CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF SEEKS U.S. ASSISTANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001128 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2016 TAGS: MASS PGOV PTER MCAP NP SUBJECT: CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF SEEKS U.S. ASSISTANCE REF: A. KATHMANDU 1052 ¶B. KATHMANDU 931 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a May 2 meeting with SCA Assistant Secretary Boucher, NSC Senior Director Millard and the Ambassador, Chief of Army Staff General Pyar Jung Thapa stressed that the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) would welcome, and work with, a civilian, democratically-elected government. General Thapa said that Nepal still had to deal with the Maoists and that U.S. assistance would be "critical." A/S Boucher stated that we stood ready to provide assistance, when requested by the civilian government. End Summary. Accepting Civilian Control -------------- ¶2. (C) COAS Thapa assured SCA Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, NSC Senior Director Elisabeth Millard and the Ambassador that the RNA would always act according to the Constitution and in the larger interest of the nation. He emphasized that the RNA "would welcome the civilian, democratically-elected government." He explained that he had given an unprecedented interview to CNN (ref A) to underscore that point to allay concerns during the transition because there was so much instability. A/S Boucher welcomed General Thapa's position on a democratic government, adding that his timely statements could help the RNA have a stabilizing role. Noting that the King had said that sovereignty of the nation lies with the people, Thapa said the problem of restoring democracy had been addressed, but Nepal still needed to deal with the Maoists. Thapa said he was glad the political parties, including the CPN-UML, were insisting that the Maoists had to hand in their weapons to join the political mainstream. Maoists Still a Problem, Militarily -------------- ¶3. (C) General Thapa said he felt the Maoists were "still a danger." He stated that the Maoists had realized they cannot defeat the RNA militarily, but that, according to the RNA's information, the Maoists would not stop until they achieved their ultimate goal of establishing a totalitarian state. He noted that the Maoist aim had been for protests to continue in order to provoke the RNA to kill more civilians; the Maoists would have then formed a parallel government to unite with the political parties against the RNA - the only force capable of containing the Maoists. Thapa explained that the RNA had lacked the air and firepower to defeat them during recent attacks in the west, including at Butwal (Ref B),but were able to prevent a Maoist victory. He noted that RNA defensive positions were strong, but that the Maoists could ambush security force patrols and also strike them with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The COAS acknowledged that some of the RNA units were inexperienced and lacked training. COAS Thapa On RNA's Military Capabilities -------------- ¶4. (C) Thapa stressed that the RNA was in "genuine need." The RNA had 10,000 troops without weapons. He added that some of its other weapons were 40 years old. He lamented that although the RNA had been able to conduct effective air attacks, it did not have any more rockets for its helicopters. He acknowledged that the RNA had difficulty buying ammunition on the international market. He hoped that the embargo on military assistance would stop. He explained that China, the only source country not requiring Indian overflight permission, had not supplied much due to its sensitivities vis-a-vis India. In response to A/S Boucher's question about Maoist supplies, Thapa replied that Maoist arms came from India. A/S Boucher suggested that Nepal work with India to try to stop shipments. Thapa said that Nepal had had a security consultative group with India, which stopped following the King's February 2005 takeover. Need Military Assistance -------------- ¶5. (C) A/S Boucher told COAS Thapa that the U.S. looked forward to cooperating with Nepal to see how we could help. He explained that we were waiting for the civilian leadership to tell us what we could do - economically, politically, and militarily. Thapa said that he had met with PM Koirala on May 1 to make a case for keeping the RNA intact as a force to support democracy and to discuss the RNA receiving military assistance. Thapa noted that Koirala seemed to realize the new government needed to keep the RNA strong. A/S Boucher said that the U.S. was willing to resume security assistance upon the request of the civilian government. A/S Boucher explained that we could probably resume training first and later work the question of resuming supplies in Washington. Thapa said that a U.S. statement in support of the RNA and mentioning the possibility of resuming security assistance could have a positive impact, psychologically. Thapa also made a push for receiving the 3,600 M-16s in storage, explaining that the Maoists had been unable to overrun any RNA position armed with M-16s. A/S Boucher assured Thapa that the U.S. would look at all of these issues as soon as we received a request from the new government. The Ambassador encouraged the COAS to continue to look at ways to improve the RNA's human rights record. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Thapa is ready to work with the new civilian government. However, he remains worried about Maoist intentions and capabilities, and the RNA's capacity to meet a renewed threat. When the civilian government makes a request for the U.S. to resume security assistance, we should be ready to respond immediately. The Ambassador was joined by DATT Lt.Col. Taylor and Political/Economic Chief Shelton. ¶7. (U) A/S Boucher and NSC Millard have cleared this cable. MORIARTY