PRT KANDAHAR: ANAP IMPLEMENTATION SNAPSHOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005865 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, EUR/RPM NSC FOR AHARRIMAN CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF SUBJECT: PRT KANDAHAR: ANAP IMPLEMENTATION SNAPSHOT Classified By: DCM Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (a) and (b) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police program (ANAP) is underway in Kandahar. Chief of Police General Esmatullah Alizai, accompanied by Kandahar PRT(KPRT), has convened three recruiting shuras. A large training class of nearly 300 recruits just graduated from the RTC, and will join the 281 ANAP already out in the districts; a new class of 300 is now underway. While more training time would be useful, trainers are satisfied with the curriculum and the results under the circumstances. Rapid expansion of the ANAP may pose significant command and control challenges given the state of the ANP -- which is supposed to play a leadership role over raw ANAP recruits. Panjwayi and Zharay are cited as examples. Canada, buffeted by the security challenges in Kandahar, wants the ANAP tashkils (approved manpower allotments) for each of these two dangerous districts raised to 250. END SUMMARY Recruiting and Training -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Three shuras have been held in Kandahar Province to recruit for the ANAP. Two of these have been at the Provincial Council with elders from various districts and one was in Panjwayi. Chief of Police General Esmatullah Alizai led these shuras personally. KPRT Commander, Political Director, and CIVPOL elements have attended as well. An additional 1131 recruits have been vetted and registered for training. The registration process is functioning well, but questions remain about the effectiveness of the screening process. There were serious concerns regarding the quality of recruits for the first class. Only 75 out of more than 200 recruits graduated from the two week program. Many were unprepared for a disciplined training approach and a significant number were found to be in possession of hashish, resulting in their dismissal from the class and disqualification from the ANAP program. Training is now proceeding more smoothly. Nearly 300 recruits are in the current class. ¶3. (SBU) The Kandahar Regional Training Center (RTC) ANAP training program represents a combined effort on the part of the Ministry of Interior, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),Afghanistan National Police (ANP),Canadian CivPol and military police, as well as DynCorp. The training emphasizes military policing tactics and officer safety skills. The training familiarizes the recruits with civilian policing concepts. Given the illiteracy of the vast majority of the recruits, the training is mainly hands-on rather than theoretical. The three classroom days include introductions to: the Afghan Constitution, Police Values and Ethics, Democratic Policing -- Human Dignity, Chain-of-Command Authority, Crime Scene Management, Use of Force -- Human Rights, and Personal Hygiene. The seven days of hands-on training include units on: police station security, first aid, individual movement techniques, buddy team movement techniques, hand and arm signals, unit movement, reaction to ambush, breaking contact, road blocks, reconnaissance, high-risk take downs, weapons familiarization, range safety, firearms training, building searches, vehicle stops, mine/IED awareness, hasty defense, danger crossing and intelligence gathering. Trainers are mindful of the extremely short period of training for new recruits but reasonably well satisfied with the course design and results. This initial 10 days of training will be followed by a week of additional training per quarter. Additionally, it is important to note that this 10 days of training is more training than most of the ANP have received. Although there is an 8-week course for ANP personnel, many of the ANP currently serving have not been allowed by their chiefs to attend the training at the Regional Training Centers (RTC). Police commanders contend they cannot spare their ANP patrolmen for the RTC training course plus associated travel time. Recruitment and Deployment by the Numbers -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Deployment: As of early December, a total of 581 KABUL 00005865 002 OF 004 ANAP have graduated from the RTC ANAP course. The following table, which is current as of late November, is meant only to suggest the district dispersal of allotments, recruits, RTC graduates, and trainees in the districts and various ANP commands outside Kandahar City or the nearby district of Dand: Column 1: Tashkil (allotment) Column 2: Registered/Vetted Column 3: Graduated/Deployed Column 4: Presently in Training Within Districts Mianshin -------------- 150 -- 122 -- 29 -- 9 Panjwayi -------------- 140 -- 138 -- 52 -- 42 Zharay -------------- 100 -- 155 -- 14 -- 108 Arghandab -------------- 100 -- 70 --- 52 -- 14 Maruf -------------- 100 -- 22 --- 0 -- 20 Maywand -------------- 100 -- 118 -- 15 -- 0 Nesh -------------- 100 -- 29 --- 0 -- 29 Ghorak -------------- 80 --- 28 --- 15 -- 11 ShahWaliKot --- 70 --- 89 --- 19 -- 22 Reg -------------- 70 --- 0 -------------- 0 --- 0 Arghestan -------------- 70 --- 5 -------------- 0 --- 2 Shorabak -------------- 60 --- 80 --- 29 -- 5 Daman -------------- 60 --- 39 --- 16 -- 22 Khakrez -------------- 60 --- 36 --- 0 --- 19 Spin Boldak --- 40 --- 66 --- 13 -- 0 Within Kandahar City and Dand Unit 888 (QRF) - 0 -------------- 35 --- 10 -------------- 0 Jananmama -------------- 0 -------------- 0 -------------- 7 -------------- 0 Abdul Rasheed -- 0 -------------- 9 -------------- 0 -------------- 0 Sub-Station 2 -- 0 -------------- 21 -------------- 5 -------------- 0 Niaz Mohammad -- 0 -------------- 0 -------------- 2 -------------- 0 Hazim Khan -------------- 0 -------------- 0 -------------- 3 -------------- 0 Mohammad Raza -- 0 -------------- 0 -------------- 9 -------------- 0 Turialai -------------- 0 -------------- 10 -------------- 0 -------------- 0 Haji Lal Jan --- 0 -------------- 45 -------------- 0 -------------- 0 ¶H. Abdul Hadi -- 0 -------------- 12 -------------- 0 -------------- 0 Crime Branch --- 0 -------------- 2 -------------- 0 -------------- 0 Total -------------- 1300 -- 1131 -- 290 -- 303 ¶5. (SBU) The numbers show that Kandahar authorities are working to get the maximum numbers of ANAP into Panjwayi and Zharay -- even above the levels of the official tashkil in the case of Zharay. KPRT understands that Governor Khalid has authorized the Chief of Police to increase these tashkils to 250 even without blessing from Kabul. The second half of the table, shows the absorption of newly minted ANAP into units within the city (or in the nearby district of Dand). None of these units are authorized ANAP but over 100 recruits for these units are now registered for the training. These unilateral provincial actions are generating pressure on the Ministry of Interior to seek a raise in the authorized personnel cap for auxiliary police beyond the 11,271 patrolmen agreed to by President Karzai. Ultimately, the GOA will depend on the international community, through its donations to the Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan (LOFTA) to pay the salaries for all auxiliary police. Panjwayi and Zharay -- "Ghost Cops" -------------- ¶6. (SBU) According to the MOI Rep to KPRT, Colonel Mohammad Hussein (protect),it is very common to use tashkils to scam the ANP pay system. He cited Panjwayi and Zharay as two relevant examples. The total number of properly trained and registered ANP policemen in Panjwayi is 9 out of a tashkil of ¶104. In Zharay, the figure is an even smaller 3 out of a tashkil of 45. The two districts have had problems with ANP staffing throughout the post-Taliban period. A full tashkil of names is submitted faithfully for payment but inevitably a significant number of the persons whose names are submitted are not even working as police. The extra wages are simply pocketed according to some formula by the leadership. (Comment: This "ghost cop" phenomenon is exactly the situation the new direct pay plan is designed to stop. The procedure now is: A list of personnel is transmitted to the KABUL 00005865 003 OF 004 MOI, the MOI verifies the list and sends this document to the MOF, the MOF then directly deposits the money into a commercial bank and the individual can either go to the bank to be paid or a representative of the bank with a certifying official and CSTC-A or IC mentor proceeds to pay the policemen off of the list.) ¶7. (SBU) Hussein went on to describe the new police chief of Zharay, Agha Ghulam Rasool, as Ahmad Wali Karzai's man. Both he and the district leader are from Karzai's Popalzai tribe, even though the Alizais are the biggest tribe in Zharay. Seven months ago he was a policeman in Kandahar and fled to Helmand to avoid arrest on charges of robbing people. Hussein asserts that through Ahmad Wali Karzai's influence, Ghulam Rasool was appointed Chief of Police in Garmser where he was again accused of robbing the people he was charged to protect. In October, he turned up as the new appointee as Chief of Police in Zharay. Hussein suggested wryly that if this man's reports of killed Taliban were accurate, then there could no Taliban left in all of Kandahar. ¶8. (SBU) The link to the ANAP program is that this same chief, with the help of only three trained and registered ANP, will be controlling the brand new ANAP police force in Zharay. The Colonel acknowledged that the new policemen are supposed to be paid directly, but noted that this only occurs in Kandahar City and perhaps Dand. Likewise, it is very difficult to effectively vet district-level recruits to ensure they will not become "ghost" police -- on a roster only to generate income. The result, he claimed, is that the majority of ANAP recruitment is done directly by district police chiefs. According to information presented in the table in paragraph 4, the ANAP tashkils are 100 (Zharay) and 140 (Panjwayi). Canada urges that these tashkils be raised to 250 each to create a force able to hold ground following upcoming operations. Provincial Police Chief Esmatullah Alizai has promised to do his best to meet this need. Canada seeks an increase in the total tashkil for the province from 1,300 to 2,000 in order to accommodate the needs of these two troubled districts. Yet these auxiliary police might provide few positives and significant negatives if Hussein is correct about the command and control issues. This has been a major Canadian concern since the program was conceived. ¶9. (SBU) A Canadian CIVPOL representaive visited with Zharay district Chief of Police Agha Ghulam Rasool on December 4. Not surprisingly, Rasool's account of the situation there differs from that described above. He acknowledges that he owes his position to Ahmed Wali Karzai and sayshe has a very difficult relationship with Esmatullah Alizai, Kandahar province chief of police. There are 13 checkpoints in the district, of which his forces control 10. He claims that the governor,s 05 Reserve Force also operates in the district and that the individuals manning the other three checkpoints do notrespond to his orders. He claims to have brought along a force of 45 ANP registered in Helmand, but that they have not been paid in eight months. He said an additional 55 ANP (apparently unregistered) remained from the previous command. He also said he was authorized 150 ANAP (vice 155 in the table above). Ghulam Rasoool,s count then varied dramatically from our provincial ANP HQ numbers; however, he claimed that only 60 (vice 108) are currently in training at the Regional Training Center (RTC) and the remaining 90 (vice 33) are waiting for training. Finally, when questioned about tribal affiliations of his force, Ghualm Rasool countered that the ANAP is a national force made up of Afghans and that tribal balance is not required. This assertion is clearly out of step with Afghanistan's international obligations under the London Compact, which requires the fielding of an ethnically balanced police force. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) While off to a good start, the ANAP program still faces many challenges in Kandahar. The wide dispersal of graduates makes it difficult to make generalizations, but we have some reports that at least some of the new ANAP have not been paid on time. (Note: The ANAP are not authorized to be paid until they graduate from training. Additionally, there KABUL 00005865 004 OF 004 is a pre-established pay period in each province. The ANAP may have to wait for up to 30 days to be paid in order for the official authorization for payment to be transmitted to the MOI and for the payment to be coordinated and paid to the bank by the MOF.) It is also clear that provincial authorities are using the program to normalize personnel irregularities within the ANP. As long as large gray areas in registration of personnel, irregularities in wage payments, and use of the governor's operational funds persist in the regular ANP program, then the ANAP will suffer from spillover effects. KPRT will continue to cooperate with CSTC-A, the ANP, and other actors to addressthese concerns and answer additional key questions such as: whether tribal affiliation is properly recorded during the registration process, how big the discrepancies will be between district and ANAP tribal balance; and the success of the recruiting shuras. A strong and effective ANAP presence in Kandahar, especially in Panjawyi and Zharay, is a key element if the security situation is to improve. Timing is critical to have the ANAP prepared to move into the two districts as part of the sequencing of upcoming operations. NEUMANN