ISAF RESPONSE TO ANTI-CARTOON RIOTS: "RESTRAINT,"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000725 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT PASS P FOR U/S BURNS DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI USNATO FOR AMB NULAND NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AF SUBJECT: ISAF RESPONSE TO ANTI-CARTOON RIOTS: "RESTRAINT," RELIANCE ON ANP, AND GAPS IN CAPABILITY REF: USDAO OSLO IIR 6 872 0101 06 KABUL 00000725 001.6 OF 004 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. Summary: Last week,s cartoon-related demonstrations, several of them violent and with loss of life, provide an opportunity to assess ISAF,s capability and willingness to respond to violent confrontations in its current areas of responsibility (RACs North and West, and Kabul). In Maimana, the acting PRT commander, a Finn, exercised restraint (perhaps too much restraint) in response to extreme provocation, but also had counted on police protection that was not forthcoming. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) support was delayed due to limited ISAF airlift capacity. The attack on the Danish Embassy showed the limitations in ISAF,s rules of engagement (ROE) for protection of diplomats and international civilians, leading the Danes at least to reassess their own Embassy force protection. Recent violence in Herat also showed that the PRT did not consider intervention in a very violent Sunni-Shia dispute leading to numerous casualties to be within its mandate. As the attention of the GOA and ISAF turns to the south and ISAF,s capabilities continue to be stretched, last week,s events highlight the need for ISAF to review its capacity to maintain security in the north and west should it be faced with either a sharp upsurge of violence or a gradual slippage linked to criminal and narcotic activity. We believe the problems noted here need to be discussed with senior officials in NATO nations. However, we ask that all sources be strictly protected. End summary. PRT Maimana -------------- ¶2. (C) Per reftel, attacks on PRT Maimana (RAC North) began at 0630 on February 7, consisting of small arms, automatic weapons fire, grenades, RPG rockets, incendiary devices, and rocks. While the ISAF forces at the PRT had implicit authorization to respond to the attacks with lethal force ("right of imminent self-defense"),and while some live rounds were fired into the crowd by PRT soldiers, the acting PRT commander (the Finnish XO) relied primarily on warning shots, stun grenades, rubber bullets and tear gas to deter the rioters. ¶3. (C) ISAF officials in Kabul emphasized the inability of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Maimana to assist in protecting the PRT. Although 200 ANP troops were physically present in their compound located next door to the PRT, the Chief of Police did not authorize police assistance in quelling the riot for several hours, despite repeated requests by the PRT and in Kabul by COMISAF to MoI. ¶4. (C) Due to limitations in air lift capability, the British QRF from Mazar-e Sharif (a 20-minute flight away) arrived in Maimana City about at 1030, about two and one-half hours after the PRT requested KABUL 00000725 002.8 OF 004 support and four hours after the violence started. After securing the airport the QRF arrived at the PRT at around noon. (ISAF F-16s engaged more quickly followed by Coalition A-10s, but did not have much effect on the rioters.) ¶5. (C) Coordination between the PRT and Afghan National Army (ANA) was lacking. This was exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. ANA embedded trainers report through the Coalition chain of command and have little routine contact with ISAF forces or the PRT. ISAF officials acknowledge that at present their PRTs have only limited capacity to partner with Afghan security forces. (Note: this situation is very different from that of U.S. PRTs, which work much more closely with both ANA and ANP. End note.) Danish Embassy -------------- ¶6. (C) In a conversation with poloff, ISAF Polad Carlo Batori and Acting Deputy COMISAF Li Gobbi reviewed ISAF rules of engagement with regard to diplomatic and non-official staff and facilities. They noted, and Danish Embassy has confirmed, that all Danish personnel had been evacuated from the Embassy by the time the riots started. (Note: Danish officials credit MoI with alerting them to the danger in time to remove their staff. End note.) ISAF ROE limits response to "in extremis" support of diplomatic personnel, not protection of Embassy property ) something that disappointed the Danes, who had expected more. Danish Acting DCM Marianne Olesen also noted that their Embassy was not allowed to work directly with Danish troops deployed to Kabul as part of ISAF, saying it was very frustrating not to be able to get support from their own national forces on the ground. Other Locations -------------- ¶7. (C) The anti-cartoon riots in other parts of ISAF areas did not reach the level of violence seen in Maimana, and PRT forces were able to work better with ANA and ANP to quell them before they got out of hand. However, in a separate incident last week, sectarian fighting in Herat led to the burning of a Shia mosque and the death of at least four civilians as well as over 100 injuries and significant damage to local businesses. ISAF reported the incident through its chain but it is significant that the PRT did not attempt to defuse the incident, which was seen as an internal Afghan problem. ¶8. (C) ISAF officials also acknowledged that should the riots have spread to attacks on NGOs, in Kabul or in the provinces, ISAF ROE does not provide for active protection of international personnel, although PRTs can offer them shelter and ISAF will arrange for quick extraction. ISAF officials note that this is not explicitly part of the ISAF mandate but something they are willing to do. Lessons Learned KABUL 00000725 003.10 OF 004 -------------- ¶9. (C) Maimana: Last week,s events, together with the potential for continuing or increasing violence even in traditionally &quiet8 areas of Afghanistan, should prompt ISAF and NATO contributing nations to review their approach and training for PRT command and staff. The preferred posture of many countries appears to be one of minimal force response, an approach that may be valid in some cases but not when violence becomes life-threatening. Opinions may differ on whether the acting PRT commander exercised correct judgment in the face of grenade and RPG attacks, but NATO/ISAF should ensure that commanders and their deputies have sufficient training to make these decisions. With regard to the lack of police response, ISAF argues that it stemmed from a fundamental failure of leadership in Faryab province ) they believe the present governor and police chief are not only incompetent, they are also tied in to the political factions which were involved in, and may have instigated, these riots. ISAF leadership will approach President Karzai next week to request a complete change of leadership in Faryab. (Note: This is ironic since Prisdent Karzai has twice asked ISAF to work with MoI and MoD to find a solution to loss of GOA control in Faryab, and ISAF has found its current mandate inadequate to the task. End note.) ISAF,s reliance on the ANP for protection shows an inherent weakness in its approach that should be addressed. ¶10. (C) Danish Embassy attack: ISAF officials, while defending the ROE that shaped the response to last week,s attack, say they are reviewing the level of ISAF support for diplomatic missions, especially smaller ones. In particular, they intend to establish permanent liaison personnel to each mission and to step up their advisory role, including an offer to review embassy force protection plans and offer suggestions. Polad Batori, who was previously DCM at the Italian Embassy, said that the present ISAF contingent has, in his view, actually been the most proactive of those he has seen in his three years here. However, Danish A/DCM Olesen told poloff that the primary lesson they learned from last week was not to rely on ISAF for anything short of in extremis protection ) the Danes are increasing the number of local police protecting the compound and are also hiring private security. ¶11. (C) Other areas: ISAF engagement in local security situations in which it is not directly affected remains extremely limited. This includes defending against attacks on foreigners such as NGOs and intervening in sectarian and other violence. Larger Issues -------------- ¶12. (C) Kabul observers remain deeply concerned by the lack of capacity of ISAF forces ) particularly where ANP and ANA are unable to provide necessary protection. When poloff asked whether a change in mandate or ROE would help ISAF in responding to KABUL 00000725 004.6 OF 004 emergency situations, A/Dep COMISAF Gobbi replied that a broader mandate would not do any good without the capacity to support it. He pointed out that ISAF forces are already stretched very thin. Moreover he noted that attention to Phase III expansion has brought with it a decreased attention to shortfalls in Phase I and II areas, where needed backfills are still lacking. Air support remains a critical problem, especially with regard to inter- theater transport. As Gobbi noted, this is a high cost, low visibility asset for member nations, who do not reap much political benefit for their donation. The limitation on air lift that affected the QRF response in Maimana is a nation-wide shortage which will only be exacerbated with the expansion to the south. The ISAF Military Advisor also noted that the recent attention to the south and relative lack of attention to the east and north appears to be shared by the GOA, which may weaken security in those areas. For example, MoD successfully moved a battalion of ANA from Herat to Helmand February 7-12. While this move was essential given recent events in Helmand, the Milad warned that there is also a need to keep the rear areas safe as well. Much planning appears to be predicated on the assumption that the &quiet8 areas will remain quiet, something that can no longer be taken for granted. NEUMANN