, it may well take some
effort to convince New Delhi to come on board.
MORIARTY