NORTHERN UGANDA: GOVERNMENT MAXIMIZING PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001616 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AF/SPG, DRL, INR, PRM E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016 TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL PGOV WCI UG SU SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: GOVERNMENT MAXIMIZING PEACE OPTIONS REF: KAMPALA 1601 KAMPALA 00001616 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political/Economic Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Government of Uganda's efforts to expand its options regarding the Lord's Resistance Army and the Juba Peace Talks intensified over the past week. These include consulting with Sudanese Vice President Salva Kiir, opening direct discussions with LRA number two Vincent Otti and pursuing multilateral discussions on potential military operations should the talks fail. The Government also is considering the consequences of no firm resolution or clear failure at Juba and the possibility that LRA leader Joseph Kony could evade a military strike. So far, the GOU is demonstrating a great deal of flexibility and patience despite the seeming lack of progress in the negotiations, including considering agreeing to the assembly of LRA combatants in southern Sudan as a pre-condition for a cease-fire. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - SITUATION UPDATE - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Speculation continues over the location and/or plans of Joseph Kony to relocate from Congo to Central African Republic (CAR). Biselele Wa Mutshipayi, Congolese Charge d'Affaires to Kampala, pointed out on a map Kony's likely destination along the CAR-Sudan-Congo border near Obo. According to Congolese government's information, Kony and some of his fighters have been to this location, which is 123 miles from his hideout at Garamba. He speculated that Kony has a genuine fear that the Ugandan military and UN forces will attack him if the talks fail. He said that Kony and Otti--who may not be in the same place--are being well-supplied with food and communications equipment. Another interlocutor told us that Otti now has four new Thuraya satellite telephones. Congo is concerned that Kony is receiving outside support, possibly from parts of the Sudanese Government, according to the Charge. Mutshipayi also expressed concern that a weekly Ugandan newspaper named specific locations of LRA soldiers and commanders in Congo, which he says, could only have come from the Ugandan military, which means that elements of the Ugandan army was in Congo to gather it. ¶3. (C) At Juba, the LRA presented additional demands, which the GOU rejected. The paper calls for the distribution of thirty percent of government appointees at various levels be from the north and east and a similar distribution of economic resources. LRA also wants a Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Commission for Northern and Eastern Uganda to be controlled by the north and east. The Sudanese mediation is reconciling the various position papers, which have all now been presented. Meanwhile, Internal Affairs Minister Ruhakana Rugunda, the head of the Ugandan delegation is talking directly to Vincent Otti by telephone on a daily basis. Northern parliamentarians report that Kony and Otti have called them for their views on the GOU's sincerity and the capacity of northerners to accept ex-LRA back. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - UGANDAN PLAN A: INITIATIVES TO MAKE TALKS SUCCEED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) The Ugandan Government continues its two-track approach to negotiating: one venue is Juba, the other "venue" is direct conversations with Vincent Otti at Garamba. Rugunda is trying to persuade Otti to make a gesture, such as releasing the women and children, as a demonstration of good faith, in part to appease the sections of the international community which want the ICC indictments honored. In response to Kony's reported concerns about the feelings of Ugandans outside of Acholiland, President Museveni has tasked parliamentarians and local stakeholders to devise a hybrid reconciliation mechanism that could work across ethnic groups. Another Government plan includes creating "reintegration" camps for returning LRA that would give them time to consider their future options in terms of relocation, provide vocational training and other forms education, and protection from local populations, if needed. The Government continues its efforts to encourage LRA defections, which included seven mid-level officers/commanders this week, according to a military source. Ugandan newspapers speculate that the Government is looking for another country to take KAMPALA 00001616 002.2 OF 002 Kony because he may fear coming back to Uganda. Museveni had previously approached Libya, South Sudan, and Tanzania, according to Betty Bigombe. Libya allegedly agreed. Museveni stopped in Libya on his way home from Germany last week but we have no information on the details of the visit. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - UGANDAN PLAN B: TALKS FAIL, PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY OPTION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Ugandan military spokesmen have made public comments signaling the potential for a military strike if the talks fail. The Congolese charge and members of the Ugandan Peace Support team confirm that there have been discussions between Uganda, Congo, and the Government of South Sudan about a multilateral approach to exercising a military option. The Congolese insist that this takes the form of a multilateral approach that include MONUC. Another condition for Congo is that this option is held off until after the second round of Congolese elections in mid-October. The LRA response, likely triggered by press reports of "Plan B", has been to recall its members from northern Uganda and southern Sudan to Congo and disperse them into small units to lessen the blow of a potential Ugandan strike. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SITUATION C: NO CLEAR RESOLUTION, KONY GETS OUT-OF-REACH - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) The GOU clearly wants to avoid a situation in which Kony is able to escape from the military and international pressure that have brought about negotiations. In this scenario, the LRA does not agree to surrender, relocates outside Congo and finds new or old patrons, and joins forces with other disaffected Ugandans in scattered rebel groups. This would make it impossible for the GOU neutralize the Kony threat. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶7. (C) The Sudanese mediators have their hands full, given the GOU's goal is to hammer out the details of an LRA surrender and the LRA's objective is to avoid international prosecution. Nonetheless, the GOU continues to seek ways to accommodate some of the LRA's requests to keep it engaged in the peace process and to keep the negotiations moving. For example, we are hearing that the Government may be willing to agree to some conditions for a cease-fire, such as the assembly of LRA fighters in designated areas of southern Sudan as a pre-condition. We have been called to a briefing by the Minister of Defense later today on the details. BROWNING