Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5889
2006-12-18 11:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
SENATOR MCCAIN AND KARZAI DIFFER OVER PAKISTAN
VZCZCXRO7692 OO RUEHDBU DE RUEHBUL #5889 3521111 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 181111Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4953 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3426
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 005889
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: SENATOR MCCAIN AND KARZAI DIFFER OVER PAKISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 005889
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: SENATOR MCCAIN AND KARZAI DIFFER OVER PAKISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Over a December 15 dinner, Senator McCain and
President Karzai disagreed over the extent to which the
Government of Pakistan was supporting the Taliban and
terrorism in Afghanistan. Karzai,s theme throughout the
evening was that Afghans see Pakistan as entirely intertwined
with Taliban efforts to destabilize Afghanistan and that
Afghans overwhelmingly believe the problem of the Taliban is
fundamentally a Pakistani problem. Karzai deflected
suggestions that he tone down his rhetoric attacking Pakistan
and argued that the people,s attention had to be pointed to
the cause of their suffering, "otherwise the people will get
confused".
2. (C) Pakistan did not know what was in its own interests,
Karzai contended. If Pakistan was still dreaming of creating
an "Islamic Empire", then it would have to deal with Islamic
extremism, but it would only get "burned". Karzai repeated a
regular but deeply believed litany, saying he received
regular messages from Afghans living in Pakistan describing
how the Taliban were protected and even moved around by the
Pakistan military. Defense Minister Wardak, who worked with
ISI for 15 years against the Soviets, debunked any notions of
rogue elements in the ISI. He claimed no one in the ISI
could make a move without the military chief knowing it and
that the ISI supported the Taliban financially.
3. (C) Senator McCain respectfully, firmly and repeatedly
disagreed with Karzai over Pakistani intentions, as it &made
no sense8 for President Musharraf to create an unstable
neighbor. The Senator characterized Musharraf as an
honorable military man but questioned why he did not do more.
Senator McCain viewed the North Waziristan Agreement as a
Faustian bargain, but did not see Musharraf,s motives as
evil. A destabilized region was not in Pakistan,s interest.
The Senator suggested some thought be given to conditioning
U.S. aid to Pakistan, as it was not a tolerable situation if
U.S. soldiers were dying due to Pakistani inaction. The
Senator said he had to part ways with Karzai as he did not
accept the premise that Pakistan was destabilizing
Afghanistan intentionally.
4. (C) Karzai pursued his criticism of Pakistan throughout
the dinner, at one point arguing that Pakistan wanted to
frustrate the U.S. in Afghanistan and dreamt of controlling
Afghanistan again. One result is that the Taliban and Al
Qaeda are now one, he claimed, which was not the case 10
years ago. Karzai gave no indication he would tone down his
rhetoric. Ambassador Neumann argued that the language made
our controlling Pakistani behavior harder and passed on the
request from Secretary Rice to stop the public condemnation.
Karzai justified his attacks on Pakistan as part of a bigger
cause. He firmly believed his role was to inform the Afghan
people about who he sees as responsible for Afghanistan,s
problems and feels that if the government does not tell them,
they will lose the whole purpose of the war on terror.
Karzai said NATO must choose whether it will confront
Pakistan or just ignore the loss of its soldiers.
5. (U) This message was not cleared by Senator McCain.
NEUMANN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: SENATOR MCCAIN AND KARZAI DIFFER OVER PAKISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Over a December 15 dinner, Senator McCain and
President Karzai disagreed over the extent to which the
Government of Pakistan was supporting the Taliban and
terrorism in Afghanistan. Karzai,s theme throughout the
evening was that Afghans see Pakistan as entirely intertwined
with Taliban efforts to destabilize Afghanistan and that
Afghans overwhelmingly believe the problem of the Taliban is
fundamentally a Pakistani problem. Karzai deflected
suggestions that he tone down his rhetoric attacking Pakistan
and argued that the people,s attention had to be pointed to
the cause of their suffering, "otherwise the people will get
confused".
2. (C) Pakistan did not know what was in its own interests,
Karzai contended. If Pakistan was still dreaming of creating
an "Islamic Empire", then it would have to deal with Islamic
extremism, but it would only get "burned". Karzai repeated a
regular but deeply believed litany, saying he received
regular messages from Afghans living in Pakistan describing
how the Taliban were protected and even moved around by the
Pakistan military. Defense Minister Wardak, who worked with
ISI for 15 years against the Soviets, debunked any notions of
rogue elements in the ISI. He claimed no one in the ISI
could make a move without the military chief knowing it and
that the ISI supported the Taliban financially.
3. (C) Senator McCain respectfully, firmly and repeatedly
disagreed with Karzai over Pakistani intentions, as it &made
no sense8 for President Musharraf to create an unstable
neighbor. The Senator characterized Musharraf as an
honorable military man but questioned why he did not do more.
Senator McCain viewed the North Waziristan Agreement as a
Faustian bargain, but did not see Musharraf,s motives as
evil. A destabilized region was not in Pakistan,s interest.
The Senator suggested some thought be given to conditioning
U.S. aid to Pakistan, as it was not a tolerable situation if
U.S. soldiers were dying due to Pakistani inaction. The
Senator said he had to part ways with Karzai as he did not
accept the premise that Pakistan was destabilizing
Afghanistan intentionally.
4. (C) Karzai pursued his criticism of Pakistan throughout
the dinner, at one point arguing that Pakistan wanted to
frustrate the U.S. in Afghanistan and dreamt of controlling
Afghanistan again. One result is that the Taliban and Al
Qaeda are now one, he claimed, which was not the case 10
years ago. Karzai gave no indication he would tone down his
rhetoric. Ambassador Neumann argued that the language made
our controlling Pakistani behavior harder and passed on the
request from Secretary Rice to stop the public condemnation.
Karzai justified his attacks on Pakistan as part of a bigger
cause. He firmly believed his role was to inform the Afghan
people about who he sees as responsible for Afghanistan,s
problems and feels that if the government does not tell them,
they will lose the whole purpose of the war on terror.
Karzai said NATO must choose whether it will confront
Pakistan or just ignore the loss of its soldiers.
5. (U) This message was not cleared by Senator McCain.
NEUMANN