Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL855
2006-02-28 04:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
PRT FARAH - ASSESSMENT OF 10 FEBRUARY ATTACK
VZCZCXRO0874 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHBUL #0855/01 0590402 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 280402Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8570 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5612 RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL RUEATRS/US TREASURY WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000855
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, G KATE
FRIEDRICH, G/IWI CHARLOTTE PONTICELLI AND DIANNE GRAHAM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT FARAH - ASSESSMENT OF 10 FEBRUARY ATTACK
Classified By: A/POL COUNSELOR MARY TOWNSWICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000855
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, G KATE
FRIEDRICH, G/IWI CHARLOTTE PONTICELLI AND DIANNE GRAHAM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT FARAH - ASSESSMENT OF 10 FEBRUARY ATTACK
Classified By: A/POL COUNSELOR MARY TOWNSWICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D)
1. (C) Summary. PRT Farah was attacked by rockets and
mortar rounds, followed by small arms fire, in the early
morning of February 10. Although no injuries or damage
occurred, the well-coordinated attack demonstrated the
growing sophistication of anti-Coalition elements. This and
similar events this year indicate the ACM and their allies
are attempting to increase their influence in Farah Province.
The PRT is reassessing the Farah environment and taking
operational and tactical precautions to prepare for further
hostilities. End Summary.
--------------
The Attack
--------------
2. (C) A 27 minute attack rocked PRT Farah at almost exactly
0100 on February 10. The attack comprised four 107 rocket
rounds and eleven 82mm mortar rounds, followed by small arms
fire. It was carried out by three separate groups, requiring
a level of coordination and synchronization not usually seen
in Farah. NDS and ANP recovered a car battery believed used
for launching 107 rockets and a 30 meter detonation cable
used to fire the rockets.
--------------
Where,d They Come From? Where,d They Go?
--------------
3. (S/NF) On February 12, GOA officials met with PRT
Commander and PRT Poloff to assess further action. GoA
officials included Provincial Governor Isatullah Wasifi, NDS
Chief Naqshband, ANP Commander Agha and ANA 1/1 Kandak
Commander LTC Ghulam Hassan. GoA officials believed at least
18 men were responsible for the attack against the ISAF PRT.
Initial evaluations indicate they were Taliban members from
Helmand and/or Nimroz Province who traveled north to Shewan
in Bala Balouk District to initiate the attack. It is
believed they traveled to Bakwa District after the attack.
With a sparse population, flat terrain and arid weather
conditions, Bakwa is an area notorious for narcotics-related
activities. As GoA security presence outside of Farah City
are minimal, law enforcement is difficult. GoA officials
assured the PRT the perpetrators coerced local villagers into
providing assistance, and did not receive it voluntarily.
Naqshband and Wasifi agreed that while Bakwa District
Manager, Asadullah Noorzai, might not be an open Taliban
sympathizer, he was ineffective as a manager and most likely
complicit in the narcotics trade. (Note: The PRT commander
stated the U.S. planned to build a road through Bakwa, but
the project would be on hold until the District Manager was
replaced. Plans to rebuild the recently burned high school
will progress as scheduled. End Note.)
--------------
Just Say &No8(With Firepower
--------------
4. (S/NF) Wasifi pushed for fast action and a strong show
of force. He recommended coordinated ANA/ANP/PRT action with
Helmand and Nimroz provincial security forces and helicopter
support from the PRT. Wasifi claimed he was already in
contact with the governors of Helmand and Nimroz. He felt
swift, decisive action would result in saying &no to drugs
and Taliban.8 The PRT Commander questioned Wasifi,s
knowledge of the other governors' loyalties and ties to the
perpetrators. The PRT commander agreed that an Afghan
security force action would be appropriate, but did not
promise U.S. action or assets. Agha said the ANP would make
arrests, but requested further resources and support. (Note:
The majority of the ANA Kandak is in Herat indefinitely, so
Kandak involvement is tentative. End Note.)
KABUL 00000855 002 OF 002
--------------
Links to Other Hostilities
--------------
5. (S/NF) GoA officials agreed the same individuals who
attacked the PRT probably placed, or are linked to those who
placed, the IED on February 7 which killed four employees of
Gulsan Cukurova, the Turkish company constructing the Ring
Road. NDS Chief Naqshband said we should expect at least
one more local attack, and that the group might be planning
to increase its presence in Bakwa.
--------------
The Forecast
--------------
6. (S/Rel ISAF) GoA officials said the weather was a large
factor in the level of anti-government activity in Farah. As
the weather became colder in the northern provinces,
anti-government activities increased in Farah. Wasifi
believed the trend would continue well into Farah,s summer.
The curfew of 2300-0500 remains in effect.
7. (S/NF) Comment: This attack was the most violent
perpetrated against the PRT to date and demonstrated a new
level of organization and resolve. Swift or coordinated
Afghan action is unlikely. Local forces lack the resources
and training required to be effective. A likely suspect is
Mullah Baz Mohammed, coordinating with Taliban in Nimroz and
Helmand. Baz Mohammed has a history of involvement in
anti-government and anti-Coalition activities in Farah. He
is known to run kidnapping rings; he is suspected of
organizing the August 31, 2005 kidnapping/murder of USPI
employee David Addison; and he was present in the area the
night of the February 7, 2006 IED attack on the USPI convoy.
Another suspect named by GoA officials is Mullah Allouf, who
is unknown to the PRT. GoA officials claim he was recently
released from Gitmo and is currently active in Bakwa. The
PRT is reassessing the Farah environment and taking
operational and tactical precautions to be ready for further
hostilities. End Comment.
NEUMANN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, G KATE
FRIEDRICH, G/IWI CHARLOTTE PONTICELLI AND DIANNE GRAHAM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT FARAH - ASSESSMENT OF 10 FEBRUARY ATTACK
Classified By: A/POL COUNSELOR MARY TOWNSWICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D)
1. (C) Summary. PRT Farah was attacked by rockets and
mortar rounds, followed by small arms fire, in the early
morning of February 10. Although no injuries or damage
occurred, the well-coordinated attack demonstrated the
growing sophistication of anti-Coalition elements. This and
similar events this year indicate the ACM and their allies
are attempting to increase their influence in Farah Province.
The PRT is reassessing the Farah environment and taking
operational and tactical precautions to prepare for further
hostilities. End Summary.
--------------
The Attack
--------------
2. (C) A 27 minute attack rocked PRT Farah at almost exactly
0100 on February 10. The attack comprised four 107 rocket
rounds and eleven 82mm mortar rounds, followed by small arms
fire. It was carried out by three separate groups, requiring
a level of coordination and synchronization not usually seen
in Farah. NDS and ANP recovered a car battery believed used
for launching 107 rockets and a 30 meter detonation cable
used to fire the rockets.
--------------
Where,d They Come From? Where,d They Go?
--------------
3. (S/NF) On February 12, GOA officials met with PRT
Commander and PRT Poloff to assess further action. GoA
officials included Provincial Governor Isatullah Wasifi, NDS
Chief Naqshband, ANP Commander Agha and ANA 1/1 Kandak
Commander LTC Ghulam Hassan. GoA officials believed at least
18 men were responsible for the attack against the ISAF PRT.
Initial evaluations indicate they were Taliban members from
Helmand and/or Nimroz Province who traveled north to Shewan
in Bala Balouk District to initiate the attack. It is
believed they traveled to Bakwa District after the attack.
With a sparse population, flat terrain and arid weather
conditions, Bakwa is an area notorious for narcotics-related
activities. As GoA security presence outside of Farah City
are minimal, law enforcement is difficult. GoA officials
assured the PRT the perpetrators coerced local villagers into
providing assistance, and did not receive it voluntarily.
Naqshband and Wasifi agreed that while Bakwa District
Manager, Asadullah Noorzai, might not be an open Taliban
sympathizer, he was ineffective as a manager and most likely
complicit in the narcotics trade. (Note: The PRT commander
stated the U.S. planned to build a road through Bakwa, but
the project would be on hold until the District Manager was
replaced. Plans to rebuild the recently burned high school
will progress as scheduled. End Note.)
--------------
Just Say &No8(With Firepower
--------------
4. (S/NF) Wasifi pushed for fast action and a strong show
of force. He recommended coordinated ANA/ANP/PRT action with
Helmand and Nimroz provincial security forces and helicopter
support from the PRT. Wasifi claimed he was already in
contact with the governors of Helmand and Nimroz. He felt
swift, decisive action would result in saying &no to drugs
and Taliban.8 The PRT Commander questioned Wasifi,s
knowledge of the other governors' loyalties and ties to the
perpetrators. The PRT commander agreed that an Afghan
security force action would be appropriate, but did not
promise U.S. action or assets. Agha said the ANP would make
arrests, but requested further resources and support. (Note:
The majority of the ANA Kandak is in Herat indefinitely, so
Kandak involvement is tentative. End Note.)
KABUL 00000855 002 OF 002
--------------
Links to Other Hostilities
--------------
5. (S/NF) GoA officials agreed the same individuals who
attacked the PRT probably placed, or are linked to those who
placed, the IED on February 7 which killed four employees of
Gulsan Cukurova, the Turkish company constructing the Ring
Road. NDS Chief Naqshband said we should expect at least
one more local attack, and that the group might be planning
to increase its presence in Bakwa.
--------------
The Forecast
--------------
6. (S/Rel ISAF) GoA officials said the weather was a large
factor in the level of anti-government activity in Farah. As
the weather became colder in the northern provinces,
anti-government activities increased in Farah. Wasifi
believed the trend would continue well into Farah,s summer.
The curfew of 2300-0500 remains in effect.
7. (S/NF) Comment: This attack was the most violent
perpetrated against the PRT to date and demonstrated a new
level of organization and resolve. Swift or coordinated
Afghan action is unlikely. Local forces lack the resources
and training required to be effective. A likely suspect is
Mullah Baz Mohammed, coordinating with Taliban in Nimroz and
Helmand. Baz Mohammed has a history of involvement in
anti-government and anti-Coalition activities in Farah. He
is known to run kidnapping rings; he is suspected of
organizing the August 31, 2005 kidnapping/murder of USPI
employee David Addison; and he was present in the area the
night of the February 7, 2006 IED attack on the USPI convoy.
Another suspect named by GoA officials is Mullah Allouf, who
is unknown to the PRT. GoA officials claim he was recently
released from Gitmo and is currently active in Bakwa. The
PRT is reassessing the Farah environment and taking
operational and tactical precautions to be ready for further
hostilities. End Comment.
NEUMANN