TERRORIST LISTS - AFGHANISTAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005902 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A DEPT ALSO FOR EB/ESC/TFS:LEANNE CANNON, S/CT:PATTY HILL, AND IO/PSC:JOHN SANDAGE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2016 TAGS: EFIN ETTC KTFN KVPR PREL PTER AF SUBJECT: TERRORIST LISTS - AFGHANISTAN REF: A. KABUL 5893 ¶B. STATE 193615 KABUL 00005902 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1.(S/NF) SUMMARY: The concept of developing a terrorist list is new to the GOA. Some elements appear enthusiastic, while others are more caustious. In meetings at the MFA and Central Bank, Deputy Econ Counselor stressed the importance of developing a GOA list and using it to freeze accounts of Taliban, HIG, and other insurgent leaders. Since the Central Bank Deputy Governor indicated the Central Bank has not yet acted on the UNSCR 1267 list, Post intends to suggest this list as a good starting point for the GOA. The Central Bank is seeking USG assistance in advancing Afghanistan's application for membership in the Egmont Group of financial intelligence units (FIUs). END SUMMARY. 2.(S/NF) Following delivery of ref A demarche, Deputy Econ Counselor asked both First Deputy Central Bank Governor Ibrahimi and MFA Multilateral Affairs Director Andisha if Afghanistan maintained a list of terrorist organizations (ref B). Both stated that the GOA did not have a such a list. However, Andisha immediately commented that developing such a list and using it to freeze accounts of Taliban and HIG leaders would be an advantageous tool in the war. He noted that the MFA maintained a list of known criminals that were barred from obtaining visas and/or passports and enthusiastically suggested that it could be culled to form the basis of a terrorist list. Thinking more broadly, Andisha suggested that once complete, the list could be passed to the UAE and Australia with a request that these governments take action to freeze the accounts of individuals and entities on the list. He cited the UAE because it is a source of funding for the Taliban, while Australia is the source of HIG fundraising. Gaining enthusiasm as the conversation continued, Andisha said he would send a memo to Foreign Minister Spanta with this recommendation. 3.(S/NF) On the other hand, Central Bank Deputy Governor Ibrahimi was more cautious. He stressed that the Central Bank had not yet utilized the power to freeze accounts granted by the new Anti-Money Laundering law. In response to a question, Ibrahimi stated that the Central Bank had not acted to instruct its banks to identify and freeze accounts of individuals and entities on the UNSCR 1267 list. Deputy Econ Counselor suggested that the Central Bank's development of a GOA terrorist list and the use of it to freeze accounts of Taliban, HIG, and other insurgent leaders would send a powerful message that the GOA had every intention of prosecuting the war by every means available. Ibrahimi listened carefully, made no commitments for action, and commented that the Central Bank had just stood up its Financial Intelligence Unit, which was now receiving hundreds of bank reports per month. Deputy Econ Counselor applauded this development, but stressed that intelligence collection is only half the equation, the Central Bank now needed to send a message that its regulatory enforcement arm was prepared to act. 4.(S/NF) When Deputy Econ Counselor related the MFA's enthusiasm for developing a list and delivering it to the UAE, Ibrahimi noted that the UAE Central Bank had refused to sign an intelligence-sharing MOU with Afghanistan's Financial Intelligence Unit because Afghanistan is not yet a member of the Egmont Group. He indicated that the Egmont Group had accepted Afghanistan's application and is awaiting letters of recommendation from the United States and Canada before accepting the application. Deputy Econ Counselor indicated that it might be good timing after Afghanistan becomes an Egmont Group member to present the UAEG with a second request to sign an FIU intel cooperation MOU and provide it with Afghanistan's list of terrorist entities with a request for action to identify and freeze accounts. Ibrahimi appeared to acknowledge the merit of the idea. KABUL 00005902 002.2 OF 002 5.(S/NF) COMMENT: Convincing the Central Bank to issue instructions to banks to identify and freeze accounts of known terrorist organizations and entities would send a strong signal to the banking community that the GOA is serious about combating money-laundering activities by the insurgency. Since the UNSCR 1267 list specifically targets Usama bin Ladin, Al-Qaida, and the Taliban, we intend to suggest to the GOA that the 1267 list would be a good place to start the development of its own list. As we cooperate on these ideas, we note that the Central Bank's supervision department is weak, but actual enforcement activity may strengthen it. We will work closely with the MFA and Central Bank to press for creation of a GOA list and look for opportunities for action both within Afghanistan and abroad. If the Afghans subsequently should agree to approach foreign governments with the GOA list and request for action to freeze accounts, it may prove useful for the U.S. either to participate in such demarches or to follow up on GOA actions. END COMMENT. NEUMANN